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THE

CONTRASTS OF CHRISTIANITY

WITH

HEATHEN AND JEWISH SYSTEMS:

OR

NINE SERMONS

PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS.

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BY

GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A.

LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF EXETER COLLEGE; BAMPTON LECTURER IN 1859

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TO

GEORGE MOBERLY, D.C.L.

HEAD-MASTER OF WINCHESTER SCHOOL,

THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED,

AS A TOKEN OF SINCERE REGARD AND ESTEEM,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THESE Sermons, preached on various occasions, and in many cases at considerable intervals, are not parts of a single scheme, nor even written with direct reference to one another. Yet it was thought that they possessed sufficient unity — if not of plan, at any rate of tone and treatment — to make it desirable that, if they appeared at all, they should appear together. The author has published them at the recommendation of an old and valued friend, who had heard the greater portion, when preached in the University pulpit. He has been induced to give them a title, which is not strictly applicable to the entire number, by a wish to invite the attention of Oxford students to the earlier Sermons of the series, which he would fain hope may be of some service to them in their philosophical studies. He has endeavoured to illustrate the discourses by a few notes, containing (commonly) passages to which he had made allusion in the text, and to which he desires to call special attention. In a few of the longer notes, he has treated subjects which came nearly, though

not quite, within the scope of a discourse; and which, though they could not claim a place in the text, seemed entitled to form part of the volume. His chief object will be gained, if his labours in any way conduce to a more intelligent appreciation of Heathen systems by students, and a clearer understanding of their points of agreement or disagreement with Christianity.

Oxford: January 2, 1861.

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ERRATA.

Page 31, line 24, *dele* the comma after "not" and place a comma after "even."

„ 67, „ 9, *for* "centered" *read* "centred."

„ 82, „ 8, *dele* the comma after "fall."

„ 161, „ 4, *for* "(10)" *read* "(10 *a*)"

„ 169, „ 20, *for* "heathen" *read* "brethren."

„ 245, „ 8, *for* "are" *read* "were."

„ 257, „ 7, last word, *for* ἀντὶ *read* ἀντ'

SERMONS.

SERMON I.

PREACHED ON ADVENT SUNDAY.

JOHN i. 11.

"*And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.*"

SUCH are the words, awful in their simplicity, wherewith the "beloved" apostle enunciated to the world the deepest and most tremendous of all mysteries, "God manifest in the flesh."[a] We, to whom these words are so familiar that they for the most part fall dead upon our ears, raising no sense of fear or wonderment or shrinking reverence, shall assuredly do well to pause, and give up our wayward thoughts and our dull souls, for some brief space at least, to earnest attention and fixed musing on the truth they shadow forth. We shall do well, especially at this season of the year, when the whole Church of Christ turns round to contemplate the Advent of the Son of Man, to cast away from us the worldly and vain hopes, the anxious cares, the selfish longings which so constantly beset our minds, and seek to

[a] 1 Tim. iii. 16.

realise to our thoughts this mystery, that so we may understand our true position in this changeful and transitory scene, and apprehend the real bearing of Christ's coming in the flesh upon ourselves. Hereby may we, perchance, inflame our cold and passionless spirits to the emission of some few sparks of that gratitude, some feeble rays of that love, wherewith our whole nature ought to glow and burn at the bare mention of the great "mystery of godliness;"[b]—or, failing in this respect, we may at least awake to some sense of our miserable and brutish deadness of heart and spirit; and by mourning over it and abhorring ourselves for it, be led on, through God's grace, to better things.

But as the contemplation of this wondrous truth in all its various bearings and manifold aspects plainly requires some considerable space of time for its due performance, and as the Church on this account has set apart a *season* for the purpose, during which each portion of the mighty mystery may receive in turn from us some lengthened meditation,—it will not be necessary on the present occasion to attempt the gigantic task of reviewing within the brief limits of a single discourse the whole doctrine involved in the Incarnation of our Blessed Lord, nor to touch on all the practical obligations connected with it; it will be sufficient to take a single phase of the great truth, and seek to exhibit this in its true light, and evolve from it the duties it necessitates. So shall we be the better able to pursue the subject into that minute detail, without

[b] 1 Tim. iii. 16.

which, however the feelings may be roused, the intellect engaged, or the fancy amused, yet we can scarcely hope that conduct will be influenced, or its intended benefit be derived from the ordinance of preaching. Generalities, however plausible, have little effect on action; nor is the truth easily recognised as such until we particularise. He who of all the sages of antiquity had the deepest insight into man's nature well observed, *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις τὰ μὲν καθόλου, κενότεροι εἶσιν· οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἀληθινώτεροι.*[c]

The one portion of this doctrine, then, which I shall now bring before you, and seek to pursue into detail, is the effect produced by the Incarnation of our Lord on those systems of matter with which we are brought into contact here. For the proper understanding of this subject it will be necessary that we should consider, first, What matter is in and by itself, and of its own proper nature; secondly, What it became by the fall of man, and the curse then pronounced upon it; and, thirdly, What change it has now undergone by the Incarnation of the Son of God. And here let none conceive that an understanding of these points is a dry and barren knowledge, or that inquiry concerning them is mere abstract and useless theorising. The truth is far otherwise. Rather without such understanding and inquiry it is probable that any theorising in which we may engage will be useless, and all the knowledge which we may attain to barren. For as the world we are placed in is a material world, and we are given a material nature, and our life here is a course of actions

[c] Arist. Eth. Nic. II. vii. § 1.

each one of which is in part material, any misconception of the nature of that connection which in reality subsists between the worlds of matter and of spirit will necessarily defile and vitiate the whole current of our lives. Other erroneous opinions can be but occasionally brought into play; but error on this point must unceasingly find a vent in action, and thereby through every moment of our lives be influencing our dispositions. And thus a true belief upon this subject is important, not only as every atom of religious truth is precious, and so all sound faith of consequence; but in an *especial* way, as having an *especial* part allotted to it in the formation of our characters.

To return, then, to the consideration of those three points, concerning which it was proposed to make inquiry,—What is matter in and by itself, and of its own proper nature?

And here, as the inquiry is not so much metaphysical as moral, it will not be needful to attempt any exact definition in reply, much less to examine those definitions or accounts of matter which have been given by philosophers. Our attention will be properly confined to a consideration of the question, What there was of *good*, or what of *evil*, in matter from its origin to the fall of man? Now, the first thing evident to observe upon this point is, that there can have been at the outset no inherent evil or intrinsic perversity in matter, since it proceeded directly from the hand of the all-perfect God. They who, as Plato (1), imagined an eternal uncreated matter, or who, with the Orientals and the Gnostics (2), derived it from a malevolent in-

telligence, might well conceive of it as absolutely in its own nature depraved, corrupt, and evil; but we, who believe, as the Church has always (not without some warranty of Scripture) taught and witnessed (3), that the original matter, no less than its modifications, was the work and creation of the One supreme God, must necessarily hold that, *as* it came from God, it had on it no stain or spot of evil, but, like every other work of Him who is Perfection Infinite, was perfect in its kind, and, for the purposes for which it was created, good. And so we are told that "God saw *everything that He had made*, and behold! it was very good." [a]

On the other hand, there were in matter from the first certain deficiencies. For instance, it was essentially inferior to spirit, since, without possessing any peculiar excellences of its own, it was devoid of all those qualities which are the main perfections of spiritual existence; it was from its creation dead, dull, inert, sluggish, incapable of thought, feeling, perception, energy. Further, as something altogether alien and contrary to the Divine nature, wherein all true goodness centres, it could scarcely possess any high excellence at all, or be more than relatively good. Thirdly and especially, as a thing altogether separate from God, it could not but separate from Him. Intelligent beings participating in it, must have felt that, so far forth as they participated in it, they were divided off from the Divine Essence; that it lay as a barrier between them and their Creator, preventing the possibility of perfect understanding or perfect sympathy; and further, whereas their perfection

[a] Gen. i. 31.

and happiness could not but consist in becoming *like* to God, they must have been conscious of a difference in this respect which nothing apparently could remove or lessen, and which might be expected to continue through all eternity.

Such, then, was matter in its origin. With nothing of positive evil about it, and many capacities for good, it yet implied much of imperfection and deficiency. What it became on the fall of man is now to be considered. As man then sinned in his material nature, so he seems to have involved all matter in his punishment. "Cursed be the ground for thy sake"[e] was part of the sentence pronounced on him; and in this a curse, not upon the ground only, but upon all sorts of matter, seems to have been contained; at least, we find from that time forth a principle of evil pervading the *whole* of nature. It was not the earth only which, designed to bring forth fruit spontaneously, became then so changed as to make his life a toil to man; but, in like manner also, celestial orbs, appointed to give him light and to be to him "for signs and for seasons,"[f] since then from time to time exert on him a malignant influence, parching his fields with drought and his limbs with fever; fire, given him for his comfort and to aid his ingenuity, bursts out upon him in destructive conflagrations; the air, created to be his constant food and nourishment, to convey him sounds, and serve him in ten thousand other ways, now oft-times bears upon its wings the noisome pestilence, or comes rushing upon

[e] Gen. iii. 17. [f] Gen. i. 14.

his labours with storm and hurricane; the sea, formed to receive and send forth waters for his use, to bear his fleets and merchandise, and unite the scattered branches of the human family, from that time forth has been wont to waste his shores with slow gnawing or sudden inundation, and whelm in its dark depths his proud vessels with their rich cargoes and their gallant crews; nay, even his own body, designed to serve his convenience and afford him continual pleasure, becomes the source to him of unceasing pain (4), thwarting him, vexing him, oppressing him. Thus all nature seems to have had impressed upon its front the brand of the Almighty's curse; all matter seems to have become at the fall rude, perverse, and obstinate—disinclined to receive impressions of good. And hence arose those mistaken opinions so widely prevalent among the heathen concerning the origin of matter. "The defect in the matter of things natural," to quote the words of Hooker[g], "they observed often—the true original cause thereof, Divine malediction laid for the sin of man upon those creatures which God had made for the use of man, this, being an article of that saving truth which God has revealed unto His church, was above the reach of their merely natural capacity and understanding." What, then, remained for them but to imagine some plausible reason for the defect they clearly perceived? And what more plausible than the eternal existence of matter independently of God, or its creation by an evil principle? But, not to pursue this further, so much is

[g] Eccl. Pol. I. iii. § 3.

evident, that our own experience and heathen testimony combine to establish it as a truth, that corruption is now spread through the *whole* of nature, and so that *all matter* was included in the malediction laid upon the ground on account of man's transgression. All matter, then, has suffered by the fall. If before that event it had about it somewhat of imperfection, then rottenness seized upon it and impregnated it altogether; organised bodies became subject to disease, corruption, and decay; things created for man's use were endued with noxious properties and baleful influences; matter was made intractable and stubborn. The whole creation was given up, in a measure, into the hands of Satan, who, becoming (as he is styled in Scripture) "the ruler of this world"[h] and "the prince of the power of the air,"[i] imparted to things material his own perverseness and malevolence. And hence we may fully understand, and even justify under the circumstances, the whole tone of ancient philosophy concerning the body and matter generally: Plato's declaration, that the aim of true wisdom is to free the soul from the fetters of the body (5); Aristotle's dissatisfaction with the σύνθετον, and disparagement of all moral virtue as being connected with the body[j]; Seneca's declaration[k], "Corpus hoc animi pondus ac pœna est; premente illo, urgetur; in vinculis est;" Virgil's "noxia corpora," and souls of men "clausæ tenebris et carcere cæco." (6) Hence, too, we may obtain a clue to all the ascetic practices,

[h] John xvi. 11, ἄρχων τοῦ κοσμοῦ τούτου.
[i] Eph. ii. 2, ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος.
[j] Eth. Nic. x. viii. §§ 2, 3.
[k] Ep. LXV.

distinctions of meat and dress, ablutions, &c., of the Orientals (7) and the Egyptians (8): they were attempts to purge away or to escape the impurity which was perceived to be inherent in matter. Hence, finally, we may account for, and almost excuse, the wild reveries on the subject of creation which, originating probably among the Magi, were from them adopted by the Gnostics. (9) These men both felt the inherent viciousness of matter, and also detected in it the influence of a Malignant Being, not an Abstraction, but a Person, using that viciousness to effect the ruin of mankind; and so, it was upon an insight into the realities of things deeper than was enjoyed by the heathen world in general that they built up their false system of the universe, which was so much the more dangerous and seductive, as it had a wider basis of truth for its foundation.

I turn now to the consideration of that change which matter has undergone by the Incarnation of the Son of God, a change of which few evident signs are presented to our senses, yet which faith believes to have been far greater and more wonderful than that which the fall wrought on it. For when it pleased the Everlasting Word to take on Him in the womb of the Blessed Virgin the perfect nature of man, *body* as well as soul, and so to be "*made flesh*" in our behoof, not only was the malediction pronounced upon matter virtually removed, but the curse was changed into a blessing. A portion of matter had been selected from the mass, not merely to be freed from the evil inherent in it, but to receive a glory which transcends all thought,

and which language shrinks from attempting to portray, the glory of being "taken into God,"[l] united absolutely and for ever with Him "in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."[m] And if this seem in one respect an incomplete reversal of the curse, as being the redemption from the power of Satan of but a *morsel* of his material kingdom; and if it be said that with the exception of the glorified body of our Lord the rest of matter remains such as it was before, to this we must reply that these things are so only in appearance, not in reality; that it is far otherwise to the eye of faith. Faith sees that *all* matter was by that marvellous junction at least potentially cleansed and purified, hallowed, filled with glory, and informed with life. Faith sees in that act the commencement of a process of purification which only terminates with the "new heaven and the new earth" of the apocalyptic vision.[n] As leaven hid in three measures of meal slowly but surely spreads itself through the whole till the lump is leavened, so from our Lord's pure and glorious body does purity and glory proceed onward to the extremest limits of the material universe. All that came in contact with that blessed body on earth was by the very contact in a measure purified. As His baptism with water in the river Jordan "sanctified" and cleansed that element "to the mystical washing away of sins"[o] (as our Church, following St. Ignatius (10), witnesses), so the heavens to which He looked

[l] "By taking of the manhood into God."—*Ath. Creed.*

[m] Col. ii. 9.

[n] Rev. xxi. 1.

[o] Baptismal Service for those of Riper Years.

up, the ground on which He walked, the air He breathed, must have derived a holiness, previously strange to them, from such connection with His perfect purity. So too all material actions in which He participated, those which mere philosophy looked upon as most gross and most hopelessly unspiritual — eating, drinking, sleeping — were from that time forward sanctified. Forms, too, previously felt to be mere dead and burthensome ordinances, became then and thenceforward instinct with life and spirituality. Above all, a way being found of uniting with His body the bodies of His faithful followers, of grafting them into Him as branches are grafted into a vine [p], making them one with Him, "of His flesh and of His bones," [q] there was thus redeemed from the curse of irremediable corruption all that matter whereof the bodies of true Christians consist. It was redeemed, not so as to become exempt at once from disease or death, but so as to admit of the indwelling of the Spirit, and to receive within it even here the germ of immortality. (11) Thus, although it is undoubtedly true that Satan's dominion over matter remains in outward appearance little affected by the Incarnation of our Lord, yet in reality the blow was then struck which must eventually strip him of all authority over it, and which has already crippled him in some degree. Already is matter made capable of a sort of holiness; by material elements grace is communicated; houses made with hands are hallowed by the presence of celestial visitants; forms have a life-giving power; the bodies of the baptized

[p] John xv. 5. [q] Eph. v. 30.

are endued with a principle of true vitality, and the Holy Spirit deigns to dwell in them. This is an earnest of what is yet to come; and this is enough totally to change our position in regard to matter, and to make Christianity in this respect present a marked contrast to the most perfect philosophy of heathenism.

What, then, is the view which Christianity reveals of our position, and how do the Christian and the heathen view differ from one another? In the first place, and most strikingly, they differ as respects the body. Heathen philosophy, as was observed, considers the body a chain or prison, from which death will bring a final and happy release. Christianity teaches that the body is to be our companion through eternity. Heathen philosophy, therefore, and heathenish Christianity make light of forms, and of all external acts of worship in which the body participates. True Christianity, on the contrary, reverences forms, and requires most positively the glorifying of God, "both in body and in spirit,"[r] by a constant union of the two in religious exercises. Hence, confession with the lips, verbal prayer and praise, fasting, kneeling, bowing at the name of Jesus, and, above all, diligent attendance on all sacraments and ordinances, are enjoined under the Christian scheme. Heathen philosophy, again, would treat the body as a slave, macerate it by self-imposed penances, torment it by inflexible opposition to its most natural desires, and utterly disdain all care for it after death. Christianity would have the body so treated during life as may best enable it to be a useful servant to the soul, and at death

[r] 1 Cor. vi. 20.

would commit it solemnly to the keeping of Him whose word is passed to "raise it incorruptible."[s] Secondly, they differ widely in their view of matter external to man. Heathen philosophy, as already remarked, saw in the material universe nothing but incurable corruption, and so recommended men to abstract themselves altogether from the things of sense. Christianity bids them "*use* this world as not abusing it."[t] Heathen philosophy could not conceive of a real holiness in things or places, and looked upon the notion as a low and vulgar superstition. Christianity has its sacred vestments, its consecrated buildings, its "laver of regeneration,"[u] its most holy altar, its "bread of God."[v] Heathen philosophy banished the idea of matter from a future state. Christianity tells of a "new heaven and a new earth;"[w] of a *supper*[x] in the heavenly kingdom; of a food[y] which is the angels' sustenance; of a "tree of life"[z] in the Paradise of God, whereof the saints shall be given to eat. Thus an entirely new view is opened to us. Instead of looking upon ourselves as confined during this life in an impure prison, from which death is to set us for ever free, we are to consider that the body from which death separates us, changed, indeed, from its earthly state, yet still the same body (12), is to rise with us, and be re-united to our souls, and continue part of us through all eternity. And this doctrine, which to a heathen would be full of

[s] 1 Cor. xv. 52.
[t] 1 Cor. vii. 31.
[u] Tit. iii. 5, λουτρὸν παλιγγενέσιας.
[v] St. Ignat. ad Eph. v. p. 274.
[w] Rev. xxi. 1.
[x] Matt. xxvi. 29.
[y] Ps. lxxviii. 25.
[z] Rev. ii. 7, and xxii. 2.

pain and misery, since it would seem to him to raise up an eternal barrier between himself and God, and to render impossible the accomplishment of his soul's longing for true resemblance and true union with the Supreme, to the Christian is full of comfort and joy unspeakable, since to him it tells of no prolonged severance from God, but of his being joined for ever with God in Christ; of no perpetuated diversity of nature, but of eternal likeness unto Him who, having become "partaker of flesh and blood,"[a] *in His body* ascended up on high, and *in it* is set down "for ever"[b] at the right hand of the Majesty of the Father. Christianity satisfies the heathen's longing, but in a mode the reverse of that whereof the heathen vainly dreamed. His fond heart flattered him that man should become as God; Christianity teaches that God is become man.

It remains that we consider briefly what practical duties flow most obviously from these portions of the truth revealed to us. Not to distract attention, I will bring forward three only out of the many which might be noticed. These shall be—first, the duty of a reverential regard to holy things and places; secondly, the obligation upon us to unite bodily worship with our soul's devotion; and, thirdly, the paramount importance of "keeping ourselves pure."[c]

First, then, since it is not only true that matter by the Incarnation is made capable of being hallowed to holy uses, but also that by the Christian scheme portions of matter are in fact so hallowed, and thereby possess a holiness not merely in our thoughts but in

[a] Heb. ii. 14. [b] Heb. x. 12. [c] 1 Tim. v. 22.

themselves, it ceases to be a matter of indifference how we conduct ourselves towards them. For instance, as in the holy Feast, which forms the highest act of our worship, visible elements are, upon the blessing of the priest (13), changed from their natural use to become to us the blood and body of the Lord; if we have not our regards and feelings towards them correspondingly affected, it is no matter of indifference, but a grievous sin. If, when we take into our hands the "bread of God,"[d] or lift up to our lips the "cup of the Lord,"[e] there dwells not deep and trembling reverence in our hearts, we are in danger of that damnation which they bring on themselves who "discern not the Lord's body."[f] If, again, we suffer ourselves to speak lightly of this heavenly banquet before we come to it, or after we have partaken of it, as though our eating and drinking were of little moment, we act most perilously. Above all, if we come to it with bodies defiled with sin; if we put to lips fresh from the utterance of blasphemy or uncleanness the food an angel would tremblingly receive; if we take it into a body in which sin and lust are allowed to reign[g],—how awful the guilt that we incur! To our condemnation we then eat and drink the sign or sacrament of Christ's body and blood[h], accounting, as we do clearly by our action, the cleansing blood of the new covenant "an unholy thing,"[i] neither, in any sense, "discerning the Lord's body."[j] Again, what need is there that we reverentially regard God's

[d] St. Ignat. ut supra, p. 13.
[e] 1 Cor. x. 21.
[f] 1 Cor. xi. 29.
[g] Rom. vi. 12.
[h] See the 39 Articles, Art. 29.
[i] Heb. x. 29.
[j] 1 Cor. xi. 29.

house! God indeed "dwelleth not in temples made with hands,"[k] i. e. not exclusively, as they thought to whom the words were addressed; yet still "the Lord is in His holy house," though His "seat" be also "in heaven;"[l] and "where two or three are gathered together in Christ's name, there is He in the midst of them."[m] Undoubtedly there are many different degrees of the Divine presence. God is in some real sense more present in heaven than upon earth, and in heaven itself most present on His heavenly throne; and so upon earth also, though He pervade the whole of it, yet is He chiefly in His sanctuaries, and in them (it may be) most present at the holy altar. Whenever, therefore, we come within a house of prayer we should remember that we step into God's more immediate presence—that we enter, as it were, the vestibule of heaven. Within such walls the ground whereon we stand is holy—how holy we know not; perhaps we have not capacities to conceive. They who have led the most saint-like lives, and so may reasonably be thought to have attained the clearest perception of spiritual things, have deemed that in such places angels have their haunt, and cherubim and seraphim stand and gaze admiringly at the miracles of grace which God's mercy works in man's behoof; they have believed a real presence of our Lord in the houses builded to Him—a real presence always, but intensified (so to speak) at those times when, by the celebration of the Holy Eucharist, "God is brought down from heaven,"

[k] Acts vii. 48.
[l] Ps. xi. 4.
[m] Matt. xviii. 20.
[n] Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lxxvii. § 1.

and "He who sitteth at the right hand of the Father, yet is present with us though unseen, comes, and with His presence sanctifies His gifts, those who offer and those who receive them." [o] If, then, this be so, how should we tremble to enter our chapel doors in a profane or careless spirit, without awful thoughts of the high majesty of that God before whom we appear, without at the least an effort to bring our spirits into a serious and reverential tone! And yet how often is the house of God entered without such preparation! How many come in cold indifference, if not with a scoff upon their lips! How many enter with their thoughts fixed on the amusements or studies of the hour! How many continue their idle and frivolous talk up to the very moment of their entrance, till the laugh sounds upon the threshold of the sanctuary! How many, when they reach their stations, bow their heads, and yet address no prayer to God! Again, during the service, what wandering of thought is suffered patiently! What listlessness of attention on all sides! What dulness and deadness of devotion among the best of us! Oh! that we could wake up with Jacob to feel, "Surely the Lord is in this place, and we knew it not;" [p] that, like him also, we might be "afraid," and say, "How dreadful is this place! this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven."

The second duty on which I proposed to say a few words is the obligation we are under to unite *bodily* worship with our soul's devotion. As these our bodies,

[o] Archbishop Laud, quoted in the Bishop of Oxford's Eucharistica.
[p] Gen. xxviii. 16, 17.

by virtue of their connection with our Saviour's flesh, are to be immortal, and to be united with our spirits through eternity, it becomes requisite that they should be, so far as it is possible, sanctified. For this the Christian scheme makes careful provision, in that each stage of our Christian course is ushered in with some appropriate form, each accession of grace made intimately to depend upon some outward act. Regeneration is not ordinarily without water, nor strength to wage successful warfare with the world without the imposition of the bishop's hands, nor abiding union with Christ without the blessed sacrament of His body and blood. Nor is forgiveness promised except upon confession; nor have we ground to think that any grace may be obtained unless it be first explicitly asked in prayer. Our part, then, is to carry out this principle heartily and thoroughly, to seek ever to "glorify God in our body and in our spirit, which are God's;"[q] to take every opportunity of associating our body with our spirit in acts of worship. We should do this by kneeling when we pray; by doing reverence at the name of Jesus; by joining audibly in those portions of the Church service which are assigned to us. Oh! how can men who call themselves Christians, and attend the Christian worship, forbear to lift up their voices with one accord in profession of faith, in confession, in praise to God? How can so many stand (as we often see them stand) with motionless lips and silent tongues during Canticle, and Psalm, and Creed, as though they had "neither part nor lot in this matter?"[r] What is it

[q] 1 Cor. vi. 20. [r] Acts viii. 21.

that thus chains their speech? Is it the consciousness that they are living in deadly sin? Alas! for such. Is it shame, the fear of being thought religious, the fear of being called "*saints*," as though that most blessed of all blessed names could be to any a reproach? Alas! for such false shame, such damning fear. "Whosoever shall confess Christ Jesus before men, him also will He confess before His Father which is in heaven;"[s] but "whosoever shall deny or be ashamed of Him in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of Man be ashamed when He cometh in His glory with the holy angels."[t] Or is it that any cherish the notion of a religion of the heart unaccompanied by outward acts expressing it? Surely this is a heathen notion. Christianity teaches that "with the *heart* man believeth unto *righteousness*," but that "with the *mouth* confession is made unto *salvation*."[u] Let such see to it, lest perchance by denying to God the honour which is His due, which He claims of them, the praise, namely, of their *lips*, they lose that spirituality on which they pride themselves, and forfeit heaven.

Finally, how careful should the Christian view of our connection with matter make us, to keep our bodies pure! With the same body that we now have must we arise. Shall we soil the robe we are to wear for ever? In this same body does the Holy Spirit deign to tabernacle. "Ye are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwelleth in you."[x] "Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, which

[s] Matt. x. 32. [t] Mark viii. 38.
[u] Rom. x. 10. [x] 1 Cor. iii. 16.

is in you, which ye have of God?"[y] "If then a man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy, for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are."[z] In this same body, lastly, are we made members of Christ, taken into Him, joined with Him, our flesh to His flesh, our bone to His bone. Shall we pollute with excess, or drunkenness, or uncleanness, or fornication, matter thus mysteriously consecrated? Shall we so "sin against our own body?"[a] "Shall we take the members of Christ and make them the members of an harlot? God forbid."[b]

God rather grant us grace to cast away *all* the works of darkness, and put on the *whole* armour of light[c], to cleanse and purify ourselves "even as He is pure;"[d] to keep ourselves as well from all pollution of the flesh as from all impurity of the spirit, so that finally we may be received, body and soul, into that awful presence, into which nothing can enter that is impure or unholy, within which nothing can dwell that is not purged from all uncleanness.

[y] 1 Cor. vi. 19.
[z] 1 Cor. iii. 17.
[a] Ib. v. 18.
[b] Ib. v. 15.
[c] Advent Collect.
[d] 1 Tim. i. 17.

SERMON II.

PREACHED ON EASTER SUNDAY.

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2 TIM. i. 10.

"*Who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel.*"

FESTIVAL times are intended by the Church especially for seasons of religious joy and thanksgiving. We are always dull and backward in such matters; slow to perceive, colder to feel what gratitude we owe to God, disinclined to render even the homage which we know and acknowledge to be due. Very needful, therefore, must it be on all festival-days; and if so, chiefly upon this, the chiefest, that we strive to arouse ourselves from our spiritual lethargy, to "lift our hearts up unto the Lord,"[a] to stir our affections and our wills to somewhat of true thankfulness, by diligently impressing upon ourselves the real nature and actual dimensions (so to speak) of the blessings which we have received at God's hands, and especially, of those particular ones which the day commemorates. Now this day, whatever other aspects it may have, yet

[a] Communion Service.

as a festival-day, speaks to us especially of that "lively hope" unto which "God has begotten us by the resurrection of Christ Jesus from the dead,"[b] that hope of an "inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved for us in heaven." Christ's resurrection, that is to say, is chiefly a subject for thankfulness, because by it were men first clearly taught their own immortal nature, and absolutely assured of a resurrection both of soul and body. "Life and immortality" were by the Gospel "brought to light;" and by no part of the Gospel so evidently shown forth, or so vividly presented to the minds of men, as by the great event which hallows this day to us. If, then, we would fain awake within us some portion of that glad and thankful spirit which befits this holy day, we must seek clearly to perceive and thoroughly to realise to ourselves the extent of the blessing which was thus made ours; we must use our best endeavours to apprehend what difference in our position is really made by the new light vouchsafed us; from what state it is that we have been saved; to what condition we are come. I propose, therefore, in aid of such endeavours, to examine in this discourse what was the change which Christianity in general, and our Lord's resurrection in particular, wrought upon the world, in respect of the great doctrine of a future life. And this can only be done by reviewing, so far as time will permit, the condition of the world, heathen and Jewish, in this respect, before Christ came, and contrasting therewith the actual state of mankind consequent upon the publication of the Gospel.

[b] 1 Pet. i. 3, 4.

First, then, as to the condition of the heathen world, it may readily be granted, that they were not destitute of a certain general glimmering of light, but that there prevailed very widely among them an expectation of *some* new state of being after death. It may even be admitted, that occasionally individual heathens attained to a belief not very remote from the truth as the Gospel has revealed it to us. Still, heathenism fell short of Christianity in many respects. In the first place, a part of the Christian doctrine, and that a most important part, was absolutely unknown to the heathen world, and never that I know of even conjectured by any of their philosophers. Secondly, that portion of the true belief which was current among them was mixed up with errors so vital as to neutralise and well-nigh vitiate the truth combined with them. Thirdly, whatever truth they had, they held upon a frail and uncertain tenure; not grounded upon any sound or sufficient reasons, but rather on conjecture and probability; and so, while none could feel the firm and full assurance which belongs to Christians, a wide door was opened to doubt and even scepticism. And hence, finally, heathenism was in danger of losing that little light which it had once possessed; and without the aid of Christianity it is probable that the last faint sparks might long since have been extinguished. Such were, in outline, the chief deficiencies of heathenism as respects the doctrine of a future life. I proceed to observe upon them severally.

One portion of the Christian verity was, as I have said, altogether above and beyond heathen imaginings. The

Christian doctrine of a future life involves two distinct yet intimately blended notions,—the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the body. Now heathenism seems to have known absolutely nothing of the latter. (1) There may indeed have been some partial revelation on this head in the primeval times, sufficient to account for that religious feeling on the subject of sepulture which we find so generally prevalent (2); yet in an explicit shape we do not meet with the doctrine, so far as I am aware, in any form of heathenism. (3) Certainly, all they who most strongly insist upon the soul's immortality, contrast with it the body's corruptibility and perishableness (4), without a hint of the possibility of such a change as Christianity leads us to expect, "when this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality."[c] Indeed, from the opinions generally current among the heathen concerning the nature of matter, which was looked upon as inherently corrupt and vicious (5), it was almost impossible that they should entertain the notion of a permanent union between our corporeal and our spiritual natures. Such an union would have seemed to them the perpetuating of whatever was most gross and evil in humanity, and so would have been viewed as a curse rather than a blessing. But in thus looking forward to a future life of the soul only, they lost, in the first place, all that reverential regard for the body which to a Christian makes every-day life a mystery, transmuting the commonest acts into a sort of

[c] 1 Cor. xv. 54.

sacrament, and hallowing and endearing to him that union with a fleshly tabernacle, against which the heathen chafed as a weary penance and woe-fraught imprisonment (6). And they lost also much of that hearty conviction of an absolute continuance of the same identical existence, which a belief in the eternity of the body is especially fitted to engender. The annihilation of the body must involve great change in the soul itself, which in many respects is bound up inseparably with it. And to what might not such changes amount? If the vital principle, and the senses, and the passions, and the animal spirits, and the fancy, and, it might be, the memory (7), perished with the body, would not the identity of the soul itself be endangered? At any rate, might not consciousness of identity be lost, and so the continued existence be to the individual *as though* a new one? Surmises of this sort could not fail to disturb the thoughts of those who philosophised on the subject; and the mass must still more have *felt* the difficulty, since they would scarcely be conscious to themselves of any other existence than that which is corporeal and animal, and so would be still less able than others to imagine themselves continuing the same conscious beings when their corporeal and animal natures were annihilated. Such persons, unless taught the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, or some equivalent one (8), are wholly unable to realise to themselves the notion of a future life. Verbally they may admit it, and they may even have some dim and vague expectation that death will not utterly destroy them; but they cannot possibly form any no-

tion on the subject, that will be practically efficient for the ends of religion or morality.

It had been well if the creed of the heathen had been defective only; if, ignorant of the resurrection of the body, they had held, in its purity and integrity, the true doctrine of the future existence of the soul. Important and essential to correct belief on the subject as the corporeal resurrection must be allowed to be, yet still it is of *secondary* importance when compared with the doctrine of which it is the complement and the safeguard,—the soul's continuance. This latter belief is alone of absolute necessity for practical purposes; and a full conviction of its certainty, a complete assurance of the eternal existence of the soul after death in a state of separate being and distinct consciousness, would have preserved the heathen world comparatively uncorrupt and stainless. In those rare instances, which the records of ancient times present to us, of individuals among the heathen who attained to this portion of the truth, and held it, albeit amid many doubts and fears, lest they deceived themselves, we observe an elevation of character, and a purity of the moral tone, which elsewhere we vainly look for. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle(9), stand forth from the multitudinous array of Paganism, not more remarkable for the distinctness of their views on the subject of man's future existence, and the comparative purity of their belief, than for the excellence of their lives and the high standard of their morality. If we were to judge the general belief of heathendom from these specimens, which are, perhaps, of all the most familiar to us, we should be apt to form an esti-

mate, very greatly beyond the truth, of the amount of knowledge which the heathen possessed, and to undervalue correspondingly the inestimable benefits which the Gospel bestowed on man. But we are not justified in forming our notion of what heathenism would have been apart from Christianity from a few, much less from these specimens. The question is not what approximation to the true belief was possible under the most favourable circumstances in Pagan times, but what the prevalent notions were, what the general result would have been, what the world would have become, without the light of the Gospel? Now, it certainly does not appear that the views of Plato and Aristotle were likely to have prevailed, or, indeed, unless Christianity had been preached, ever to have attracted many followers. Philosophy has always been to the mass what Christianity was to the world at large when first preached,—"*foolishness.*"[d] And philosophy itself in these ancient times spoke upon this matter with no distinct or uniformly consentient voice. They who maintained the soul's existence after death differed among themselves as to the nature, the duration, and the circumstances of such existence; and the general tendency of men's minds was decidedly not towards the purer, but towards the more corrupt forms of opinion on this subject. Three special lines of error may be traced throughout the teaching of the ancient world concerning the future life of the soul of man, all of great practical importance, all tending to weaken the moral power of the doctrine, all diminishing from its

[d] 1 Cor. i. 23.

awfulness, and at the same time lessening its soothing and consoling influence. These are, the doctrine of the periodical annihilation and reproduction of souls, the belief in transmigration, or metempsychosis, and the notion of the absorption of the soul after death into the Divine Essence.

The Stoics held that the souls of men continued after death, but only until the period of the next general conflagration of the universe. (10) According to them, all things rolled on in a perpetually recurring cycle. Worlds were created and set in motion, men and animals were formed, states grew up, arts were invented, cities built, the course of human events proceeded in its appointed order, till the expiration of a certain number of years, when all was consumed by fire. Then the Supreme God existed for awhile alone; all other minds, angelic or human, were annihilated; "Zeus was left by himself, and remained at rest with himself, considering the method of his government, and occupied with his own imaginings." (11) After this pause creation was renewed; worlds, the same in number, and exactly like in all things, were again produced; the course of events proceeded as before; men, under the same names, and exactly like the former men, again lived, and did the same deeds, and died in the same way; and their souls underwent the same punishments, or received the same satisfactions; till again the fatal term came round, the great year drew to its close, and fire once more destroyed all things but Zeus. (12) Such was the "charmed circle" within which they placed mankind, all our actions determined for us by

the actions of previous men, bearing our names, and having already lived our lives, in successive revolutions of the great mundane cycle, our free will a mere fancy, and our future nothing but the brief space between the moment of our departure and the time of the coming conflagration! How little calculated was this teaching to console or to restrain mankind! Submission, indeed, resignation of a certain sort, patience, or rather a dull, cold apathy, such views were apt enough to engender; but cheerful hope, confident and joyful looking forward to the final rest, were scarcely possible to those who had no better prospects than these. The Stoic did not conceive that he could affect his own future; and that future itself was but a prolonged *term* of life, a reprieve, not a reversal, of the sentence of death passed upon him from the moment that he began to live; an extension of the time of his continuance, not a passage from death to immortality. Again, the Stoic could not tell how short his future life might chance to be; nay, he could not even be quite sure that he would have any future life at all, for he knew not how near the cycle in which he himself was born approached its close, or whether the great conflagration might not come upon the universe within the term of his own natural lifetime. To look forward, even after an indefinitely extended period of existence, to final annihilation, is to miss of half the comfort which the doctrine of the soul's continuance is naturally fitted to bestow; but to be uncertain whether annihilation may not follow almost immediately upon death, or even accompany it, is almost to be in the condition of those who expect no

future life at all. Thus vital was this error, which showed no tendency to disappear or give place to sounder views before Christ came, but was rather at that time gaining in strength, and threatening to become (together with Epicureanism) the only philosophic belief of the Roman world. (13)

The doctrine of transmigration, or metempsychosis, was another error, which obtained extensively in ancient, as indeed it does in modern times, where the light of the Gospel has not yet reached. Held from a very remote antiquity in India and in Egypt, and spread likewise, we know not how widely, over the barbarous nations of Upper Asia and Europe, it early obtained a footing in Greece and Italy by the teaching of Pythagoras, and about the time of our Saviour's coming it was received into that subtle and complex form of error which bears in theology the ambiguous name of Gnosticism. (14) Originating, possibly, in a symbolical mode of expressing truths (15), it came to be literally maintained and believed, as it is found to be at the present day in various parts of Asia; and it seems to have formed the definite expectation of perhaps the larger portion of those who believed in a future life at the time when Christ appeared. Men expected that after death they would transmigrate either into the body of a beast or into that of another human being, and so that they would pass from life to life, from body to body, in a prolonged, if not even in an infinite series. Now it is very evident that this belief, although in some respects serviceable for moral purposes, as it gave definiteness and sub-

stance (so to speak) to what would else have been vague, formless, and beyond the power of most men to realise, yet in other ways was very ill calculated to subserve the ends for which the great doctrine of a future life has been revealed to us. A poor consolation were it to the weary soul, tired of existence under the conditions here attached to it, and thirsting for a closer union with the Source of Life and Fountain of all true blessedness, to be told that after death it would be born at once into another body, and undergo the trials and miseries of another sublunary existence, possibly as a man, but possibly also as a brute beast, and so continue, passing from form to form for some indefinite period. Again, what great effect was likely to be produced upon practice by an expectation of a future state which involved the notion of an indefinite extension of the time of our probation, while we passed successively through many bodies, in each having power over our future? If men even now, when they know that their behaviour in this life will fix their doom irrevocably for all eternity, are so slow to "redeem the time,"[e] what must have been the natural working of a belief which thrust off the final settlement of our condition for good or evil beyond all fixed limit, if it did not, even by implication, deny any final settlement whatsoever? Must not the spirit of procrastination, which leads men now so generally to defer repentance and amendment till the approach of old age, have then induced them to put off the hard task till the next stage of their being?

The theory of the absorption of the soul after death

[e] Eph. v. 16.

into the Divine Essence has also been at all times a favourite notion among the more philosophic in heathen countries. It is often found combined, as an esoteric doctrine, with the last-mentioned error, in which shape it exists in India at the present day. With this doctrine, however, it has not any necessary connection; and so we find it, historically, attached to various schools, and recurring under various forms in different parts of heathendom. Sometimes what is expected is immediate absorption into God as soon as this life is over, sometimes final absorption; and again, the opinion has been either that the good alone are so absorbed, or that all equally return into Him who gave them being. In this last shape, the doctrine differs but little from the general Stoical teaching, and accordingly it is by the later Stoics chiefly that this view of it has been inculcated. (16) Such a view is open to almost the same objections, on practical grounds, as the common Stoical theory; and even when the doctrine is refined to the uttermost, and held as by Plotinus (17) and the Oriental mystics — when the expectation is, that while the souls of the bad are annihilated, the good shall be rewarded by being taken into God, and becoming absolutely one with Him — in this case there is, besides the approach to blasphemy in thinking that the creature can thus be made a portion of the Creator, great practical difficulty in so holding the belief as to maintain at the same time a conviction of real continuance of being. It is possible, indeed, that subtle metaphysicians, such as Plotinus, may have conceived of an absorption into the Divine Essence

which should not annihilate individual being or separate consciousness, which should be compatible with personal identity, and the sense of it; but it is most unlikely that the generality of thinkers could have made such refinements. What is more clear than that absorption into the Infinite Mind must have seemed to most men but another name for annihilation?—a glorious end, indeed, for weak and frail humanity, and so one upon which glowing epithets might well be lavished, yet still an end, absolute and final.

Thus defective then were the highest heathen notions of a future state of existence. Yet, if in respect of the subject-matter of belief there be thus a wide gulf between Christianity and Heathenism, much more important is the difference between them in respect of the grounds and evidences of belief possessed by each, and so in respect of the confidence and certainty wherewith each affects its votaries. The heathen found in his nature certain instincts which seemed to point to an eternal, or, at least, a future life; he was sensible of the presence within him of an approving conscience begetting complacency, and a condemning conscience generating an awful dread (18); he had aspirations which this life was utterly inadequate to gratify; he felt a longing after immortality, and an anticipation of it; a shrinking from annihilation, and a presentiment that he would never cease to be. Further, external to him he found belief in some future state or other existing almost universally,—most confidently held, and most zealously maintained by the best (19); and if he enquired he would learn that the

belief came down to all by tradition from a remote antiquity. (20) But here his encouragements and grounds for believing ceased. If he betook himself to reason, and strove by argument to fortify his convictions and confirm his faith, he was soon entangled in a labyrinth of doubts and difficulties. We have only to call to mind the reasonings by which the wisest of all heathens, Plato, sought to protect and enforce the doctrine of the soul's immortality (21), or those to the same effect which Cicero culled from the entire range of Greek philosophy (22), to be convinced that Reason in this cause is a poor unserviceable advocate, introducing at least as many and as great perplexities as she removes.

There is scarcely an argument in either of the treatises referred to, which is not as valid to prove the pre-existence or pre-eternity of the soul, as its post-existence or post-eternity. Yet against such an imagination as that of our pre-existence, all common sense and natural instinct must ever have revolted; and plain men must have been inclined, rather than admit a position of the falsehood of which they were sufficiently assured, to reject a theory which was felt to be uncertain. Nor can the effect ever be different, when reason attempts to *demonstrate* a future life. For in very truth a future life cannot be *demonstrated*. The utmost that reason can attain to, is to show, as our great Christian moralist has shown in his "Analogy" (23), that a continuance of the soul after death is probable, and its eternal continuance not impossible. Reason can furnish nothing to set against

that natural axiom, πᾶν τὸ γεννητὸν φθαρτόν. For that is indeed an absolute and eternal verity: whatever has been created, must be capable of annihilation; what a word has evoked out of nothing, a word from the same Being must be able again to reduce to nothing; what once was not, might again not be: nay! it is a closer approximation to the truth to say, that what has been created, possesses in itself no permanence, but each moment is rushing back to nothingness, and must at once cease utterly to be, unless continually upheld by the very same Being who created it, and almost by the very same act as that original one of creation. (24) The soul then is not *per se* immortal, but only *by gift*, as Plato sufficiently perceived, though he shrank from so teaching, lest he should thereby rather prejudice his cause than further it. (25) The religious heathen, therefore, was necessarily thrust back from reasoning upon those prior grounds of internal anticipation and external authority which were before enumerated: and these, when they came to be examined and sifted, could not but have appeared altogether weak and unsatisfactory. The fear engendered by a condemning conscience, and the complacent hope arising naturally out of self-approval, *might* indicate a judgment to come, future reward and future punishment; but they might also be only a part of that judgment actually pronounced, and that rewarding of virtue and punishing of vice actually taking effect, in this present state of existence (26); and so they might stand in the room of a future judgment, and obviate the necessity for it. Those aspirations which this life

seemed inadequate to gratify, might be idle longings; no more natural, no more destined to be one day gratified, than the desire of universal dominion which fired so many. All did not feel them; it might be the duty of such as did to repress them — "ἀνθρώπινα φρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, καὶ θνητὰ τοὺς θνητούς."[f] And as for that mere abstract anticipation of continuance which each seemed to feel within him, how impossible in such things to distinguish the voice of nature from the effects of education, the soul's own instinct from the prejudices instilled into it! Such thoughts must have occurred to all who strove to find in their own hearts and minds a sure and solid ground on which to rest their hopes of immortality. If then, amid these manifold perplexities, they turned for support to the systems external to them; to the general belief, the traditional accounts of a judgment to be undergone after death; of Hades or Orcus; the horrid shades of Tartarus, and the bright Elysian fields; the fiery Phlegethon, and the peaceful islands of the blest, fresh difficulties would beset them. Besides the extreme difference between the beliefs of different nations, they would find in the traditional religionism of their own country an infinite variety of statement,—discrepancies, contradictions; above all, the grossest absurdities and immoralities inextricably intermingled with the entire mass of the religious teaching, discrediting every portion of that mass, and seeming to show that all was the invention of man, the produce of the fertile imagination of the poet, or of the far-sighted prudence of the legis-

[f] Arist. Eth. Nic. x. vii. §. 8.

lator. Doubt then, painful, harassing, distracting doubt, was of necessity the heathen's portion. Who of them ever expressed a *full* persuasion and *complete* assurance of his immortality? Nay, who but Plato ever declared himself absolutely convinced that death would not prove his annihilation? Certainly Cicero, with all the accumulated light that could be derived from an acquaintance with every form of Greek philosophy, could attain to nothing higher than a *hope* of the soul's continuance, which did not allow him to pass by the consideration of the other alternative, its utter destruction upon death. (27) And Socrates himself, in that most solemn moment of his life when he was concluding his farewell address to the judges who had condemned him, was forced to allow that death *might* be the annihilation of all consciousness. (28) If then the best and wisest fell thus far short of certainty, what may we not reasonably conclude concerning the condition of the generality? Must it not have been altogether impossible for them to reach to that degree of confidence in this matter which alone practically avails to regulate men's conduct.

One more defect of heathenism remains to be noticed; and it is perhaps of all the most considerable. The light, which they had, continually from age to age burnt feebler—less and less of truth was "retained by them in their knowledge,"[g] — corruptions prevailed more and more widely, — belief grew weaker, — scepticism advanced with rapid strides,—and but for Christianity an universal Pyrrhonism might eventually

[g] Rom. i. 28.

have overspread the world. When we go far back into the recesses of heathen antiquity we find notions comparatively pure, and faith unwavering; undoubtedly because the real source of the Heathen's knowledge was primeval revelation, and so the stream is clearer the closer we approach the fountain. As we proceed, error and uncertainty increase. For a while certain philosophies, whose principle it was to pay the utmost deference to old traditions, the Pythagorean in part, but especially the Platonic (29) and the Peripatetic (30), continued to propagate notions in the main correct. Plato especially, who loves to speak of the world to come in the very words of the ancient myths (31), taught and maintained a doctrine very nearly approaching to the truth. But with the great bulk of the philosophies it was otherwise. These, throwing themselves in a proud and self-trusting spirit upon abstract reasoning to the exclusion of authority, darkened by degrees the previously existing light, weakened men's faith, and departed more and more from the true doctrine. (32) And these became the popular systems, against which those purer philosophies struggled all in vain. Pythagoreanism, as a system, had expired by the time of Aristotle (33); and before the coming of our Lord, Aristotle's professed followers had completely changed his teaching, and Plato's successors in the Academy had virtually become Pyrrhonists. At the time of the publication of the Gospel two new forms of philosophy, both denying the continuance of consciousness, divided the Roman world, Epicureanism and Stoicism: and of these the grosser, Epicureanism, was fast swal-

lowing up its adversary. Among the Orientals a strange and subtle form of error, the Satanic counterfeit of that new religion for which the nations were looking with longing eyes towards the East, was starting into being, and threatening to become the creed of Asia; and of this creed the doctrine of metempsychosis, if not also that of absorption, was an essential portion. (34) The very notion then of men retaining permanently their human nature, their identity and the consciousness of it—which is the only doctrine on the subject of a future life of full practical utility—had well nigh perished from among the heathen when the "Sun of Righteousness arose." [h] They who professed any dogmatic belief at all expected, either that they were to undergo a number of transmigrations destructive of all real identity, or else that they were, sooner or later, to have their existence merged in that of the Universal Soul, or finally, that at death they would cease to be. The bulk of men were yet more miserable; distracted by the uncertainties and contradictions of philosophers, destitute of any sounder guides, with their natural instincts weakened and deadened by the sinfulness of their lives, without a written revelation, so far removed from that oral one which had once been theirs, that they were ignorant of its authority, they were fast becoming sceptical of everything for which they had not the evidence of their senses. The ancient traditions concerning Tartarus and Elysium, rejected even by the advocates of the soul's immortality (35), were beginning to be regarded by the mass as old wives' fables, whose falsehood was self-evident.

[h] Mal. iv. 2.

Men generally looked to this life as alone worthy of their concern or care, and did not deem it necessary to provide for a future the coming of which was so uncertain. All thought was concentrated on the modes of attaining in this world the utmost possible enjoyment, the infinite capacity of man for enjoyment vainly seeking to obtain satisfaction within the narrow term of a mere human lifetime. Even virtue was practised on selfish grounds, and, as time went on, approached more and more to absolute selfishness, while vice became stranger in its forms, and wilder in its licence, as the old characters of crime ceased to afford the same gratification which they had furnished when they were less trite and common. A phantom form was constantly before the eyes of men; a dark shadow rested on every object; a sword of Damocles hung over every head. Death, ever drawing nearer, ever snatching away the precious moments of life, leaving men's store perpetually less and less, and sure to come at last and claim them bodily for his victims, made life, excepting in the moments of high-wrought excitement, a continual misery. Hence the greatness and intensity of the heathen vices; hence the enormous ambition, the fierce vengeance, the extreme luxury, the strange shapes of profligacy; hence the madness of their revels, the savageness of their sports, the perfection of their sensualism; hence Apician feasts, and Capuan retirements, and Neronic cruelties, and Vitellian gormandism; they who, "from fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage;"[1] they before whose eyes the pale spectre ever stood, waving

[1] Heb. ii. 15.

them onward with his skeleton hand to the black gulf of annihilation, fled to these and similar excesses to escape, if it might be, for a few short hours the thought which haunted them, the terror which dogged their steps. In the wild carelessness of the Anacreontic drinking song, in the mad licence of comedy, in the soul-stirring scenes of the great tragic poets, in the exquisite beauty of all the remains of art, in the magnificence of the buildings where shows and games took place,—in all these we see the efforts made to shut out for a while the sense of the Awful Presence, and to divert the soul from brooding on a woe felt to be intolerable. The slave, amid sports and pastimes, forgets for a space his servitude; and the thought of death, which, apart from the hope of another life, is a burthen too heavy for men to bear, passed from the mind under the strong excitement of mad revel, or scenic interest, or appreciation of the beautiful, or sympathy with the combatants. But the thought soon recurred; and the life of the heathen, instead of being passed in learning how to die, was occupied chiefly with endeavours to discard and put away the feeling that death must come.

Thus far I have considered the condition of the heathen world. It follows briefly to inquire what knowledge the Jews possessed, and what effect it may reasonably be supposed that that knowledge would have had upon the rest of mankind apart from Christianity. And here, without having recourse to any theory so extreme, and indeed untenable, as that of Warburton, it will be sufficient to notice three points wherein the knowledge of the Jews fell short of ours. In the first

place, it is generally admitted that the resurrection of the body was unknown to them. (36) Whatever may be thought of that passage in the Book of Job [k], which, as *we* render it, seems to contain the doctrine, certain it is that the Jews failed to gather that doctrine either from the passage in question or from any other. (37) What the Sadducees were peculiar in denying was not the body's resurrection, but the soul's; as is plain from those passages of Scripture which mention their error. (38) In this respect, then, the Jews had no advantage over the heathen. And even in respect of the continued existence of the soul, their knowledge had two deficiencies: — First, it did not exclude the notion of metempsychosis, which seems even to have been generally prevalent among such Jews as believed a future state at all, at the coming of our Lord (39); and, secondly, it rested upon a basis which was so far doubtful and insecure, that it did not compel belief, but only invited it. We know that there were persons who admitted the entire Jewish Scriptures (40), yet "said that there was no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit." [l] And they who thus held and taught were become at the first publication of the Gospel a numerous and powerful sect. Nor is it at all improbable that a people so worldly and carnal as the Jews were at that time, might, if left to themselves, have become generally, or even universally, Sadducees.

But we need not have recourse to such an hypothesis in order to show, that it is scarcely conceivable that any light possessed by the Jews should ever have greatly

[k] Job xix. 26. [l] Acts xxiii. 8.

benefited the heathen world. Even had they degenerated no further, still never was there a nation so unapt to spread its opinions. Sunk in character and depraved in conduct, so that no moral weight could possibly attach to a creed by their support of it, divided among themselves as to the teaching of their sacred books, and, above all, resolutely bent on confining to themselves those benefits which they expected a knowledge and observance of the law eventually to confer on them (41), they were neither likely to seek to impart their light to others, nor to be successful in propagating their creed if under any circumstances they wished to proselytise. The contempt in which they were held by the heathen on the one hand, and their own selfishness on the other, must have altogether precluded the possibility of the enlightenment of the world by them.

It remains that we consider what has been effected by Christianity. Christianity, then, with regard to the doctrine itself, has freed that portion which was known before from error, and has added besides a new and unheard-of truth. Christianity, wherever it prevails, has swept away the notions of metempsychosis and absorption, teaching that in the life which we at present lead our whole probation is to begin and end, and that after it is over we shall continue for ever the same conscious beings that we now are; and further, in confirmation of both of these truths, Christianity has revealed to us the new doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Again, with regard to our assurance of the truth of the doctrine, Christianity, especially by the event this day commemorated, has removed all doubt, and established

in its stead entire and absolute certainty. "Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept," is proof sufficient that "they that are Christ's shall rise afterward at His coming."[m] The Manhood joined *for ever* inseparably to the Eternal Godhead declares with voice as of a trumpet, that man, for whose sake alone that union subsists, shall ever live to profit by it. Thus, then, have "life and immortality" been by the Gospel "brought to light."[n] That which of old was feebly advocated in a few schools of philosophy, or whispered occasionally as a conjecture into the mourner's ear, is now proclaimed openly throughout all Christian lands, and as a topic of consolation is almost too trite to be effectual. Week by week, as the day on which Christ rose returns, from ten thousand thousand pulpits are proclaimed, without one atom of dissonance, without one suggestion of doubt, the great doctrines of a judgment to come and of the soul's immortality. Day by day, as disciple after disciple is committed to the dust, the declaration is repeated of "sure and certain hope of the resurrection."[o] And the consequence is, that the humblest and most ignorant of Christians possesses a confidence and assurance on these points to which the wisest philosopher never attained, and which was unknown even to the patriarchs. As in other respects so in this, "the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater"[p] than the greatest of those who lived before the time when "the Dayspring from on high visited us."[q] A Chris-

[m] 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23.
[n] 2 Tim. i. 10.
[o] Burial Service.
[p] Matt. xi. 11.
[q] Luke i. 78.

tian knows that as surely as the Only-begotten Son of God is eternal and immortal, so surely is he the same; for not only does the "man Christ Jesus" [r] live for ever for the very purpose of securing him eternal life, but it is the same life in both. For Christ is Himself "our life." [s] Christ "liveth in us." [t] He hath made us His members, bone of His bone, and flesh of His flesh." [u] He feeds us with Himself, He counts Himself imperfect without us, we are one body with Him. How, then, shall we ever cease to be unless He too fail, and corruption begin to seize upon Him "who is the true God, and the Eternal Life?" [v] No doubt then mingles with the Christian's faith, no fear bedims that "lively hope" to which "the resurrection of Christ Jesus from the dead has begotten him." He is not more certain of his present being than of his coming immortality. He "knows in whom he has believed," [w] and that his life depends on one who is "a quickening Spirit," [x] and "hath life *in Himself*." [y]

And this leads me to remark, that whatever of grand or noble, whatever of pure or holy, was contained in the aspirations and imaginings of Jew or heathen, Christianity has confirmed with a Divine sanction, and delivered to its professors, purified and exalted to a higher excellence. If the hopefulness of affection led some to look beyond the grave for renewed intercourse with those who had been to them here dearer than their own selves (42), Christianity

[r] 1 Tim. ii. 5. [s] Col. iii. 3. [t] Gal. ii. 20.
[u] Eph. v. 30. [v] 1 John v. 20. [w] 2 Tim. i. 12.
[x] 1 Cor. xv. 45. [y] John v. 26.

holds out the consolation of an eternal reunion, and bids us on that account not to sorrow "for them who sleep in Jesus,"[z] whom He will bring with Him at His coming. If, again, the misery of the flesh, in which, while it continues such as in this world it must ever be, we cannot but continually "groan, being burdened;"[a] if, I say, the misery of being clothed and clogged with a "fleshly tabernacle" of such a character, caused many to desire and expect with eagerness release from this bondage as among the chief blessings of death, Christianity likewise bids us look to death for deliverance from all which constitutes the real misery of the body, telling us that we shall then be altogether "changed"[b] our corruptible flesh putting on incorruption, our mortal immortality, and "mortality" being entirely "*swallowed up of life.*"[c] It was not the mere fact of having a body, but the wretchedness of being tied to *such* a body, that Plato mourned, and Philo thought so heavy a calamity. (43) Plato's highest angelic natures had bodies (44), and in them were perfectly happy, needing nothing external to themselves, and not deriving any taint of corruption or impurity from their connection with an etherial, and (so to speak) "spiritual body."[d] If we can be quit of the burthen of the flesh, if we can be set free (that is) from all the pains, temptations, impurities, grossnesses, restraints, impediments to which our corporeal nature, as it now is, subjects us, plainly there is no reason to desire more, or to wish to be "unclothed"[e] and quite stripped naked of all body.

[z] 1 Thess. iv. 13, 14. [a] 2 Cor. v. 4. [b] 1 Cor. xv. 51.
[c] 2 Cor. v. 4. [d] 1 Cor. xv. 44. [e] 2 Cor. v. 4.

And this freedom it is which Christianity promises us; we are to be reunited with the body, but not with the body *as it now is*, which were indeed no better than a prolonged imprisonment; we are promised the spiritualisation and glorification of our bodies—the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies which we here lie oppressed under — their "redemption,"[f] and assimilation to that glorious body which Christ has set for ever at the right hand of God. Here, then, we see the heathen, and Jewish, longing to be released from the "fetters" ,and "sepulchre" of the body admitted and responded to in the Christian scheme,—responded to, not as they who most strongly felt the longing, for the most part, imagined and desired, but in a better, more comforting, and more readily conceivable way. Corporeal beings cannot contemplate incorporeity without shrinking and shivering (so to speak) at the prospect of being entirely unclothed; and so Christianity, in this portion of the doctrine of the resurrection, satisfies *two* instincts: the desire to be free from the foulness and grossness of our present bodies, and the disinclination to be quite divested of all body. "Our house which is from heaven,"[g] our spiritual, uncorrupt, immortal, heavenly, glorified, "isangelical" body (45), will be free entirely from all that constitutes defect or drawback in "our earthly house of this tabernacle;"[h] walls will not confine it; distance will not delay it; external systems of matter will not hurt it; internal wants and pains will not disturb it—it will

[f] Rom. viii. 23. [g] 2 Cor. v. 2.
[h] Ib. verse 1.

pass with the swiftness of volition from place to place; —it will be (as Tertullian calls it) "angelified flesh" (46);—it will exalt, not lower, our nature:—and it will also be a home for the soul, a dwelling-place, a garment, "so that being clothed therewith we shall not be found naked."[i]

That loftiest longing also, that which in one shape or another has, in all ages, formed the stay and hope of the more spiritually-minded of our race, the desire of being united to God, finds in Christianity, and in that alone, full satisfaction and accomplishment. The theory of absorption is not calculated thoroughly to content the soul which is "athirst for God,"[k] since it robs the human being of consciousness at the very moment when consciousness would be the greatest blessing,—it makes him incapable of perceiving his happiness at the time and in the act of attaining to it. But Christianity—pointing equally with this theory to union with God as the true end and aim of our existence, teaching however a different kind of union, one consisting rather in unison than unity, and leaving the separate consciousness of the creature untouched, not merging or swallowing up the created in the creating intellect,—allows of our looking forward to a constant *perception* of the communion which is to constitute our happiness, and so makes us not only to *be* one with God, but to *feel* that we are one with God, through all eternity. Here again the Christian's hope transcends the heathen's. The gift which God has

[i] 2 Cor. v. 3.

[k] Ps. xlii. 2.

of a truth in store for us surpasses all that man's utmost stretch of imagination could conceive of as possible.

May we then be truly thankful to Almighty God for His goodness to us; — may we evermore praise and magnify His glorious name for the "blessed hope of everlasting life which He has given us in our Saviour Jesus Christ."[1] And may we ever bear in mind that it is not to satisfy our curious thoughts that this wonderful knowledge has been vouchsafed us, but to influence our practice — to have its effect upon our lives. Each addition to Revelation adds to our duties — each increase of light increases our obligations. If the faint glimmer that feebly illumined the obscurity which was spread around the heathen was sufficient nevertheless to point out to him the necessity of making all life a preparation for and practising of death (47),—if the ancient Israelites, amid the clouds and darkness that overhung the tabernacle, lived nevertheless "as strangers and pilgrims on the earth,"[m]—"what manner of men ought *we* to be in all holy conversation and godliness!"[n] How dead ought *we* to be to the cares, and vanities, and paltry honours of this world! How lightly ought *we* to esteem of temporal deprivation or suffering! How ought *our* "conversation to be in Heaven,"[o] whither Christ is gone to prepare for us *eternal* habitations! Again, since godly fear should chasten always the rejoicing of the Christian, it will be well for us to bear also in mind, that if the doctrine which has now been occupying our thoughts be, to the faithful, full of com-

[1] Collect for Second Sunday in Advent.
[m] Heb. xi. 13.
[n] 2 Pet. iii. 11.
[o] Phil. iii. 20.

fort, and consolation, and joy unspeakable, yet it has one aspect which is terrible. The eternal union of the manhood with the godhead has conferred on all who are partakers of the nature of man the gift of an eternal being, but not on all the blessing of eternal *life*. There is an existence which is endless misery and undying death. Let us beware that we turn not God's blessing into our bitterest curse.

SERMON III.

JOHN xviii. 38.

"*Pilate saith unto him, 'What is truth?'*"

THESE words have been called a jest (1), but there is nothing jesting in their tone. Pilate was not, so far as appears, a scoffer. He presents to us the likeness of a weak rather than a wicked man, and is a warning to us of the lengths to which mere weakness may proceed when bolder and stronger spirits lay hold of it, and bend it to their will. Pilate had, if not a sense of religion, a sense of right and wrong, and shows throughout the whole painful scene which depicts him to us, a wish, not to aggravate our Lord's sufferings, but, if possible, to spare him. Even the scourging which he ordered, and the mockery by the soldiers which he allowed, seem to have been sanctioned by him under the notion that they would perhaps be accepted by the clamorous people in the place of a severer sentence. Pilate was selfish and worldly; he shrank from the guilt of shedding innocent blood; but he shrank more from the danger of becoming an object of suspicion to Tiberius. His own anxieties occupied him; and while it must be granted that the question, "What is truth?" was not in his mouth a serious and earnest inquiry after that knowledge without which

man walks in darkness, it was at least as far from being a scoff or jest—which it is never regarded by any of the ancient commentators. "Christ," says St. Chrysostom, "by these words attracts and persuades Pilate to listen to his discourse, and at last leads him on to ask this question, 'What is truth?'" (2) "He not only," says St. Cyril, "liberates Pilate from his fears, but engages him to lofty thoughts concerning himself." (3) "His words," says Theophylact, "though short, took such hold on Pilate, that he was led to ask the question, 'What is truth?' For truth had well nigh disappeared from among men, and was unknown to them, since they lay in unbelief." (4)

But why then did he not "stay for an answer?" Perhaps, as St. Augustine thinks (5), because he now for the first time conceived the idea that Jesus might be accepted by the people as the prisoner to be released at the feast; or, more probably, because although he had not asked the question in the proud spirit of a scoffer, he had asked it in the untrusting and unhoping spirit of a sceptic. Viewed thus the words ring mournfully back through the long corridors of the past, and the echo of them sounds still more mournfully down the vistas of the future. The natural man, in presence of the Truth itself, perceives not the presence, but utters despairingly the cry, "What is truth?" and having in those words given a vent to the pent-up scepticism of years, turns to practical life and busies himself with action. As if action could stifle thought, or as if there could be any comfort or satisfaction in practical life till its theory is understood, till the true "way" of life is

"made plain"[a] to us, and we know whither our steps tend, what we are to strive to obtain, and how our object may be best accomplished. "What is truth?" then, must ever be the first question for the awakened soul; and till we have a firm hold on the answer to be given to it, to plunge into practical life is like going to sea without chart or compass, and can only tend to an unsettled and unstable course, ending in shipwreck.

Long had the heathen asked the question of nature without and of their own souls within them, "What is truth?" and poor and unsatisfying had been the replies given. Nature tells of a God, and witnesses to "His eternal power" and "godhead,"[b] but says little of His justice, and scarce anything of His love and mercy. The soul is too apt to throw upon the image of God the shadow of its own imperfections and impurities; or if it rises to the conception of a perfect moral being, then to shrink from such a being through the sense of its own guiltiness. "The world by wisdom knew not God;"[c] and the vain efforts of conflicting philosophies had issued, at the time of our Lord's coming, in that general scepticism and unbelief, that utter hopelessness of ever attaining to any real knowledge of the truth, which found in Pilate—the foremost Gentile of all those brought into contact with our Lord—no inappropriate nor unfitting mouth-piece. The first phase of scepticism had passed away. It was now not so much that men were dissatisfied with all the systems wherewith they were surrounded, and sought for a truth which they did not find in any of them, as that they had

[a] Prov. xv. 19. [b] Rom. i. 20. [c] 1 Cor. i. 21.

begun to despair of truth itself; the search after it was abandoned; and it was thought the highest wisdom to know that nothing could by any possibility be known. Bred up in a moral atmosphere of this kind, and faithfully reflecting the tone of thought belonging to his class, the Roman magistrate no sooner hears the declaration — conceived in so opposite a spirit — "For this cause was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I might bear witness of *the truth*; every one that is *of the truth* heareth my voice;" than he expresses his astonishment at such an assumption of an absolutely true, as distinct from mere theory and opinion, and responds with his question, "What is truth?" not so much by way of inquiry as by way of protest; of protest against the very notion of objective truth, not against any peculiar statement of what the truth is. And this was the state of mind most common among the heathen. A few clung to particular systems, but without any heartfelt trust in them; the mass worshipped after the manner of their forefathers, but without any faith at all in the beings whom they were professing to honour; the great bulk of the educated openly professed their scepticism, both in the national religion and in philosophy; and scarcely a hope seems to have been entertained in any quarter of emerging from this condition of universal doubt and incertitude into any higher phase of intellectual life where truth and knowledge would be attainable. (6)

A change, however, impended — as so often happens — when there was least hope of it. "The Truth" itself

became incarnate, and stood upon the earth. One came who said authoritatively, "I tell you the truth;"[d] by Him "the truth" was once for all delivered to mankind, and delivered with such an array of evidence and proof as carried conviction to all honest minds, and produced within the space of three centuries the extraordinary spectacle of the conversion of an empire co-extensive with the civilised world. To the universal scepticism there succeeded then an universal faith; and it might have seemed as if the question "What is truth?" would never again have to be asked; as if nothing but wilful blindness could ever again make men unable to distinguish the false from the true, nothing but positive dishonesty cause them to doubt "the truth as it is in Jesus."[e]

Yet we know that this is not so. Eighteen centuries have passed, and from one cause or another—from the cessation of miracles, from the continually increasing distance of the events which accompanied the original publication of the "truth," from the divisions of Christendom, from the growth of a refining and criticising spirit, and perhaps in part from injudicious and unskilful reasoning on the part of the defenders of Christianity—it is palpable that a time of doubting has returned, that the question "What is truth?" is once more asked—not with the same despondency as formerly, but still with real incertitude—and asked, not, I am sure, by those alone who desire (consciously or unconsciously) to free themselves from moral restraints, but often by persons who are among the best, the purest,

[d] John viii. 45. [e] Eph. iv. 21.

the humblest of our body—by those who most earnestly wish for a solid basis of Christian faith on which to rear the fabric of their lives—whom their doubts most grievously distress—and who would be most glad to be free from them. I trust I shall not be thought presumptuous in saying, that I question whether under these circumstances—considering this to be one of the special trials to which persons are at the present day exposed—whether, I say, we do enough in this pulpit, and elsewhere in the University, to meet and combat the danger, to strengthen the wavering faith of our weaker brethren, by pressing upon them the various evidences of Christianity, which are so weighty severally, and in their cumulative force so overwhelming. Secure in our own faith, we generally assume that of our hearers—we do not think it necessary to "lay again the foundations[f]" of belief—we are for *leaving* "the principles of the doctrine of Christ," and "going on" to those points which seem to us to constitute its "perfection," forgetting that too many of those who hear us are weak Christians—"babes," in St. Paul's language[g]—who have more need of "milk" than of "strong meat"—who though approaching to the time when for their age they should be teachers, yet "have need to be taught again," the very "first principles of the oracles of God."[h]

To enter effectively on the entire question of the Christian Evidences within the limits of a single discourse, is plainly impossible. On such subjects vague generalities carry with them but little weight; and

[f] Heb. vi. 1. [g] Ib. v. 13. [h] Ib. ver. 12.

there is no single one of the many recognised heads of evidence, which, if attempted in detail, would not furnish abundant matter for a volume. I hope at some future time, if opportunity shall offer, to bring before you the present state of the *historical* evidences for Revealed Religion (7), which have of late years been much augmented by the progress of cuneiform and other discoveries. On this occasion we shall perhaps best employ ourselves by confining our attention to another and a narrower branch of the enquiry—the *moral* argument, as it has been termed—the argument from the superiority of the Christian morality over any other, firstly and pre-eminently, as seen in the teaching of Scripture and the person of Christ—secondly, and in a far inferior degree, as exemplified in the lives of Christians.

In connection with the first of these two subjects, there is an objection sometimes taken *in limine*, which requires an answer before we can properly proceed to the development of the reasoning. If there is a contrast, it is said, between the Christian morality and the morality of unassisted human reason, by what right do we pronounce the former to be the higher and the better of the two? Is not this a vicious circle? Do we not assume the morality to be higher, because Christianity is true, and then argue Christianity to be true, because its morality is higher? The reply to this objection is to be found in a very plain and palpable fact of our nature—a broad fact, often noticed, and extending to all the subjects on which our minds can be employed—I mean this—that our critical transcend our

inventive faculties. We recognise excellence when put before us, of which previously we could have formed no idea; and this, because there is nothing in our minds contradictory to truth, as there is nothing in our moral natures "contradictory to virtue."(8) In approving a low standard, when a higher one is as yet undiscovered, our intellects show themselves defective, but not distorted or depraved; in rejecting a higher standard in favour of a lower, the mind would embrace positive falsehood, which is as contrary to its nature as pain to our appetitive element. As therefore in science we can judge between theories, neither of which we could have elaborated, and can with sufficient certainty select the sounder of the two; and as in art we can appreciate accurately the comparative merit of works, the lowest of which our own powers could not have produced; so in the case before us, the human mind, which at its utmost stretch of perfection could only reach to the discovery of a morality such as we find in Plato or in Aristotle, can nevertheless, when the Christian view is set before it, and it compares that view with the teaching of heathen philosophy, pronounce determinately, and with full confidence in its decision, on the superiority of the former over the latter. Here is no vicious circle—the question is not begged—we have an inborn, or infused, moral sense—which judges better than it conceives—and to this moral sense we may properly submit the question of the relative excellence of Christian and heathen morality, secure in its power to pronounce aright, if at least we have not depraved it by long persistence in evil-doing.

I suppose that it may, without unfairness, be assumed, that the utmost height to which unassisted human reason ever attained in its speculations upon moral perfection, is made evident to us in those works of the Roman and Greek philosophers with which we are in this place most familiar. Oriental scholars are wont to speak occasionally in very exalted terms of the high morality which they discover in the works of Confucius, in the system of Sakya Muni, and in the teaching of the Vedas. But it has yet to be shown that Confucius surpassed Socrates, Sakya Aristotle, or the Vedic writers Plato and his followers. Had this been capable of proof, the proof would no doubt have been furnished long ere now. We may therefore, it would seem, still properly regard the philosophers of Greece and Rome as placing before us, in their ethical writings, the highest views of morality to which the human mind, without revelation, has shown itself capable of attaining. It is consequently with the systems of these teachers that I should propose especially to compare the Christian morality, without, however, intending strictly to confine myself to this comparison.

Of all the names of classical antiquity none stands so high as that of Socrates. The moral honesty of the man—his uncompromising opposition to tyranny, when it strove to make him an instrument of oppression (9)—his boldness in opposing popular views (10)—and, above all, his martyrdom in the cause of truth—give him the foremost position among the sages of Greece, and lead us to expect of him, rather than of any other, a moral system which might compare with the Christian. What,

however, is the morality which he taught, according to the evidence of the best witness, the unimaginative Xenophon? What, for instance, is his temperance? Not abstinence from sinful pleasures, not the "crucifixion"[i] of those lusts which "war against the soul;"[k] but *moderation* in such pleasures, an *infrequent* indulgence in them — and this, moreover, on the mere ground of self-interest; because the palled appetite ceases to feel pleasure, and loss of health, and loss of goods, and loss of reputation, accompany the unrestrained gratification of the lower lusts and appetites. (11) This, perhaps, is the most gross instance that the "Memoirs" furnish of plain departure from those moral instincts which nature implants in all; but further, we may observe *throughout* a low tone, a pervading selfishness, an absence of all nobility of sentiment, a want of any theory of self-sacrifice, which it has been usual to excuse on the plea of condescension to the moral weakness of his countrymen, but which seems insufficiently accounted for by that theory, since it would imply an exercise of reserve transcending that, not of Plato only, but even of Aristotle. Even the very act of martyrdom itself — the act which in our minds associates the name of Socrates with that "noble army"[l] which has spent itself for the truth — is emptied in a large measure of its grace and virtue, by the selfish motives which (according to Xenophon) sustained the philosopher in his hour of trial — the thought that his death was glorious for himself and disgraceful for his adversaries; and the

[i] Gal. v. 24. [k] 1 Pet. ii. 11.

[l] Hymn of St. Ambrose.

further thought that he was taken away from the evil to come, that he was spared the weaknesses and infirmities of old age, dulled senses, failing powers, and that worst and sharpest pang of the advanced in years, the *perception* of weakened memory and diminished intellect. (12) Contrast with this the thoughts of the Christian under such circumstances. "I will very gladly spend and be spent *for you.*" [m] "I endure all things *for the elect's sake.*" [n] "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far better; nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful *for you.*" [o] And again, the feeling with respect to persecutors indicated in the words:— "At my first answer all men forsook me; I pray God it may not be laid to their charge." [p] "They stoned Stephen calling upon God, and saying .... Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." [q] Or contrast with it the thoughts of Him from whom Christians have derived alike the knowledge of how they ought to feel, and the power to feel as they ought, at such moments:— "I am the good shepherd, I lay down my life *for the sheep.*" [r] "It is *expedient for you* that I go away." [s] "I go *to prepare a place for you.*" [t] "Now is the Son of man glorified, and *God is glorified in him.*" [u] All thought of self swallowed up in thought of others, prayer for others—prayer for the dear friends whom he leaves, prayer for the whole body of the faithful through

[m] 2 Cor. xii. 15.
[n] 2 Tim. ii. 10.
[o] Phil. i. 24.
[p] 2 Tim. iv. 16.
[q] Acts vii. 59, 60.
[r] John x. 14, 15.
[s] John xvi. 7.
[t] Ib. xiv. 2.
[u] Ib. xiii. 31.

all time, prayers and excuses even for his murderers — "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."[v]

If the Socratic morality is unsatisfying from the lowness of its aim, and the unworthy compromise which it allows with positive evil, the Platonic is weak and vague, deficient in any sufficient stimulus to action, and apt to produce a mere fastidious and refined æstheticism, instead of that healthy practical tone which the circumstances of this world require. The true Platonist, like his master, will be content with negative good; he will shrink from the rude shocks and hard struggles which have to be endured, if the great battle of practical life is fought with spirit; enough for him if he can shelter himself behind a wall (13), while the hurricane of popular frenzy — political, commercial, or religious — goes sweeping past, destroying and making havoc along its path; enough for him if he can but "keep himself pure" (14) by abstaining from the unholy deeds and words which he sees and hears on all sides. He is not "his brother's keeper."[w] What is it to him if the multitude rush madly into crimes, sure to bring about, sooner or later, their own ruin? Of what *use* his attempting to resist or warn them? "*They would kill him*" (15); and this is a consummation from which he instinctively shrinks—too happy if he may find some quiet and safe retreat wherein to sit in silence and gently dream away his existence, amusing himself with speculations on the abstract good, which are to profit no human soul but his own.

[v] Luke xxiii. 34. [w] Gen. iv. 9.

With the dreamy speculative life of the Platonic system, the practical life of Aristotle's good and happy man stands in striking contrast. Here there is no abstinence from the battle of life, no avoidance of difficult duties, no cowardly fear of death, no lazy weaving of fruitless fancies. Life and happiness are energies; moral character is to be produced by action, and to find a vent in action — all the offices of life, civil, conjugal, parental, social, are to be performed — peril is to be faced, and death itself confronted, alike at the call of private friendship and the demand of public duty. (16) The strong and vigorous spirit of the Aristotelian moral system, its practical character, and direct antagonism to that listless tone of mind always too prevalent in the upper classes of a highly civilised community, have justly made it a favourite in this place; but it is to be hoped that we are not blind to its defects, to which all Christian teachers are bound to call the special attention of their scholars. Aristotle, in his zeal for action, omits from his account of virtue almost one entire half of what is really comprised in it. The rich, powerful, and prosperous find in his description of the life men ought to lead, and the character to which they ought to aspire, a portrait which they can appreciate, and a rule which they have it in their power to follow. But the weak, the poor, the needy, the oppressed, those whose lot it is to suffer rather than to do, the "bruised reeds"[x] who need most help, and claim most sympathy, are omitted from his account. Passive virtue, on which Chris-

[x] Matt. xii. 20.

tianity lays the greatest stress, which has the choicest blessings[y], and the most glorious promises, obtains scarcely a recognition from the philosopher of Stagirus, who almost reluctantly admits that in suffering and calamity a few stray gleams of goodness may here and there pierce through the murky clouds, behind which he regards it as being then concealed. (17) Patience, long-suffering, humility, self-distrust, resignation, fortitude, find no place in his catalogue of moral perfections; into which even meekness is received under protest, as a state of mind half way between a virtue and a vice. (18) Nor is this all. The *active* virtue of Aristotle, though far higher than that of Socrates, is not free from certain grievous flaws, which are sad blots upon his teaching. His good man will retaliate and revenge injuries; he will insult over his enemy when fallen; he will dislike obligation, and feel a petty jealousy towards those who in worldly rank excel him; he will despise the great bulk of his fellow-men, whose hearts are set on the good things of this life; and he will meet the proud with their own weapon of pride, to preserve his own dignity. "To endure insult," Aristotle says, "is slavish" (19); "not to retaliate a wrong is base servility." It is by retaliation of wrongs as much as by return of benefits that society is held together; and so the tame-spirited man who puts up with an injury is on a par with the ingrate. (20) Contrast this teaching with the injunctions, "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other; and if any man will

[y] Matt. v. 3, 5, 7, and 10.

sue thee at law, and take away thy cloak, let him have thy coat also."[z] "Recompense to no man evil for evil; avenge not yourselves; but if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good."[a]

But it is scarcely necessary to show, *by means of quotations*, how infinitely the morality of the Christian Scriptures transcends that of the best classical moralists; it is enough to point out defects in them. We are all familiar with the tone and tenor of the Christian teaching, and can supply from our own memories the passages which furnish a corrective to the mistakes of unaided reason. I pass, therefore, from this subject, to a brief review of certain of the Oriental systems, which have been ignorantly, or insidiously, extolled as inculcating a morality of the highest order.

No doubt it is possible to cull from the Vedas a set of passages which shall exhibit natural religion in its best and purest form—passages almost sublime in their simple majesty, on the nature and attributes of the Most High, as well as passages inculcating various moral duties very clearly and forcibly. For instance, we find in a Veda the following:—"This world was as yet in darkness, imperceptible, undiscoverable by reason, indiscernible, as it were altogether asleep. Then He who exists by Himself, the Most High, who is Himself imperceptible, made the world, composed of great elements, perceptible. He, the Almighty, showed Himself, and dispelled the gloom. He, whose nature

[z] Matt. v. 39. [a] Rom. xii. 17—21.

is beyond our reach, whose essence escapes our senses, who is indiscernible but eternal; He, the all-pervading Spirit, whom the mind even cannot grasp, even He shone forth Himself." (21). And again, in another place:— "Let us adore the supremacy of that divine light, the God-head; who illuminates all, from whom all proceed, to whom all must return, whom we invoke to direct our understanding aright in the progress towards His holy seat." But it is not by the selection of a few detached fragments carefully picked and chosen from the mass, which is of a very different colour, that a true notion of the moral character of the Vedic or ancient Brahminical system is to be obtained. The whole system must be taken together, and judged, as commonly held and taught among those who profess to regard it as authoritative.

Now all who are acquainted with the East will bear witness, that the moral aspect of Brahminism, like that of Gnosticism (which it greatly resembles), is twofold—ascetic and licentious. (22) With the mass it takes the latter shape. Matter being regarded as either necessarily impure or else unreal, a free license is given to all bodily acts; and even the sanctions of religion are called in, as was the case in the old Pagan world, to authorise and encourage sensuality. With the few, Brahminism is ascetic. To combat the impurity of matter, the Indian mystic either simply withdraws himself from the concerns of men, and seeks to dwell in a continued state of serene abstraction in a sphere above the sensible; or else, made conscious of the weakness of the flesh by vain attempts to free

himself from its influence, has recourse for its subjection to the most painful and disgusting austerities, performed usually in the sight of men; as though the satisfaction derivable from gratified pride were necessary to enable shrinking nature to endure such terrible pangs. In either case, the perfect man of this system —the object of a veneration approaching to worship among his co-religionists—is a man who lives only for himself, whose thoughts, hopes, aims, are centered wholly in himself, who puts aside all the claims of his brother men upon him in order to elevate himself into what he deems a higher sphere; and undergoes sufferings, not to benefit others, but to obtain more quickly his own imagined good—absorption into the Divine Essence. No wonder that, thus wrapped up in self, he is cruel to others (23); no wonder he sternly forces the shrinking widow into the flames, and having brought his aged father to the banks of the sacred stream, refuses all his requests for food, and compels him to die.

The morality of Buddhism is not very different from this. Buddhism is reformed Brahminism—Brahminism without its most offensive parts. It has, however, the same pervading vice of selfishness; and it superadds to this a formalism unknown to the earlier system—a formalism which has its natural development in the invention of praying-machines, which place an additional good work to the account of their erector, each time that the wind turns them. (24)

The dim and indistinct knowledge existing among us on the subject of these systems, has alone made it possible to represent them with any plausibility as incul-

cating a pure and high morality. Our better acquaintance with the teaching of Mahomet, precludes, in his case, such misrepresentation; and its absence will relieve us from the necessity of extending any further this portion of our inquiry.

The question of the actual superiority of Christian morality, as exhibited in the life and conduct of Christians, over any other, is one the importance of which can scarcely be exaggerated. It has been well said that "the *strongest possible* argument for a religion is its influence upon the lives of its professors." "By their fruits ye shall know them,"[b] may be extended from individual teachers to churches, and from churches to entire religious systems. Indeed it is thus only that the words can be broadly and indiscriminately applied; for, on the one hand, men are better than their systems, and on the other, with individuals, the truth may be "held in unrighteousness."[c] Moral improvement is not perhaps the *sole* end which true religion — natural or revealed — proposes to itself; but it is undoubtedly *an* end embraced, and a very principal end; so much so that it is not to be expected a religion should make much way with men, unless the argument from its moral results can be justly used in its favour. Now it has been too much the fashion of late years to allow, with that affectation of liberality which characterises the present age, not only that there are good and bad men of all religions, which is true, but also (which I believe to be most entirely false), that about

[b] Matt. vii. 20. [c] Rom. i. 18.

the same proportion of good and bad, and the same degrees of goodness and badness exist in each. The point is one which does not admit of strict proof. We cannot count the good and bad of each religion; neither can we accurately test and gauge the highest goodness produced under one system, and the highest goodness produced under another. What, however, we can do is to judge, as we judge of the superior intelligence of a race or nation, by the general results seen upon the surface of society, in manners, customs, institutions, tone of thought and speech, practices forbidden or allowed, and the like. On all these various points recent events have given to our spurious liberality a rude shock. The closer insight obtained during the late war into the state of morality among the Turks, dispelled an illusion which many writers had fostered, that there was not much difference of moral tone between a Christian and a Mahometan. And now, the calamities which have befallen us in the East are rapidly opening our eyes to the true character of Oriental heathenism. The mild and gentle Hindoo, so soft in speech, so courteous, so deferential, so patient, so blameless in his life, has suddenly shown the ferocity of the tiger, combined with a treachery and a malignity only seen among the worst men. Our writers have often expressed themselves in forcible terms as to the wickedness of the unregenerate heart; but it has remained for *us* to see it, and to have branded into our memories, ineffaceably, the *terrible* nature of that depravity which lurks beneath the surface, however fair that surface may show, in every land, and almost in

every heart, where the constraining force of Christian motives and Christian faith have not chained the wild beast that is within us, and brought the passions and the will into subjection to the law of God. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The Vedic and Buddhist systems, the religions of Confucius and of Mahomet, have been long enough in existence to have shown clearly by this time of what spirit they are, and what effect they are able to produce on men. A dreamy mysticism, an austere asceticism, combined with spiritual pride and a hard callousness to the sufferings of others, these are their best results, and these are but rarely obtained. With the mass they foster and encourage selfishness, pander to lust, increase pride, nurse cruelty. Still to this day, as in Apostolic times, where the Lord Jesus is not known, and His law is not received as the rule of life, men are "filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness;"[d] still are they "full of envy, murder, debate (strife), deceit, malignity;" still are they "whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful." Vain is civilisation to check these things; for of that there is wellnigh as much in the east as in the west, more in China, certainly than in many of our own colonies. Civilisation cannot soften the heart, subdue selfishness, repress pride, compel purity, introduce the spirit of love.

[d] Rom. i. 29—31.

Christianity, which has stopped polygamy, caused the vice of impurity to hide itself, raised woman to be the companion of man, abolished slavery in most lands, forbidden private revenge, made laws against infanticide and suicide, has in all this shown a marvellous power to elevate the moral tone of mankind. Nor is this the whole; Christianity has transformed that shadow of philanthropy which flitted before the eye of certain of the ancient sages (25), seen dimly and indistinctly, but never laid hold of or made the ground of acts; Christianity has transformed this faint shadow into a living and breathing reality, and has made the whole earth a witness to the transformation. Not only in each Christian land do institutions rise up, schools, alms-houses, hospitals, refuges, penitentiaries, collegiate foundations, and the like, an enduring evidence of that "love of the brethren" [e] which is made the very mark and test of our being disciples of Christ; not only are societies for charitable purposes formed and maintained by the voluntary offerings of the faithful, whose collective income equals the revenue of an empire, while still the work of private charity goes on without interruption, amounting perhaps to more in the aggregate than all that is done openly; not only, I say, does Christian love produce these fruits, and others like to these; but over the whole earth — in the chill regions of the ice-bound north, on the burning sands of the Sahara, in the pestilential swamps of Mozambique — whatever the clime, whatever the physical obstacles, whatever the

[e] John xiii. 35.

danger, Christian missionaries are found pursuing their most arduous calling, far from the comforts and solaces of home, in strange lands, among savage races, spending and being spent to spread the Gospel of Christ and win souls to heaven. Making every allowance for secondary motives, for the desire to see new scenes, for the love of excitement, for the mere spirit of enterprise, for the ambition to have a high calling, there will still remain in the lives of missionaries, and the history of missions, a mass of self-denial and self-sacrifice, which can be explained on no low or worldly theory, which stands out above and beyond the rest even of Christian excellency, "a spectacle to men and angels,"[f] unique in the history of the world. When a Francis Xavier, born and nurtured in the richest kingdom of the West, plunges into almost unknown regions, amid idolatrous tribes, with a mere handful of coadjutors, when he spends his whole life in almost incredible labours and endurances, preaching, baptizing, tending the sick, moving from place to place, twice traversing the provinces of Southern India, twice crossing the sea from Cape Comorin to China, and even to Japan; three times, in the space of eleven years, passing over the whole circuit of the globe, and at last, worn out with his toils, perishing just as his perseverance had opened to him a new door, and he had set foot within the charmed limits of China; when a servant of the Cross, "consumed with a quenchless

[f] 1 Cor. iv. 9.

love of souls" (26), thus acts and suffers, it is a sight different in kind from any other which the world has to show, and one which, even alone, is (in my judgment) quite sufficient to prove the divine origin of Christianity. But such a case is no lone nor rare one. From the time of the Apostles to the present day, the Christian Church has sent forth a succession of such holy warriors, the champions of the Cross of Christ, who have carried the Gospel into all lands, and made Christianity the only religion which has a universal rather than a local character. Some names stand out pre-eminent from the long and goodly catalogue — St. Martin, the apostle of Gaul, St. Boniface, the apostle of Germany, St. Patrick, the apostle of Ireland, Saints Columba and Columbanus, the converters of Scotland and Lombardy; and, in more recent times, Matthew Rogier, in China, Henry Martyn and Bishop Heber, in India, and (perhaps I may be allowed to add) Bishop Selwyn, in New Zealand. But besides these burning and shining lights, to whom God gave more or less of the blessing of success, the Church has had in all ages an array of men possessed of almost equal zeal and self-devotion, who, without attaining to such fame, have given themselves for others. What is there like to this in connection with other systems? Ambition has led some to extend their religion, and with it their kingdom, by the sword. Impatience of opposition, or a desire of consolidating their power, has caused princes to require all their subjects to be of one creed. A wish to increase their numbers and their strength has

led political communities, of a peculiar religion, to labour zealously to obtain proselytes in foreign lands, whom they seek to draw to their own territory. (27) But earnest efforts, sustained and unwearying, to convert separate and independent nations, who are to remain separate and independent, which is the only unselfish proselytising, is a phenomenon peculiar to Christianity. None but Christians even pray for the conversion of others. None but Christians seem to desire, much less to strive, that their religion may overspread the earth. And the natural result follows, itself an additional argument in favour of Christianity being from God, that the proportion of Christians to persons of other religions is perpetually increasing, that Christianity is the only religion which is steadily progressive, and that thus, by the very law of its being, it must in time become the religion of the world.

One practical remark may be added to this review. If the moral argument be indeed one of the main grounds upon which Christianity must ever rest, if the influence of a religion upon the lives of its professors be rightly termed "the *strongest possible* argument for its truth," under what an obligation is each Christian laid to strive that in his own person this argument be not weakened nor impaired! Indian Missionaries tell us that one of the greatest, if not actually *the* greatest, obstacle in the way of the reception of Christianity by the Hindoos, has been the flagrant immorality of too many of those nominal Christians whom we have sent out to govern them. Yet they have been a fair sample

of ourselves, neither better nor worse than the classes from which they were taken. We, therefore, at home, are equally to blame with them for this stumbling-block. And it is only by a general elevation of the moral tone of the community, by increased strictness, greater purity of life and conversation, especially in our schools and universities, that we can expect to send out a succession of persons fit to represent the morality of the Christian system before the jealous eyes of hostile heathenism. Could this change be made — could strictness of living become the rule, and immorality the rare exception, in our educated classes — could those who represent Christianity in the East be universally, or even generally, such in heart and life as some of those heroic men whose deeds have been lately much before our eyes, we need not despair of accomplishing that great task which we seem to have been set by God —the conversion of India. The age of miracles is indeed past, but that need not dishearten us. It is at least doubtful whether the heathen of the old world were converted to any very great extent by miracles. Perhaps the greatest marvel in their eyes — that which wrought with them most, and most disposed them to believe—was, as a great infidel writer of the last century was fain to allow, "the virtues of the first Christians." (28) "See how these Christians love one another!" is said to have been their frequent remark; and such love, with the deeds which flowed from it, and the general purity to which Pliny reluctantly testifies (29), could not but have infinite weight, and gra-

dually overcome the prejudice which had at first pronounced our religion "exitiabilis superstitio." (30) Could we but return, and "repent, and do again the first works,"[g] the nineteenth century might perhaps repeat, or eclipse, the glories of the fourth and fifth.

[g] Rev. ii. 5.

SERMON IV.

HEB. iv. 9.

"*There remaineth, therefore, a rest to the people of God.*"

LABOUR is our portion, yet rest is our chief desire—rest, from the first moment that his energies are called into play, is ever present to the mind of man as his ultimate haven, the object of all his toils, the end of all his exertions, the satisfaction of all his faculties. Turn the pages, sacred or profane, which convey to us, through God's providence, the mental history of our race, and there is no leaf but will show the existence of this instinctive longing, ever deepest and strongest in the best and holiest, now struggling to find an utterance through the stammering lips of heathen philosophy, now bursting in full-voiced choral-song from the inspired mouth of Judah's prophet band—anon echoed, albeit harshly and dissonantly, from the tongues of worldlings and pleasure-seekers. From the cold Stoic, vainly dreaming of obtaining, by isolation and neglect of duty, the blessing of perfect quietude in *this* life (1); from the man of practical sense and wisdom above all others, reaching onwards to what he saw must be the *final* condition of beings such as we are (2); from the man of a diviner wisdom than he, the wisest of all the sons of men, that have been, or that shall be, while

the world endures (3); from the whole "goodly fellowship" of those who through seven centuries of ever increasing darkness, passed on from hand to hand the torch of prophecy (4); nay, even, strange to say, from the palled modern worldling and voluptuary (5); one universal cry goes forth, age after age, a cry for REST. (6)

Strange contrast which the actual condition of the world offers to this ideal perfection! Look abroad upon the whole race of mankind; take in at one glance the manifold peoples of the earth; pass in thought from this civilised and enterprising Europe to the broad plains of stationary Asia, the glowing sands of crushed and bleeding Africa, or the busy savannahs of the ever advancing Western World, and on what does the eye look but ceaseless, changeless toil—a race of creatures seemingly formed only to pass their lives in never-ending labour — myriads upon myriads perpetually working and drudging, and knowing no rest, except when overtasked nature sinks awhile under its load, and allows the wearied wretches a brief obliviousness? If there be indeed "above the highest moveable sphere" another, wherein there is neither "alteration, motion, or change, but all things immutable, unsubject to passion, blest with eternal continuance in a life of the highest perfection, and of that complete abundant sufficiency within itself, which no possibility of want, maim, or defect can touch," (7)—how would a being from such a sphere stand aghast at introduction into this world of ours! Like one brought suddenly from quiet pastoral scenes into the turmoil of a mighty city,

or a recluse taken from his cloister, and placed in the midst of all the clang, and whirl, and bustle of a factory, bewildered at the multiplicity of the movements, astonished at the noise and tumult, confused with the crowd and hurry, he would assuredly regard this huge workshop of a world in which we live, as the habitation of a race with whom unrest and labour were as much objects of desire as peace and quietude to beings cast in his own mould.

And this unvarying spectacle of myriads toiling everywhere, even beyond their strength, is no new thing upon the earth. The records of by-gone times, in books and monuments, show us the mass of men yet more ground down by toil in former ages, than at the present time. Assyria's palaces, Babylonia's gigantic mounds, Egypt's temples and pyramids, Grecia's Cyclopean walls, Rome's amphitheatres and aqueducts, are evidences of the exaction, from vast classes of the people, of an excessive and oppressive amount of labour, to which modern times afford no parallel. In the ancient world slavery, the lowest degradation of the working class, was an universal institution; and subject races, in almost every country, were employed in servile labours involving heavier work and harder suffering than any to which men are exposed in the present age.

What shall we say, then, to this contrast and contradiction? Whence comes it that, in this instance, the ideal and the real are so utterly opposed to one another? Why, with so keen a craving for complete repose, are we doomed to such perpetual drudgery?

Why, if toil is to be our portion through life, are we gifted with the desire "to be at rest"?[a] Shall we lay all to the curse which "one man's disobedience"[b] brought upon us? Shall we say that the power to appreciate and desire repose is but a chance remnant of that purer nature, and a stray record of that better time, when sinless man dwelt peacefully in calm content, amid the still and stormless shades of the Eden which God had planted for him? Shall we view the toil and travail, which are now the portion of our race, as nothing but the undying brand of the Divine displeasure, stamped upon our miserable human life, marking it as ruined, lost, and fallen, the life of prisoners expiating their crimes by suffering, the doom intended and irrevocably fixed by the words of the malediction — "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread"?[c] Doubtless it is true to say that the curse is *at the root* of the contradiction between our lot and our longings, between the actual life which we lead and the ideal estate to which our hopes and feelings tend. The power to see the beauty of repose, the heart to love it and seek to it, have indeed come down to us from the days of our primeval innocence; and the world-wide necessity of toil, the never-ceasing stir and hum of our life here upon earth, do owe their origin to the change which "man's first disobedience" rendered necessary; but the one is no chance remnant of a state of things that has wholly passed away, and the other is no mere exaction of a still unpaid penalty. Mercy spoke by the

[a] Ps. lv. 6. [b] Rom. v. 19.

[c] Gen. iii. 19.

mouth of God even in the very words of the curse itself; and labour was from the first as much a means of restoring man to the happiness which his sin had lost, as a punishment for his disobedience. The rest, which had been suitable to a perfect nature needing no change, was unfitted for a being who required renovation and recovery; and labour, which before would have had no object, was now the necessary, or at least the appointed, means of moral restoration. It was not needful, however, in order to bind men to labour, that they should lose their sense of the excellence of repose; and so that feeling was allowed to continue, and man was thereby taught to look forward, beyond this life of toil, to another and a better world, where his aspirations after rest might be realised.

I say, therefore, that from the first labour was no evil or wholly unblessed thing. Men despised it, hated it, strove to escape from it, thought scorn of those who, by compulsion or choice, passed their time in it. Yet all the while it was doing its work upon them, elevating, improving, purifying them. While they cursed it as a degradation and a misery, they owed to it all that rendered life tolerable. I speak not so much of those external appliances, those comforts and conveniences of life by which such as despise labour commonly set more store than others, and which are yet, all of them, the produce of laborious industry, as of the internal capacities of enjoyment, the health, the strength, the moral and mental vigour on which they specially prided themselves. All these were the fruits of exertion, the effect of toilsome exercise. God's image once marred

in man, the decree went forth that only by care and labour, by effort and travail, should the ruin be repaired, the lost likeness restored in him. And so labour and travail, working towards this blessed end, had, even, in heathen times, a bright as well as a dark aspect, and were capable of being contemplated in a hopeful no less than in a desponding spirit, as means of recovery, albeit traces of a fall, from our first estate.

And if this were the case, even in heathen times, how much more in Christian! Perhaps among the numerous *present* blessings which Christianity has conferred upon mankind, there is no single one for which more gratitude is due than the change effected by it in the character of labour, the necessary lot at all times of by far the greater number of men. From the moment when the Lord of heaven and earth "took man's nature upon Him in the womb of the blessed Virgin," and condescended to be born into the world, the child of one whose husband was a "carpenter," from that moment labour lost altogether its character of curse, and became invested with a marvellous dignity,—was transformed into a glorious employ, which no longer only benefited but dignified and exalted men. Unreasonable and foolish would it be to doubt that He, who, at the age of twelve, went down with Joseph and His mother to Nazareth, and "*was subject* to them,"[d] until, "beginning to be about thirty years of age,"[e] He was "led by the Spirit"[f] to commence His ministry,—unreasonable, I say, and foolish would it be to doubt,

[d] Luke ii. 51. [e] Ib. iii. 23. [f] Ib. iv. 1.

that during these seventeen or eighteen years passed by Him in the dwelling of the carpenter, He himself laboured, working with His holy hands "the thing that was good,"[g] aiding the aged Joseph in his daily toil. Or, if men will cavil here, because we have no *direct* account in Scripture of how He passed these years, what *other* explanation can be given of the fact, that He himself bore among His neighbours and acquaintances the designation of "the carpenter"? "Is not this *the carpenter*, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joses, and of Juda and Simon? And are not His sisters here with us?"[h] They who knew His daily life knew Him as "the carpenter." Doubtless, to thousands upon thousands of wearied souls, worn with the never-ending drudgery of toil, this thought — the thought that HE laboured, that HE toiled, that HE for *eighteen* years lived the common life of working men, "rising early and late taking rest,"[i] "eating HIS bread in the sweat of HIS face"[j] — doubtless this thought has brought peace and content to thousands who might else have sunk into the pit of despair, and perished through their misery.

Thus did Christ redeem from the curse rude manual labour, exalting it high, and making it an employ in which men may well glory. If, however, He had stopped here, may we not say that His work had been but half accomplished? The world must ever contain two sorts of labouring men, those who toil with the hand and those who toil with the brain; and

[g] Eph. iv. 28.
[h] Mark vi. 3.
[i] Ps. cxxvii. 2, Prayer Book version.
[j] Gen. iii. 19.

therefore, to redeem *all* labour, it was necessary that Christ should live both lives, and, giving up His handicraft, become a labourer of the other kind. So the Carpenter became the Teacher and the Preacher; and mental labour, no less than bodily, grew bright and full of blessedness.

Time was, and that no distant time, when in this country, and even among ourselves in this place, these truths were scarcely recognised. To have no real occupation, to be above the necessity of toil, to be rich enough to live without a profession, these were the advantages which formed the boast of the more affluent; while the secret or open envy of the rest of the world acknowledged them for the choicest of all earthly blessings. Of late years truer views have been put forward, and have spread widely. The dignity of labour, whether mental or manual, is felt and allowed in many quarters; the duty of men with respect to labour is sometimes urged; yet still the old leaven works. The illusion that it is better to be idle than to toil hard is not dispelled from all minds; idleness has still charms for numbers, and is mentioned by those who have been required to examine into the condition of this University as among the besetting sins of the place (8); and I think it may be said that comparatively few of those who are here placed under our care have any deep or strong conviction, or, perhaps so much as a real belief or feeling, that industry and diligence are among their religious duties.

Yet few things are more plain, whether we look to reason or to Scripture, than that we are *under an obli-*

gation to lead an active, laborious life. Heathen moralists, from a consideration of the nature given to man and the circumstances in which he is placed, drew the conclusion that he had undoubtedly a *work* to do in the world, and that his work was "to *energise.*" (9) They saw clearly enough that to shrink from all active exertion, to trifle away one's time, to be an idler in this busy workaday world, however congenial to our natural indolence, was really a crime against nature,—which bound men together in societies, which gave them social instincts, which endued them with principles of action, which made activity a general law of all being, which attached individual happiness to exertion, and which made the well-being of all men collectively to depend upon the laboriousness of each man separately. Hence the contempt with which they spoke of the lazy and effeminate man (10); hence the anger which they expressed against those whose highest object in life was amusement. (11) They warned these drones in the human hive that their conduct was displeasing alike to gods and to men, and that it could bring them in the end nothing but shame and misery. (12)

Scripture teaches the same lesson with equal plainness, only adding higher motives and more awful sanctions. I have spoken of the example of Him who is to be to us our perfect pattern, whose participation in labour hallows and blesses *all* labour,—of Him, for thirty years the Carpenter, for three the Teacher and the Preacher, ever "going about doing good," [k] never pausing on His

[k] Acts x. 38.

work of love, day after day toiling to relieve men's wants, and turn their hearts unto Himself. I might speak of the example of those who are likewise set forth to us "*as ensamples*,"[l] the first and truest followers of their Blessed Lord, the holy apostles of God, who laboured with such persevering zeal and earnestness to spread the Gospel of Christ through all countries. But I scarcely think it needful to prove, what all who have any knowledge of the Scriptures must know so well, that Christianity requires of men a life of active exertion and continued laborious industry. The comparisons which represent to us our life here below, as that of labourers toiling in a vineyard[m], combatants striving at the games[n], soldiers struggling for life or death in a battle[o], indicate the general tenor of Holy Writ on this matter, and may suffice in lieu of that cumulative proof which it would be impossible fully to exhibit without quoting from almost every page of Scripture.

The sum is, that we, being God's creatures, are placed by Him in this world not to disport or amuse ourselves, not to make life a holiday, nor yet to fold our hands in idleness, and float calmly down the stream of events; but each one of us to do a work, to "set ourselves in some good way,"[p] to put the "talents," be they more or be they fewer, which God has given to us, "out to usury,"[q] to "serve,"[r] to "labour,"[s] to "minister" to

[l] Phil. iii. 17; 2 Thess. iii. 9.
[m] Matt. xx. 1.
[n] 1 Cor. ix. 24.
[o] Eph. vi. 11; 2 Tim. ii. 3.
[p] Ps. xxxvi. 4.
[q] Matt. xxv. 27.
[r] Gal. v. 13.
[s] Eph. iv. 28.

the necessities of others [t], to help to "bear their burthens," [u] to "work in God's vineyard," [v] to fight God's battle [w], to "be about His business." [x] Neither as Christians nor as men can we be justified in doing less than this. If we would wish, when life draws towards its close, to look back with tolerable satisfaction upon our past career, we must from our early years act steadily upon the principle that, unless as useful beings, we are out of place in this world; unless as helpers of the work of the world, it had been better for us not to have been born into it. God has made the sum total of the happiness of His creatures to depend on the sum total of their exertions. If, then, persons allow themselves to receive pleasure and benefit from the toils and labours of their fellow-men, while they for their part contribute nothing in return,—if they are content to consume the produce of other men's industry, yet not themselves to be producers of anything,—they do in fact an appreciable injury to mankind, and the world would be better off had they never lived. Perhaps in God's sight it is little less than robbery for a man to snatch every atom of enjoyment that he can for his own portion, and yet to have no care to supply in exchange what may render service or impart enjoyment to others. Every sip that such a one takes from his pleasure-cup is so much deducted from the general store, to which he has no right, since he contributes nothing. "Let him that *stole steal* no more, but rather

[t] Heb. vi. 10.
[u] Gal. vi. 2.
[v] Matt. xxi. 28.
[w] 2 Tim. ii. 3.
[x] Luke ii. 49.

let him labour, working with his hands the thing which is good," [y] will apply literally to each idler in God's universe. They who have set themselves in no good way, who do not their share of the world's work, may well be said to *steal* what they take of the world's enjoyments and advantages, which, if not consumed by them, would remain for worthier men.

Work, then, is our duty, and work likewise is our privilege; not alone in that it is only by laborious exertion that we form habits of goodness, but likewise in that no otherwise can we be "conformed to Christ's image," [z] or "manifest," ever so faintly, "the life of Jesus in us." [a] He "came not to be ministered unto, but to minister;" [b] He "was among us as he that serveth." [c] The "work which His Father gave Him to do" [d] He joyfully undertook, and slacked not His hand until it was accomplished.

And here let it be observed, that although after we have "set ourselves" in some "good way," after we have found and entered upon our work, there be various degrees and varieties of intensity with which we may, in the exercise of our Christian liberty, apply ourselves to our labour, yet, if we aim high, if we would wish to attain to any greatness or loftiness of character, we must make up our minds to use our *utmost* endeavours, to exercise the most patient diligence, to give ourselves wholly to the employ, be it what it may, which choice or circumstances have assigned to us. There is no

[y] Eph. iv. 28.
[z] Rom. viii. 29.
[a] 2 Cor. iv. 10.
[b] Matt. xx. 28.
[c] Luke xxii. 27.
[d] John xvii. 4.

eminent success, in these days at any rate, to be reached by any man, without vast industry, sustained attention, intense application, and long-continued pains-taking. Brilliant talents, unless thus accompanied, are of no real benefit either to their possessor or to the world at large; they flash across the path of humanity with a meteor's splendour, but neither aid man's progress, nor sensibly affect his destinies.

There has lately passed from among us a name familiar to all (13), — a name which, Sunday after Sunday, sounded in your ears from this place; never, perhaps, will that name be here uttered again, but the memory of him who bore it will live while the world endures: he was a remarkable instance of the connection of greatness with laboriousness. Never was there a man more bent on thoroughly mastering the whole of every subject which came before him; never was there one so unsparing of labour, so determined "whatever his hand found to do," to "do it with his might."[e] And so, without perhaps any extraordinary talents, by untiring energy and honest, unflinching diligence, conjoined with firmness, conscientiousness, and great good sense, he achieved his mighty renown, and made himself a name which will thrill the hearts of generations yet unborn, while hundreds to whom nature gave more splendid powers will have passed into complete oblivion.

Labour, then, to meet with any success worth the name, must be both intense and sustained. It must not

[e] Eccles. ix. 10.

be of that unsteady, fitful character which we too often see, the sign of an ill-disciplined mind, and the certain prelude of disappointment. Neither must it be mere bustle, which is the activity of the little-minded; nor restlessness, which is the unsteady movement of impatience and discontent. In true laboriousness, while there is abundance of hidden energy, there is a wonderful calm and quiet, recalling the operation of all the mightiest forces in nature, which, silent and unperceived, accomplish their vast results.

Nor, of course, is it enough, in a Christian point of view (however it may suffice for worldly success), that our labour should be intense and unremitting, unless it be sanctified throughout by holy ends and motives. To seek our own success merely; to toil unceasingly, but only for our own advantage; to look to profit, distinction, fame, as final objects, — this is, indeed, somewhat better, both for ourselves and others, than to be mere idlers; but it is to miss altogether of the blessedness of labour; it is to go near to *make* toil the cursed thing which some have supposed it to be necessarily. Our own success, as a *minor* motive, is not perhaps illegitimate. The nature which we have received from God bids us aspire; and the general good of society is promoted by the desire on the part of individuals to advance themselves. There is not, perhaps, on the whole, too much ambition among men; rather there is too little. (14) A few have the feeling in excess; but by far the greater number fail of attaining that position among their fellows for which they are by nature fitted, from the want of sufficient love of distinction to stimu-

late them to exertion. Desire of success, therefore, may be *among* our motives, though our sole motive it should never be. Ever side by side with it should be found the desire of doing good to others,—the wish to increase our usefulness, to help forward every good work, to have a real share in aiding that social progress which, among many hindrances and drawbacks, is still, we may trust, proceeding in the world. Few things so sweeten labour as the thought that all our toil tends to give others ease; that by labouring diligently we both actually diminish other men's burthens and likewise render ourselves more able to give them help in all times of need. Such is the motive for exertion which St. Paul puts forward when he says, "Let him that stole steal no more; but rather let him labour, working with his hands the thing which is good, *that he may have to give to him that needeth.*"[f] We should seek to gain knowledge, to gain cultivation, to gain high feeling, to gain a name in the world, in order to give our knowledge, and our cultivation, and our high feeling, and our name to the service of them that need; that is, to employ them all in behalf of those less privileged than ourselves,—to advocate their claims, to remove their deficiencies, to elevate their minds, to improve their characters. If we work steadily with this object in view, we shall soon find a yet higher motive dawn upon our souls, even the love of God, who has plainly expressed to us, that we best please Him when, like real "faithful servants,"[g] we trade

[f] Eph. iv. 28.

[g] Matt. xxv. 21.

boldly with the talents given us; not being "slothful"[h] or "unprofitable,"[i] but "abounding in all diligence;"[j] not "wearying in well doing,"[k] not "standing idle" about His vineyard[l], but "working the works of Him whose servants we are;"[m] "doing good to all men,"[n] labouring, with all patience, to be of use to others, and to improve ourselves. "If a man love not his brother, whom he hath seen, he cannot love God, whom he hath not seen:"[o] but from the love of man the passage is easy to the love of God, the only true *final* motive of all virtuous action.

In thus urging labour as the duty, privilege, and true happiness of man upon this earth, I have had occasion to speak with severity of those who pass their lives in amusement. I would not, however, lead any to think that because labour is our true business in life therefore amusement is unlawful. Amusement is a necessity of our nature. There is no power which we possess but tires by exercise (15); and the healthy action of those loftier and more serious faculties and principles which the grave duties of life call into play, can no otherwise be maintained than by occasional periods of relaxation, during which it seems intended that the lighter and less important faculties should have scope to unfold and display themselves. Absolute and entire inaction does not rest us so well as such a change of employ. And we may be sure that God

[h] Heb. vi. 12.
[i] Matt. xxv. 30.
[j] 2 Cor. viii. 7.
[k] Gal. vi. 9.
[l] Matt. xx. 6.
[m] John ix. 4.
[n] Gal. vi. 10.
[o] 1 John iv. 20.

would not have given us those tendencies which lead men everywhere to allow amusement a place in life, or those faculties which in amusement alone find their proper exercise, unless He had intended that men should, within certain limits, pursue amusement. What these limits are it is not difficult to determine. As the rule of bodily rest is to take just so much sleep as best maintains the healthy discharge of the various functions of our animal nature, so the rule of amusement, which is the mind's repose, must be fixed at the point which, in each individual, preserves the thinking and working powers at the height of perfection. It is the business of each man to find out the necessities of his own nature, and neither to injure his usefulness by that overstraining and overtasking of the severer powers which in this place are—not seldom—witnessed, nor to enfeeble and enervate his mind by an undue pursuit of what is properly no end, but only a means of maintaining mental vigour. (16) I conceive that there can scarcely be any real difficulty in fixing sufficiently the mean between these two extremes, if men are but in earnest, and conscientiously bent on doing what is right?

In conclusion, let me say to those who have come to this place, professedly for education, that, if these remarks have any *special* applicability to one class rather than another, it is to them. They are in the full vigour of youthful health and strength, and so are best able to work; they have most manifestly a distinct work to do, about which they cannot doubt; they, again, are entering life, and according to the

beginning which they now make will be, almost certainly, the whole character of their future careers. Would that such as now hear me, would that all who, in each successive year, here take their first step upon the real arena of life, could, even but one half, realise to themselves the *immense* importance of these few years to their own well-being and happiness! It is here they pass from the jest of life to its earnest; it is here they bid adieu to boyhood, and first begin to be what they are proud to claim to be—*men*. Would that they could be brought to follow the example of the great Apostle, who "when he became a man, put away childish things!"[p] Would that they could feel that here their characters will be formed for evil or for good, that here they will either incapacitate themselves for future usefulness, not only by acquiring habits of idleness and expense, which they will find it scarcely possible to throw off, but also by dissipating their mental powers, and so rendering themselves incapable of real sustained application; or, on the other hand, that they will lay the foundation upon which the superstructure of a life of utility may be raised, by forming habits, and gaining powers of mind, which will enable them to take an effectual part in the world's work, and to be real labourers, doing good service in God's vineyard! Are there any who feel that they can be content to go through life without being of the slightest use to others?—whatever their wealth or station, despised, as those whom accident alone has

[p] 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

elevated into the upper class; never depended upon for advice, never consulted in emergencies, tolerated because of their manners and connections, but manifestly regarded as supernumeraries by those who are fighting the world's battles? Are there any whom such a position would satisfy? Yet this is what men bring themselves to, who waste the precious opportunities of mental and moral improvement which this portion of their life holds out to them, — opportunities which it is quite impossible they should ever enjoy again,—which, therefore, if wasted, can never be effectually redeemed. Do not all wish that others should set some value on them? Now is the time to make themselves of value. I will be bold to say that of those admitted to be students in this place, there is not one but may, by a due use of the time of his sojourn among us, by honest, careful study, by attentive, diligent attendance upon the instructions offered him, by quiet observance of the established regulations of the place, so form and discipline his mental and moral being as to render himself, in after-life, whatever success attends him here, a man whom those about him will look up to, whose opinion they will consider of weight, whose advice they will seek in difficulties. Is not it worth while to forego a little amusement, to lay aside foppery and affectation, nay, even (if need be) to stir ourselves to energy and earnestness by a serious effort, when on the labour of these few years so much seems to depend?

Hitherto the class of men by whom exhortations of this kind were chiefly needed, have met them, either

tacitly or openly, with the objection that our studies were not suitable to their needs, that as statesmen, landlords, magistrates, they would derive no advantage from acquaintance with ancient literature, or from a knowledge of the mathematics. This objection, at no time altogether valid, has now at any rate been removed by the enlargement which the university has made in its field of study. (17) Henceforth no excuse of this kind can be regarded as a serious reason, or as anything better than the plainly dishonest plea of wilful and self-recognised indolence.

God grant that all of us may, with an honest and true heart, each in our several spheres, labour diligently at our respective works, "whatever our hand findeth to do, doing it with our might,"[q] toiling ever, patiently, zealously, cheerfully, as those who feel that toil is redeemed from the curse, toiling to help our brother men and to please our Father which is in heaven; not asking or looking for rest as a recompense here, but, in full assurance of hope, looking onward to that future life, where for those who perform their labour aright in this world there is reserved a rest, according to the apostle's consoling assurance, "There remaineth, therefore, a rest for the people of God."[r]

[q] Eccles ix. 10. [r] Heb. iv. 9.

SERMON V.

PREACHED ON THE FEAST OF THE CIRCUMCISION.

LUKE ii. 21.

"*And when eight days were accomplished for the circumcising of the child, his name was called Jesus.*"

THE event which we this day commemorate is one of manifold bearings and aspects. It may be regarded as an act of faithful obedience on the part of Joseph and Mary, who, notwithstanding that the circumstances of His birth might have seemed to set this Divine Infant *above* the law, yet, having no express command to abstain, conformed themselves humbly and meekly to the requirements of the law, and brought their child by the appointed mode and at the earliest possible time, within the covenant which God had made with the favoured race. It may be viewed, as our Church views it in the Collect for the day, as an act of obedience on the part of Christ, the first link in that long-drawn chain of perfectly righteous deeds by which He "fulfilled the law"[a] for us, and became capable of offering Himself on the cross a *spotless* and *meritorious* sacrifice. Again, it may be looked upon as a sign and bond of sympathy and love, as that act by which communion

[a] Matt. v. 17.

was established between the saints of both covenants, Christ thereby accepting the headship of the circumcised as by His baptism He did the headship of the baptized, and so becoming the centre of unity to the whole world in such sort, that "in Him neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision"[b]—"there is neither Jew nor Greek, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all."[c] Or it may be seen as an act of gracious condescension, an act by which He would fain have won over His nation, "His own,"[d] His "kinsmen according to the flesh;"[e] an act by which He removed a stumbling-block out of their path, and rendered the Gospel far more acceptable to them than it would have been otherwise. Or, lastly, we may see in it the commencement of Christ's sufferings, the first spilling of that "precious blood"[f] which He was in so many ways to shed for man, now in a few weak stains, anon "in great drops falling down to the ground,"[g] at length freely and fully from the five wounds, and the scourged back, and the thorn-pierced brow, in a spilling like that of water, without let or stint.

We shall do well in our meditations on the event of this day to embrace these various aspects. They are one and all well suited to be subjects of devotional thought. Shall I err if I say that they are ill-suited for the handling of the preacher, too simple or too sacred to bear many words, which in the one case would be

[b] Gal. v. 6.
[c] Col. iii. 11.
[d] John i. 11.
[e] Rom. ix. 3.
[f] 1 Pet. i. 19.
[g] Luke xxii. 44.

too apt to "darken" knowledge[h], in the other to weaken the feelings of awe and reverence with which this passage in the life of the God-Man is by pious minds contemplated? At any rate I shall prefer on the present occasion to leave the direct fact which we to-day commemorate to the secret thoughts and meditations of my hearers, and to call their attention rather to the general subject — to the contrast (I mean) between Christianity and Judaism which is indicated by the discontinuance of circumcision under the Christian covenant — notwithstanding our Lord's example, and the substitution for it of another rite, of so entirely different a character.

I suppose it will be generally allowed that the ceremonies of the Jewish law were significant. With whatever suspicion or dislike symbolism in religion may now be regarded, it will scarcely be denied by any that the system which it pleased God to give to the Jews was, in its whole extent, and in all its parts, from first to last, a mighty parable—a showing forth, under material types and figures, images and similitudes, of moral and spiritual verities. This idea is the entire basis and essence of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and indeed it is assumed throughout all the writings of St. Paul (1) as a fact of which there can be no question. "The law had a shadow of good things to come;"[i] it was throughout emblematical, typical; taken as a whole, it was a long, complicated "allegory." (2) We may assume, therefore, with confidence that circumcision was not an unmeaning rite, arbitrarily taken to be a

[h] Job. xxxviii. 2. [i] Heb. x. 1.

sign of entrance into covenant with God, as anything may be of anything; but was expressly chosen and singled out from an infinite number of possible ceremonies *on account of its fitness* to symbolise that of which it was intended to be significant.

If, after this, we ask *what* it was then which the strange ceremony of circumcision peculiarly typified or signified, I suppose that again, in a vague and general way, there would be an agreement as to the answer to be given on the part of all Christians. All would say that the foreskin signified the natural corruption of the flesh, which was to be cut off and cast away, and that the circumcision made with hands was typical of that "circumcision made *without* hands,"[j] the "circumcision of the heart,"[k] which consists in the "putting off of the body of the sins of the flesh,"[l] in the "mortification" (to use the words of our Collect) "from all worldly and carnal lusts of our hearts and all our members." Thus much is, I think, generally admitted; but if we stop here, if we are content with this vague and inexact representation, we shall miss altogether the force of the contrast which seems to me so remarkable; we shall have to regard the abolition of circumcision, and the institution of baptism in its stead, as an unmeaning substitution of one rite for another, a change for change's sake, akin to the mere human devices which are introduced to mark a new era, and not an alteration which was intended to teach a lesson.

[j] Col. ii. 11. [k] Rom. ii. 29.

[l] Col. ii. 11.

For baptism signifies all that has been here assigned to the Jewish rite. Baptism is the putting away of the filth of the flesh;"[m] it represents "a death unto sin,"[n] the laying aside of all filthiness and corruption, the cleansing from all defilement, the mortification of all evil and corrupt affections. Baptism and circumcision alike imply that we come into the world impure, and need to be set free from our impurity. *They differ as to the mode whereby our cleansing is to be effected.* Circumcision suggests the ascetic theory of religion. When admission into covenant was through blood and pain, when suffering was made the essential condition of access to God, when mutilation, moreover, and disfigurement of the body, enduring and irremediable, were required absolutely, that the soul might not be cut off from the congregation[o], men were taught in a language sufficiently clear and intelligible that, in order to draw near to God, they must afflict themselves; in order to please Him and be His favoured children they must chastise their bodies, undergo rigours, abstain from pleasant things, cut off enjoyments. And if, from the inherent materialism and worldliness of the Hebrew race, this lesson had but a very weak effect upon the mass of the people, yet with the better disposed and the more spiritually-minded it always produced a religion of strictness and severity — strictness and severity of the ascetic kind, vows of abstinence (as that of the Nazarite), sackcloth, penal fastings, prolonged watchings, rejection of "pleasant bread."[p] And this tendency

[m] 1 Pet. iii. 21.
[n] Church Catechism.
[o] Gen. xvii. 14.
[p] Dan. x. 3.

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increased as time went on. We observe it first in David (3), and then, as an accompaniment of repentance, and as occasional, not constant or permanent. But in the prophets it becomes the prevailing temper. Sackcloth comes to be the prophet's garment[q]; insomuch that, in the later times, when impostors wished to be regarded as true prophets, they found themselves compelled to wear "the rough garment" in order to "deceive."[r] The practice of fasting, not commanded anywhere in the law, at the same time grows and becomes more settled. We find that in the Pharisaic system, which dates from about the third or fourth century before our Lord's birth, two days in the week — the second day and the fifth — were made regular fast-days (4), and the keeping of such fasts was considered a very main part of religion. Before the Gospel was published another sect had arisen, which is generally believed to have absorbed into it the great bulk of truly religious Jews — the sect of the Essenes — who carried asceticism in some respects to greater lengths even than the Pharisees. Josephus describes these Jewish monks as living together in village communities under a strict and severe rule, abstaining from marriage, and in some cases forbidding to marry, abstemious in their food, simple in their habits, and altogether exemplary in their lives. (5) Finally, the Jewish system culminated, as we know, in John the Baptist, than whom there was no greater among them that had been born of woman up to that time; and he "came neither eat-

[q] Is. xx. 2. [r] Zech. xiii. 4.

ing nor drinking"—so that men said he "had a devil;"[s] he was, apparently, "a Nazarite from the womb, drinking neither wine nor strong drink;"[t] his meat "locusts and wild honey;" his "raiment of camel's hair;"[u] his habitation "the wilderness of Judea;"[v] his life from childhood that of a solitary.

Such were the tendencies and such the results of Judaism — results symbolised and encouraged by the rite which we are considering, and parallel to those which the highest heathen wisdom had reached by the employment of reason upon the facts of human life and conduct. Asceticism had indeed been condemned by Aristotle (6), who derived from *à priori* reasoning a system theoretically higher and truer than those of Plato and Zeno, but practically, and for those for whom it was intended, perhaps less true, and certainly less suitable. The philosophies of the Porch and of the Grove, dealing as they did with unregenerate man, were probably more beneficial in their effect, and consequently more right, than the philosophy of Aristotle, which cannot be properly applied unless to the unfallen or the regenerate. Human nature being corrupt, man being "very far gone from original righteousness,"[w] perfection will not be reached by "following nature," by observing the mean, by maintaining the balance even among *all* the various principles of which we are composed. The evil, whatever it be,—the corrupt principle, wherever it lies,—will be untouched by

[s] Matt. xi. 18. [t] Luke i. 15; Num. vi. 3.
[u] Matt. iii. 4. [v] Ib. v. 1.
[w] See the 39 Articles, Art. 9.

this process. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one?"[x] Thus, wherever among the heathen there has been conviction of sin, a sense more or less deep of the inherent wickedness and depravity of man, ascetic notions of greater or less severity have prevailed. (7) If human nature was itself in fault, nothing could reach to the root of the evil but an alteration of that nature itself; and as man could not add to his nature a principle any more than to his stature a cubit[y], no serious alteration seemed possible but by subtraction or mutilation. Hence the proposal to crush, destroy, uproot, the lower appetites and affections which we find in Greek and Roman philosophy, beginning with Plato (8), and culminating in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (9); hence the endeavour to mortify and attenuate the body itself which has always prevailed among the Orientals. Perfection, indeed, is not reached in this way, not even where the asceticism is most free from its special dangers of pride and self-exaltation; but probably by moderate asceticism a nearer approach to perfection is made, while man continues unregenerate, than in any other way. More is done to counteract the evil influences of the fall, which has (among its other effects) given an undue prominence and preponderance to the lower and animal propensities (10), while it has checked and stunted the higher. Thus, as the Baptist is the highest type of Jewish character, so the ascetic heathen — Socrates (11), Zeno, Seneca, Epictetus—are the most exalted specimens of the excellence attainable under heathenism.

[x] Job xiv. 4. [y] Matt. vi. 27.

What now is the "more excellent way"[z] which Christianity points out, and which it symbolises by baptism? Is not the Christian doctrine simply this—"Wash and be clean?"[a] Surely the lesson that the new covenant conveys by its substitution of baptism for circumcision, is, that the time for asceticism has passed away, that we may no longer think to please God by self-inflicted sufferings—a "voluntary humiliation," which is "will-worship,"[b] and not the religion of Christ—but that we are to live, as Christ did[c], in the world, eating and drinking such things as are set before us[d], not abstaining from wine[e], not holding marriage in disesteem[f], not flying human society or its harmless pleasures and amusements, not macerating the flesh by austerities(12); but still taking care that we deal not with these things as the worldly and the fleshly deal, but in every case purify what the ascetic cuts off and casts away, and only use it after such purification. "To the pure all things are pure;"[g] and the holiness which Christianity requires of its professors, is not a withdrawal from the world, not a renunciation of rights, or duties, or pleasures, or amusements, but such inward purity of heart and soul as can keep us clean in our contact with these things, and can prevent the taint of defilement from resting on us. As the bodily frame which is in perfect health may be brought in contact with all the varied forms of disease and get no hurt thereby, being repel-

[z] 1 Cor. xii. 31.
[a] 2 Kings v. 13.
[b] Col. ii. 18, 23.
[c] Matt. xi. 19.
[d] Luke x. 7.
[e] 1 Tim. v. 23.
[f] Heb. xiii. 4.
[g] Tit. i. 15.

lent of that subtle and mysterious influence, whatever it is, which lays hold upon our physical powers and prostrates them; so the pure soul will repel from it moral evil, and come out from contact with "this miserable and naughty world"[h] clean from all filthy stain, brighter and more lustrous far than those which have sought to escape pollution by separation from all that could defile. For this result is needed, in the first place, that cleansing of the soul, that renovation of our nature, that recovery in Christ of all we lost, and more than all we lost in Adam, which by God's mercy we all attain in baptism; when we are first "washed, sanctified and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God."[i] Cleansed by that heavenly washing — "regenerate and made God's children by adoption and grace"[j] — the Christian has a nature which no longer needs, which will not be bettered by, ascetic discipline. For him the theory of Aristotle becomes true—let him only follow out the bent of his *regenerate* nature, let him maintain the balance among the various powers of which he is composed, let him moderately use and not abuse the things of this world[k] — and, by God's grace, it is possible that he may pass through life with his baptismal garments never so soiled but that the blood of Christ washes away the stain, when the evening prayer-time brings with it repentance, and an entreaty for pardon. And even in the more common case, when the Christian lapses into worse than

[h] Office for the Visitation of the Sick.
[i] 1 Cor. vi. 11. [j] Collect for Christmas Day.
[k] 1 Cor. vii. 31.

venial sins, and forfeits his baptismal position, it is no longer by the path of ascetic discipline that he must look to return to God. David "wept, and *chastened his soul with fasting*,"[l] "made sackcloth his garment,"[m] "lay all night upon the earth,"[n] seeking, as it would seem, at once to punish his own sin, and to appease God's wrath by such punishment; but the Christian has no warrant to use such practices in such a spirit. The Christian may fast and keep vigil, but it is to "keep under"[o] a rebellious body, or to train it to "endure hardness"[p]— not to torment and punish it, much less to appease God by self-torture. We may not take our punishment out of God's hand, Whose it is to punish or to remit, as seemeth Him good. We may not hope to appease God by our sufferings, Who has accepted the sufferings of One as "a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world."[q] Again, as it is not for us to torment our bodies, unless they require it that they may be brought into subjection, or unless we are seeking to train them to greater power of doing God service, so it may be doubted whether we are not wrong in seeking to please God by abstaining from anything lawful. We all know what snares vows of abstinence have proved in other times and countries, even when supported by general opinion and approved by the Church. There cannot certainly be less danger in the vows made now, without such support and approval, administered by

[l] Ps. lxix. 9.
[m] Ib. 10.
[n] 2 Sam. xii. 16.
[o] 1 Cor. ix. 27.
[p] 2 Tim. ii. 3.
[q] Office for the Holy Communion.

the officers of a self-constituted society. (13) Nor are *resolutions* of abstinence without danger. When men, for instance, resolve to abstain from particular amusements, in which there is nothing wrong, and in which many excellent Christians indulge, they are apt to make a merit of such abstinence, and to account it (as the Pharisees did their unauthorised fasting[r]) for a very important point of religion. They then naturally become puffed up on account of their fancied superiority to others in this respect, and they often uncharitably condemn those others for not adopting their rule. Whereas, in very truth, it is in such matters, as St. Paul says, "Neither if we do as they are we the better," nor if we do otherwise "are we the worse."[s] It is not "meat" that "commendeth us unto God,"[t] neither is it abstinence from things lawful. It is "the keeping of the commandments of God."[u] All will-worship is dangerous. We have not such an overplus of the religious principle that we can afford to add to the requirements of God's law a further set of requirements of our own, and make religion consist in the observance of both. If we expend our strength upon keeping the latter, it can scarce be but that the former will suffer.

Of course there is a line to be drawn somewhere, between things that are lawful and things that are not lawful. The "*vain* pomp and glory of the world," which we renounced at our baptism[v], is to be eschewed

[r] Luke xviii. 12.
[s] 1 Cor. viii. 8.
[t] 1 Cor. viii. 8.
[u] 1 Cor. vii. 19.
[v] Office for the Public Baptism of Infants. Address to Sponsors.

through life as well as the "*sinful* lusts of the flesh."[w] We must not "follow nor be led by them." And there is a danger—perhaps even in this place a greater danger—of over laxity than of over strictness in interpreting these phrases; of too free an indulgence in amusements than of too stiff a rejection of them; of too tender a treatment of the body than of too great severity. But there is also a real peril of the other kind; and as this peril is but seldom noted, it may not be superfluous to have drawn attention to it here.

Again, it must be borne in mind, that there is a ground upon which systematic abstinence from lawful things is not merely justifiable but obligatory. Where, if we took advantage of the "liberty wherewith Christ has made us free,"[x] we should offend weak consciences, and thereby diminish our own usefulness, we are bound to abstain, by the double obligation of Christian love and of regard for our own best interests. "If meat make my brother to offend," says the great Apostle, "I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."[y] We must not allow our liberty to become "a stumbling-block to them that are weak."[z] We must curtail our own lawful enjoyments for their sakes, since "if we sin against the brethren, and wound their weak consciences, we sin against Christ."[a] The principle herein involved is equally obligatory upon all; but its application is especially to the Clergy, who are expected to live by a stricter rule than others, and in whom what is thought to be laxity

[w] Church Catechism. [x] Gal. v. 1. [y] 1 Cor. viii. 13.
[z] Ibid. 9. [a] Ibid. 12.

especially offends men. They who love Christ, and in Him love His "little ones,"[b] will not begrudge their Master the sacrifice of a few things indifferent, in which they might have found a natural and innocent pleasure, when they remember how completely He identifies Himself with His little ones, and how solemnly He warns men to avoid giving them offence. "Whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the sea. Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come, but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh."[c]

[b] Matt. xviii. 10.

[c] Ibid. verses 7, 8.

SERMON VI.

PREACHED BEFORE THE JUDGES OF ASSIZE, MARCH 1858.

MATT. XV. 19, 20.

"*Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies. These are the things which defile a man.*"

IT is the special characteristic of the religion of Christ that it claims the obedience of the whole man. Not a religious old age only, but a religious manhood and a religious youth, nay, even a religious childhood are among its requirements. The *whole* life is to be sanctified. Religion, like the precious ointment upon Aaron's head, which ran down to his beard, and thence descended to the very skirts of his clothing[a], is to pervade and interpenetrate the Christian's entire existence, to distil its perfume throughout his whole being. Christianity is no holiday religion, to be put on once a week, like the poor man's best suit, and then laid aside till the Sunday comes round again. Nor, again, is it, like the great man's official dress, to be worn only in public and upon grand occasions, but put off when we retire into the secrecy of domestic life or the solitude of our chamber. The Bible is inexorable in demanding our

[a] Ps. cxxxiii. 2.

complete devotion to God—life-long obedience, daily worship, entire submission of our will to His, a sustained and undivided religion. In this Christianity differs from every other religion which either is, or ever has been, professed on earth; it will allow nothing to escape it; it is exacting, all-embracing; it knows no limits to the sphere of its authority; it claims to rule all things and everywhere.

One of the most remarkable exemplifications of the characteristic in question is to be found in the dominion which Christianity would establish over our thoughts. We expect that a religion should control our actions; we are not surprised that it should claim to check our speech; but that it should go further, that it should pierce the veil behind which we show ourselves to the world, that it should enter the very *penetrale* of our hearts, and require as strict a watch to be kept over our light wishes, our idle and vague imaginings, as over all that we carry out in word or act, is not what we *à priori* expect, or what we very readily submit to. "Thought is free," says the human proverb, and free most men consider it; free they deem themselves to expatiate at will over the broad fields of speculation; free to let fancy present to their notice what images it chooses; free to judge men's motives and characters; free to repine secretly at their lot, and to covet a higher position. What is this but to forget that there are such things as "evil thoughts"? What is it but to ignore the Christian duty of keeping watch over our *hearts*, and bringing every *thought* into captivity to Christ?"[b]

[b] 2 Cor. x. 5.

What is it, finally, but to miss the very sum and essence of our religion, which in nothing so much shows its exalted and superhuman character as in laying the stress that it does upon what men in general regard as of such little account—the inward and secret springs of action which lie deep in the heart—feelings, fancies, wishes, aspirations—the real proofs of what we are, the hidden sources of all that we say or do, the fruit and evidence of all that in our past life we have said or done?

He who knew the heart of man as none other has ever read it[c], when He would put before His disciples the true defilements which separate man from his Maker, gave the first place—not, surely, without a purpose—to "evil thoughts." Without such thoughts there would be no sin at all. The "root of bitterness,"[d] the fount and origin of all wrong-doing, the head-stream of impurity, and violence, and injustice, and falsehood, and profanity, from which they all flow, without which they would shrink away and be dried up, is an evil heart. If, then, we allow the force of the advice, that the "beginnings of evil are to be checked;" if we admit that it is vain to lop the branches while the root remains full of vigour, it is to our thoughts that we must pay special attention, it is over them that we must keep the strictest watch. Here is the seat of our corruption; here is the stronghold of the tempter. Beaten back from his outworks of word and act, here he entrenches himself as in a citadel, resisting to the

[c] John ii. 25. [d] Heb. xii. 15.

utmost all attempts to dislodge him, yielding ground only inch by inch, ever looking that we may weary of our efforts to drive him out, that our siege may slacken and cease, and well knowing that in that cause he will sooner or later recover all that he has lost, and once more reign over our whole nature. Till every thought is brought into captivity to Christ our position is altogether insecure; we know not to what depth of evil we may not fall, we know not in what an abyss of guilt we may not lie. God, who is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity,"[e] "whose ways are not as our ways, nor His thoughts as our thoughts,"[f] may see in the chafings and strivings of a wayward heart as much rebellion against His will, as in the wild blasphemies of a maddened tongue, or in the bold deeds of a ruthless and ungoverned hand. Especially in the case of those whom circumstances exempt from the vulgar temptations to open sin, whom interest and education and the tone of the society wherein they live, tend to keep correct in life and decent in speech; especially in the case of such persons (and those whom I address are mostly such) must sins of thought be of the gravest consequence, their probation, in fact, consisting *mainly* herein. Our great moralist observes that there are persons "who "from their natural constitution of body and of temper, "or from their external condition, have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, "in the common course of life," and suggests that to such men the discipline of thought supplies a probation

[e] Hab. i. 13. [f] Is. lv. 8.

as real as that which the mass of mankind undergo from "the ordinary motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure." (1) Undoubtedly this is the case of numbers here. Education, refinement, taste, self-interest, shame, combine to preserve them from vicious acts and coarse or profane speech; but in thought there can be no external or conventional restraint. Here, then, and here alone, they reveal their true selves, showing clearly what spirit they are of, pure or impure, proud or humble, charitable or censorious, greedy or contented, loving or selfish; here they reveal themselves to God and their own conscience, and (it may be) to angelic intelligences; here, in this inner world, their characters are formed, and they become, on the one hand, idle or "filthy dreamers,"[g] on the other, "pure in heart,"[h] and fit for the vision of God.

But what, it may be asked, are "evil thoughts," and when do thoughts become evil? We cannot think of what we please. We cannot say beforehand what thoughts shall arise in our minds; our will is powerless here; and it is to a cause external to our will, if not even to ourselves, that we must ascribe the first presentation to the mind of each successive thought whereof we are conscious. Circumstances over which we have little or no control are continually placing before us objects calculated to call forth in us wishes, desires, passions, appetites, the first occurrence of which is absolutely involuntary, and therefore cannot be sinful The first stir of appetite or affection, the first rise of a

[g] Jude, verse 8. [h] Matt. v. 8.

wish, is a thing as much beyond our power to check or prevent as the presentation to our ears and eyes of the sounds and sights which surround us. (2) And so too, with what are commonly called thoughts, the fancies which flit before our mind's eye. We have within us a strange and restless faculty, which, unless we be occupied with external objects, is ever bringing before us, in a long unbroken stream, a series of ideas or phantasies. Like the figures seen by the inmates of Plato's cave (3), or the phantasmagoria of a troubled dream, the train of images floats by, a never-ending still-beginning succession, coming whence we know not, vanishing whither we cannot conceive, only interrupted from time to time, when the outward impressions of sense overpower and, as it were, break up their subtle and more delicate fabric, and recurring again without fail the moment that the senses are at rest, and that external things cease to occupy us. I will not say that for the presentation of these images to our mind's eye we are in no case blameable. There are occasions, to be hereafter considered, when the very first occurrence of one of these thoughts or fancies is sinful; but these are comparatively rare, and speaking generally we may lay it down that the mere presentation of an image, the mere advent of a thought, is harmless; that it is neither good nor bad, neither praise nor blame worthy, being beyond the moral pale, inasmuch as it in no sort proceeds from our spontaneity; and that our probation, our trial, our power to act rightly or wrongly, begins *after* the thought has occurred to us. And this is equally the case, whatever account is to be given of the origin of our thoughts. Many curious speculations

have been entertained on this subject, into which there is no need that we should directly enter. According to some, laws of association, over which we have no power, determine absolutely the entire succession of our thoughts and fancies, thought following thought by the same iron necessity by which the links of a chain succeed one another when we unwind a coil. (4) According to others, physiological causes, external influences acting upon our nervous fibre, states of atmosphere, of the electric current, and of our own bodily health, necessitate the presentation to our minds, at each moment when external objects do not occupy us, of this or that particular image. (5) A third set of thinkers explains the mystery by the agency of spirits good and bad, who suggest to the mind continually the ideas whereof it is conscious. (6) Whatever truth there may be in all or any of these theories, and some truth there probably is in each, one thing at least is clear, and is tacitly acknowledged in all, namely, that the sequence of our thoughts is independent of our wills, and so neither praiseworthy nor blameable. Our responsibility, then, commences after the thought has occurred. It is in the encouragement that we lend to good thoughts, and the opposition that we offer to evil ones, that our moral character is seen and exercised. Here the will has great power. Here, therefore, our probation as respects thought begins, and to this point we must direct our especial attention, if we would profit by our Lord's warning against the thoughts which 'd efile a man."[1]

[1] Matt. xv. 20.

When a thought occurs, we may either arrest it, dismiss it, or simply allow it to occupy us until it yields to another, without an effort either way. In the first of these three cases and in the second there is a direct act of the will; in the third, the will is indirectly concerned, for it allows what it might hinder. Our responsibility, consequently, extends to all three cases; but it is more complete in the two former. It is our duty not to give ourselves up to the random vagaries of our imaginations, not to remain passive, and allow our thoughts to wander as they please. We are endowed with a power of controlling them; and this power we are bound to exercise; more especially as we are warned in Holy Writ, that, since the fall, "every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually."[1] Now, when a thought occurs, we possess, as I have said, in the first place, the power to arrest it. This power may be called universal and unfailing; at least, it is only on rare occasions that it fails, and that we find ourselves vainly striving to detain a conception or an image which eludes us as we seek to seize it, and vanishes before our too curious scrutiny. Generally, we experience little difficulty in seizing and holding a thought or image, in keeping it before us as long as we like, and scrutinising it thoroughly. But our power to dismiss a thought is far less complete. We may will the dismissal, and turn away from the contemplation of an evil thought; but we cannot prevent it from recurring again and again. Often men complain that

[1] Gen. vi. 5.

thoughts haunt them, of which they do their utmost to get rid. Often the best men have a torment of this kind, images which they detest rising up before them, and defying all their efforts to drive them away. Perhaps the most probable explanation of such cases is, that Satan has obtained permission to tempt and try such persons, and that the hateful thoughts and images which occur to them are "put into their hearts,"[k] or brought before their minds, by him. (7) Temptation, however, is not sin; we are tempted through our weaknesses and infirmities, but there is no sin unless we yield to the temptation, and allow it to overcome us. So long as we resist it, so long as on each occurrence of an evil thought, we will to dismiss it, and strive to banish it from our minds, we in fact triumph over Satan's malice, we baffle him, we confirm in ourselves the virtuous principle (8), and "out of weakness are made strong."[l] Our duty then, as regards our thoughts, may be summed up under three heads. First, we are bound to take heed to our thoughts, to watch over them, and do our best to prevent them from running wild. Secondly, we are bound to turn away from every evil thought as it arises, and by an act of the will to dismiss it. Thirdly, we are bound to welcome all good thoughts, to treat them as honoured guests, pressing them to stay with us, laying them up in our heart of hearts, and giving to them our full attention.

In regard to our powers, both of retaining and dis-

[k] John xiii. 2. [l] Heb. xi. 35.

missing thoughts, it may be noticed, that they are not so much natural gifts as acquired habits; and, consequently, that they may be greatly strengthened by practice. Little by little the ability of controlling thought grows with use, and he who once was at the beck of every vain imagination, carried hither and thither by the surge and swell, as the waves of thought followed one another in his mind with ceaseless and seemingly resistless flow, will, in time, if he gives his heart to the work, acquire the mastery over his fantasy (9), and (with God's grace) reduce into captivity to Christ every thought and every "imagination" that "exalteth itself."[m]

I have already observed that there are some occasions where even the very occurrence of a thought is sinful, although at the time we cannot prevent it. This is the case wherever, but for some past sin, the thought would not have occurred; as, most palpably, when the memory of past acts of sin rushes upon us, and they rise up in hideous distinctness, with all their accessory circumstances, branding themselves in anew upon our mental vision, and making us sigh for the fabled draught from Lethe, which would deliver us from the terrible curse of such dread remembrances. Again, it is the case when the evil thought, although not the mere reflex image of a past crime, is one from which we should have been free, had we acted rightly on former occasions. The character of a wish, the intensity of a desire, the power of a thought to haunt us,

[m] 2 Cor. x. 5.

is frequently the result of wrongful indulgence at some former time of a similar wish, thought, or desire, whereby our nature has been deteriorated, and we have been rendered more liable to err in that particular respect than we should have been but for such indulgence. In such cases, as in those where the evil thought is a remembered sin, spontaneity, and therefore guilt, has some place. We cannot prevent the occurrence of the thought at the time; but we could have prevented it, and should have prevented it had we acted aright in our former times of trial. We are therefore answerable in such cases, not only for our behaviour when the thought is presented to us, but for the very presentation itself, which is the consequence of our own conduct.

Of the degree of each man's guilt in these respects he is himself the best judge, if he will turn his mind's eye inward upon himself, and honestly ask himself the question, how his thoughts must show in the sight of Him, to whom all that is unclean and selfish is more hateful than we can conceive, who is "of purer eyes than to behold evil, and cannot look upon iniquity."[n] God, let us remember, sees the heart[o], and "searches the reins."[p] We can have nothing secret from Him. His eye pierces through the veil of decent respectability behind which we shroud our impurities from the gaze of men; He sees us as we really are, not as self-interest, or shame, makes us appear to the world. He knows what we should be, were conventional restraints

[n] Hab. i. 13. [o] Heb. iv. 12.
[p] Rev. ii. 23.

removed, and our true characters allowed to reveal themselves without concealment or reserve. All guilt is relative to the degree of temptation whereto the offender has been exposed, and the power of resistance which he has possessed within him. We who have by circumstances been placed above want, who have been brought up to know right from wrong, whom example, and advice, and our own plain interest, and the knowledge of God's will, and hopes and fears extending to another life, and ten thousand other lesser motives and restraints, combine to preserve free from gross and palpable sins,—from bloodshed and violence, from theft and dishonesty, from perjury and falsehood, from dissoluteness and profligacy, from drunkenness and intemperance,—may incur a deeper stain of guilt by yielding weakly to our slight temptations, and lending an encouragement to evil thoughts, than many of those who render themselves liable to the penalties of human law by the commission of wrongful acts. They are sorely, and often almost irresistibly, tempted by want and unhappiness, by acute desires and fierce cravings, which they cannot legitimately satisfy; they are too frequently bred up in wrong principles and beliefs, without religion, without shame, without self-respect. God, measuring criminality by a scale which is not our scale, viewing sins solely in their moral aspect, not in their political or social bearings, judging all men with strict reference to their opportunities and the use they have made of them, knowing exactly the excuse which is to be made for some, and the aggravations of guilt which attach to others, may in His

unerring wisdom and rigid justice, more often than we are apt to imagine possible, pronounce the transgressor of human laws absolved, the decent observer of them deeply guilty before Him. "All," remember, "have sinned and come short of the glory of God;"[q] all, however blameless their lives may seem, must cover their faces before Him, and own themselves "unclean, unclean."[r] He only knows the "secret sins" of all; He alone can take the measure of the guilt of each; it it not for us to forestall His judgment, or pronounce determinately on the relative criminality of individuals or classes; enough that we acknowledge and feel, each one of us, his own sinfulness; enough that we confess ourselves, not with a mock humility, but in sincerity of self-abasement, "*chief* sinners;"[s] for aught we know, in God's sight, as guilty for our "evil thoughts," as others for the "murders," "thefts," "false-witness," "blasphemies," which He has placed in the same sentence of condemnation.[t]

These reflections are humbling to our pride; but they are good for us at seasons like the present. Amid the manifestations, which meet us on all sides, of the administration of human justice, we are apt to lose out of sight, the sense which we ought always to entertain of the more searching justice of God. The spectacle of those who come among us invested with the awful mission of judging and condemning crime, the solemn holding of the courts, the publication of the calendar of offences, all the special circumstances which mark the

[q] Rom. iii. 23.
[r] Lev. xiii. 45.
[s] 1 Tim. i. 15.
[t] Matt. xv. 19.

recurrence of these seasons, have a tendency to pamper our pride, and raise in us a feeling of self-complacency. We are led in our thoughts at such times to divide men, by a sharp line, into the two classes of the criminal and the respectable, and to identify this division, far more than is right and just, with that separation of men which Scripture makes into righteous and unrighteous, saints and sinners, "children of God and children of the devil."[u] We are led to dwell, with a feeling akin to that of the self-righteous Pharisee, upon the fact that *we* are of the superior class, and to hug ourselves in the comfortable persuasion that we are "not like other men."[v] Vain and ill-founded fancy! Who shall say that if he had had the bringing up of the criminal, had been exposed to the same influences, received the same teaching, companied (not by choice but of necessity) with the same persons, been tempted, both inwardly and outwardly, in the same degree, *his* foot would have stood firm, *his* "treadings would not have slipped"?[w] Who can say that he might not have fallen into the lowest abysses of sin, and have become himself one of those criminals amenable to human law, on whom he now looks down so contemptuously? It is by God's preserving grace that we are what we are. Unless we be miserably blind and self-deceived, we must be conscious of the existence in us of such a root and nucleus of evil, as, had it been fostered and developed by circumstances, might have carried us on to crimes, at the bare thought of which we now shudder,

[u] 1 John iii. 10. [v] Luke xviii. 11.
[w] Ps. lxxiii. 2, Prayer Book Version.

and have placed us among the very worst class of offenders. That we have been spared this consummation is God's mercy, not our own merit. "It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do;"[x] it is God that fences us in with restraints, that "delivers us from evil,"[y] that enables us to resist Satan, that upholds us in the time of temptation. Let no man then exalt himself at these seasons, or forget, even for a moment, that it is quite possible he may be in God's sight a worse sinner than those unhappy persons who have committed crimes and made themselves amenable to human punishment.

It will perhaps be asked, whether, if the moral guilt of "criminals" be not, on the whole, much greater than that of the mass of "respectable" persons, the entire system by which we punish their particular class of offences is not one-sided, and so wrong in principle? I boldly answer, No. The administration of justice in a country, by the punishment of offenders, is of the utmost importance for the *general* interests of morality among all classes. It is the great public protest against sin—it is a voice proclaiming so loudly that none can fail to hear, throughout the length and breadth of the land, the reality of moral distinctions—the eternal difference of right and wrong—the ill-desert of evil-doing, and the essential connection between sin and suffering. It is true that the incidence of human punishment is unequal; it cannot strike all the guilty. Overt acts alone are within the sphere of human cognizance, and such alone can be punished; it is impossible to know,

[x] Phil. ii. 13. [y] Matt. vi. 13.

and therefore impossible to punish, thoughts, unless they have revealed themselves in external actions. Human law must therefore either be silent altogether, and allow rampant vice to pursue its course without let or hindrance, and shamelessly run riot at its will; or it must be content to visit sinful acts with punishment, leaving sinful thoughts to the judgment of God, the condemnation of conscience, and the disapproval of all good men. The inequality is not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the case—there is here no partiality, no favouritism, no unjust *class*-legislation; the law strikes with equal and unflinching hand the high and the low, the great and the small, the pauper and the millionaire, so soon as they proceed to the commission of overt acts of sin. The past year has given abundant evidence of this, and has shown that such sins as the law can punish it will punish, with the same measure of severity in the rich and in the poor; in the opulent merchant or banker, and in the petty trader; in the companion of nobles, and in the comrade and accomplice of common thieves.

Human justice, therefore, though imperfect and incomplete, and greatly needing to be supplemented by that Divine justice which is at once universal and infallible, apportioning to each man the exact award which is due when all things are taken into account—human justice, I say, though thus defective, is not one-sided, or intentionally unequal. It does not exempt from punishment any form of moral evil whereof it can take cognizance; it does not show respect of persons; it does but limit itself to the sphere for which

alone it is suited, omitting from its consideration those "secret sins" which can never be judged aright, till an all-wise God has "set them in the light of his countenance."[z] Meanwhile, within its sphere, it is of incalculable advantage to the community, not only in the protection that it affords to life and property, which is scarcely estimated at its real worth by those who have all their lives dwelt securely beneath the shadow of its uplifted arm; but further, and more especially, in the moral influence which it exerts on large classes of men, and those the most difficult to bring under any sort of restraint or control. Thousands, whom the preacher's voice never reaches, to whom neither the terrors of Sinai, nor the gracious promises from the Mount of the Beatitudes are known, who live in the thick murk of a moral darkness which no direct ray from the Sun of Righteousness is able to pierce, receive from the administration of human justice their only moral enlightenment, and thence obtain at least a certain appreciation of the difference between good and evil—an appreciation which suffices, in most instances, to keep them clear of the worst forms of crime and guilt, and which may even, in some cases, stir the conscience from its sleep to vigorous life, and form thus the first step in a real reformation. The terrors of the law not only check crime by the instinct of fear, but diminish it by the responsive echo which they waken in the heart of the criminal, who feels his sentence to be just, and has thus, perhaps, first brought home to him the fact of the

[z] Ps. xc. 8.

"sinfulness of sin."[a] As St. Paul says, in the person of the natural man, "I had not known sin, but by the law,"[b] so in every age, and not least in this our time of boasted enlightenment, it is the law which conveys to thousands their first knowledge of wrong, their first conviction of guilt, and which thus stirs a feeling which may not seldom issue in the salvation of a soul.

It is, then, an honourable task to be engaged in the administration of the law. God has said that "by Him kings reign, and princes decree justice."[c] The persons who are thus employed he calls "his ministers" —"revengers to execute his wrath upon those that do evil."[d] To be thus engaged, then, is a thing at once honourable and useful. It is to stand as God's ministers in respect of the most fearful of His attributes, to be the representatives of His majesty, the messengers of His anger, the executioners of His vengeance. The administration of justice should therefore be a *solemn* work. No doubt it is difficult for those who live in the air of courts, who pass their lives in the occupation of hearing or conducting trials, to avoid losing, in some measure, the sense of the awful seriousness of the task in which they are engaged, through familiarity with its incidents. But this is an infirmity against which men should struggle. To all persons their *work* is apt to become tame and common-place. It requires either warm and deep sympathies, or a strong and abiding sense of our responsibility in God's sight for all that we think or do, to maintain the heart fresh and the interest

[a] Rom. vii. 13. [b] Ibid. verse 7.
[c] Prov. viii. 15. [d] Rom. xiii. 4.

unflagging in anything that is our daily task. By none is this better known than by the minister of Christ, who knows, however, that he ought to combat the weakness, and that to do so effectually, he must throw himself into the feelings and circumstances of those with whom he has to deal, whose troubles are always fresh to themselves, and whose emotions are as keen as if none such had ever been felt before. Deep and true sympathy with human griefs and struggles, hopes and fears, wrongs and woes, will best enable us to keep up a lively interest in our daily work, where it touches on the concerns of others; and will be a guard alike against listlessness and levity, two dangers to which those who practise the learned professions are greatly exposed. In default of such sympathy, which all perhaps cannot command, an abiding conviction of the seriousness of life, the deadly consequences of sin, and their own responsibility for any encouragement that they may lend to it, will help to preserve in those engaged in trials, that proper gravity of tone—sincere, not affected—heartfelt, not formal—which befits the solemnity of the occasion, and gives such scenes their proper influence on the beholder.

It cannot have escaped the notice of those whom I am addressing, how strong an interest is felt in our courts of justice by the poorer classes of the community. Whatever the sources of the interest, — and I believe them to be in great part such as we have no right to disapprove, — its existence furnishes an opportunity of which advantage might easily be taken to school and instruct such persons, and gradually but surely elevate their

moral tone. If the Athenian law-courts were (as Plato said) the school-rooms of the Attic youth (10), our own might be made, as indeed they are made to some extent, the school-rooms of our adults of the lower classes. I have already called attention to the beneficial effect which they have in forcing on the notice of their frequenters the primary moral notions, and waking conscience out of the deep slumber in which it too often lies. I must now take leave to add, that it may be questioned whether in some respects they have not an injurious effect, arising from the light tone in which some sins—sins of impurity, for instance—are too often spoken of in them. If a stricter and more Christian spirit pervaded our courts; if those who are privileged to speak in them would uniformly abstain from idle jests and railleries in reference to a sin which is the great destroyer of souls in this country; if such subjects, when necessarily adverted to, were treated in the serious spirit in which not merely the Christian but even the mere social reformer feels it right to treat them; if none in any *station* or *position* seemed to count such immoralities a trifling matter,—some effect might in time be produced upon the feeling of our humbler classes in respect to them. At any rate, the blame of encouraging and fostering a vice which is eating like a canker into the very heart of the nation, and destroying alike its moral and its physical soundness, would not rest upon those whose superior station and opportunities constitute them in a peculiar sense "their brothers' keepers."[o]

[o] Gen. iv. 9.

For every "idle word" that our tongue utters we shall, in the dread day of our own trial, be called upon to give account.[f] Then we shall see, and doubtless see often with horror and dismay, the evil effects that our light and foolish words have produced,—how they have fallen as the first germ of corruption into some minds; how they have stimulated the growth of vice in others; how, again, in others they have checked the return towards better courses and better feelings, and have thrown back the soul which was struggling out of the slough of sin. What a bitter thought it will be, if, for the pleasure of making a smart speech, a telling remark, a clever repartee, we have suffered ourselves to make light of "deadly sin,"[g] and have thereby encouraged others in it! Let me then once more venture to exhort all those who have a part in the administration of the law, and are privileged to raise their voice in our courts, that they cherish and foster in themselves a deep sense of the seriousness of their office, of the importance of their words and demeanour, and of the weight of responsibility which attaches to them. Let me exhort them not to be misled by the differences which human law places between transgressions which are equally hateful in God's eye; but as they would shrink from speaking lightly of a punishable crime, so to avoid all levity with respect to sins, which, albeit man does not punish them, are placed by God in the same list with the worst of

[f] Matt. xii. 36.

[g] Litany. "From fornication and all other deadly sin, . . . good Lord, deliver us."

legal offences. Let them remember that among the "things which defile a man" and separate him from God, are not only "murders, thefts, false-witness, blasphemies," but "adulteries, fornications," and the "evil thoughts" which either lead to or flow from them.

SERMON VII.

PREACHED BEFORE THE JUDGES OF ASSIZE, JULY 1860.

GENESIS, iv. 9, 10.

"*And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel, thy brother? And he said, I know not: am I my brother's keeper? And he said, What hast thou done? The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground.*"

THE days of innocence were but just over; Eden was but lately lost; the flaming sword still waved at the eastern portal of the garden of the Lord[a], witness of the time and scene of absolute purity and sinlessness, when Crime appeared among men. Crime appeared, —not in any mild and comparatively innocuous form, —not veiled or disguised, as we find him in later ages, when wolfish wickedness walks about in sheep's clothing[b], and satanic malice assumes the appearance of an angel of light[c],—but palpable, manifest, in his own proper form and shape, Murder, red-handed, suddenly stood upon the earth. It was an awful manifestation. Not that Cain is to be regarded as certainly premedi-

[a] Gen. iii. 24. [b] Matt. vii. 15.
[c] 2 Cor. xi. 14.

tating his crime, or even as knowing of a surety that death—absolute destruction of the corporeal frame, and disappearance of the living being from among men—would be the consequence of his furious blows; for if, as is probable, no man had previously died, it must have been at least uncertain to him whether man *could* destroy his fellow. But the deed of Cain was nevertheless an awful manifestation, both of man's capacity to work evil, and of the existence in him of those sinful and pernicious principles which lie at the root of all crime, if not even of all transgression. The germ of sin, once introduced into the world, sprouted rapidly; and the light fault, as it may be thought, of Adam, was followed, within a very narrow interval, by the terrible guilt of Cain—the evil deed which, perhaps, of all those recorded in the Old Testament, strikes us from our early youth with the most horror, and remains through life the most deeply engraven in our memories. A brother's blood cried to God from the ground[d]; and the murderer of that brother stood, proud and unrepentant, bold to bandy words with his Maker, hoping to hide his crime by a lie, and to obtain acceptance for that lie by the unblushing avowal of a selfish, heartless unconcern; a cold, unsympathising egotism,—"Am I my brother's keeper?" As if in those very words there did not lie the essence of the sin which he had committed, the very root of that bitterness which had grown in him to such a fearful height, and borne such fearful produce. He claims to have a right to feel no

[d] Gen. iv. 10.

interest in his brother, to have no care whether he be alive or dead, to look on himself as owing him no duties, whether of protection, of assistance, or of sympathy; to stand aloof, in isolated and stoical indifference, regardless of aught but his own comfort, his own welfare, his own individual interests. Now this is the exact source of all crime, or sin against our fellows. If we think of, and care for, ourselves only; if we make the sphere of our sympathies coincident with that of our own being; if we start with the notion that we have only to pursue our own good, and that the welfare of others is nothing to us, there is no depth of wickedness or depravity into which we may not fall. It is very true that the general happiness of mankind is promoted by virtue; it is true, probably, of each act of sin or crime, that it lessens the sum-total of human enjoyment; but it is not true that selfishness, even the most enlightened selfishness, will necessarily keep men in the paths of virtue, or prevent them from grossly injuring their neighbours. The sum-total of human happiness is diminished, but the share of the particular individual is often increased, so far at least as this world is concerned, by injurious acts, especially when they are decently cloaked (as they may be), not only to mankind at large, but even to the conscience of the person doing them. (1) And if the selfishness be of the common kind, blind rather than enlightened, it does not confine itself to such acts, but proceeds, in all cases where the rights and claims of others come in conflict with its own wishes, to infringe the rights, to ignore the claims, to carry out, so far as it dares, its own

desires, to take to itself all the good things within its reach, to hate those that stand in the way of its obtaining them, to wish and plot their removal from the world, and, in the last resort, even to remove them by actual violence. Crime, then, springs up from selfishness; and the only adequate security against it is either a true sense of justice, a deep and strong regard for the rights, the claims, and the general well-being of our fellows, or a feeling of real love and reverence towards God, and a conviction that selfishness and disregard of others' interests is hateful to Him.

It is the business of religion to seek to implant these sentiments. It is the special aim of Christianity to stir up, if possible, within the hearts of men, that love of man which is "the fulfilling of the law,"[e] and that love of God which is necessarily bound up with the real love of our fellow-creatures.[f] The aim of human law and human justice is lower. Seeing that unchecked crime is absolutely destructive of human society, which it is the office of civil government to preserve, those who direct states have thought it necessary to curb and check the more flagrant excesses of selfishness by the enactment of laws, the establishment of courts, the appointment of judges, the erection of prisons and scaffolds; the menace, the solemn award, and the infliction of a great variety of punishments. The primary and direct object has, in most cases, probably been to work on men's fears (2), to deter them, by dread of the punishments threatened and known to be inflicted,

[e] Rom. xiii. 10.

[f] 1 John iv. 20.

from committing the offences against which it has been sought to guard. By these means selfishness is made to work as a check upon itself. The selfish fears of the individual are invoked as a counterpoise to his selfish desires; he is induced to refrain from much wrong-doing, which would bring him present enjoyment, by the conviction that his enjoyment would cost him too dear, being purchased by an overplus of after suffering. Doubtless this consideration has an important influence with many; thousands in whom the moral principle is weak, who are neither kept from crime by a sense of justice nor by the love and fear of God, *are* deterred by the terrors of the law, by fear partly of the penalties attached to offences, but still more of the stigma which attaches to the convicted offender. On the whole, however, the working of human justice in the mode described is unsatisfactory. Nothing is done towards raising the character of the individual by a system which leaves him under the influence of the lowest motive that can actuate man. To call selfishness into activity against selfishness may be an ingenious device, and is not actually wrong, since it does not positively deteriorate the character; but it is a poor mode of dealing with imperfect moral beings (3), whose real need is to have their natures elevated by the substitution for this low motive of a higher one, and by the excitation of better feelings than those with which they are familiar. Again, although undoubtedly the terrors of the law do have a considerable effect in checking crime, yet neither in ancient nor in modern times has the effect been such in degree as the

philanthropist can view with entire satisfaction. It was remarked of old that punishments failed greatly of their purpose; and though continually aggravated by those who observed the inefficiency of the lower kinds, yet still had but little preventive power, however great their severity. (4) And so, too, in our own times, we find that, labour as we may at perfecting our penal code, make the character of our punishments as distasteful as we can to criminals, render detection, conviction, and actual punishment as nearly certain as it is possible to render them, still we do not get rid of crime, or even seriously lessen it. The statistics of crime show but little tendency to a diminution in the proportion borne by our criminals to the rest of the population; and it may be questioned whether such reduction as may be apparent is not owing to the greater skill and cunning with which crimes are concealed by those who commit them now-a-days, rather than to any real diminution in the amount of crime committed. At any rate, the leprosy of crime still infects our whole country, and shows no signs of any intention to quit its hold upon us. Notwithstanding our boasted progress in civilisation and enlightenment, notwithstanding the real improvement which has taken place in the physical condition of our poorer classes, crime continues; crimes with violence are said to be even on the increase (5); not a week goes by but our ears are shocked by accounts which reach us of horrible murders and other outrages; not a year but reveals fresh forms of atrocious guilt, beside which the crime of Cain shows faintly, and sinks into an offence of a very ordinary type and character.

It is the opprobrium of our age that this is so. Clearly our preventive system, our punishment of criminals *in terrorem*, has not the testimony to its merit which is furnished by success. It may do something, but it certainly does not do very much, towards accomplishing the object at which it aims professedly. This is seen particularly by the number of re-convictions (6); which are a striking evidence of the insufficiency of our punishments to deter from crime even those who have in their own persons experienced them.

Is it not time that we should try some other method? The wisest philosopher of antiquity thought, that the proper object of all human punishment was to reclaim the criminal. (7) I will not say that this view is absolutely and altogether correct. I will not assert that "the prevention of future mischief," which our writers are apt to make the *sole* end of civil punishment (8), is not *an* end which may fairly and properly be included within the aims of the civil governor when he punishes —far less will I deny that there is a still higher aim and end, which Plato altogether ignored, the vindication of justice itself, the punishment of wrong as wrong (9), which ought to be regarded as the *main* purpose of our punishments. But while I would allow to each of the two ends here indicated their place in the general scheme, I desire on this occasion specially to vindicate what has been called the "remedial," or "correctionist" theory, and to point out both the grounds upon which its claims to consideration rest, and the advantages which might fairly be anticipated from its full practical recognition in our own country at the present day.

Now, the theory rests primarily on the general obligation of "good-will to man" under which we all lie, alike from the constitution of our nature and from the express command of God delivered to us in His Word.[8] No degree of demerit or guilt on the part of the criminal dispenses us from this obligation, which is universal and absolute.(10) We are all "our brothers' keepers;" and are bound at all times and under all circumstances to do the best we can for each one of them, consistently with our obligations to the remainder. (11) Undoubtedly we do right to protect society from wrong-doers — undoubtedly we do right so to punish them as to vindicate God's moral law — but it is equally possible either to combine with these aims, or to dissociate from them, consideration for the offender, and an earnest endeavour so to shape his punishment as to make it both answer the other ends and also work for his moral improvement. The precepts of the Divine Word, and the principle of benevolence implanted in us by nature, alike require us to keep in sight this last-named object. Its pursuit and realisation need not interfere in the least with the pursuit and realisation of the other ends. For instance, there are some crimes for which a certain term of imprisonment, longer or shorter, is a fitting punishment, fairly satisfying our feeling of what the offences deserve; the mere imprisonment will also sufficiently act as a preventive, deterring others from the commission of the like crimes. Neither of these

[8] Matt. xxii. 39.

two results is in the least impeded, if consideration for the criminal be allowed to determine the peculiar character of his imprisonment — if continual efforts be made during its course to render his confinement beneficial to him; if solitude and silence be judiciously applied to soften and subdue his nature; if the manual labour required of him be made such as will supply him with a livelihood, and so save him from much temptation, when he quits prison; if he be made to see that no vengeful feeling, no mere regard to self-interest actuates those who punish him, but that they are really anxious to raise him in the scale of humanity, to place him on a par with themselves, to facilitate (as far as they can) his moral restoration, and his return to a position of respectability among his fellows. In advocating the view that civil punishments should be made to work towards the reformation of the offender, no call is made for great alterations in our laws. An increased elasticity, a greater choice of punishments, would perhaps be desirable; but in the main we may rest content with the nature and degree of the penalties as they stand. All that our view requires is, that the arrangements for the carrying out of sentences should not be left to chance or to the caprice of individuals, but that they should be wisely framed by the advice of those best qualified to advise on the subject, and universally established throughout the empire in all places of punishment.

I have said that our obligation to adapt our punishments to the reformation of the criminal, rests primarily upon our general obligation to seek the welfare

of our fellows. In artificial communities like our own there is a further obligation; and it may be questioned, whether, though second in natural order, it is not an obligation of even greater exigence than the earlier and more general one. Where a community is homogeneous, where all lead the same, or nearly the same, lives, men seem to fall into crime wholly by their own fault; but where the reverse is the case, where classes are numerous and marked, where extreme poverty and excessive wealth stand side by side, where some are so placed at birth as scarcely to have any temptation to break the laws, and others are under a constant and most pressing temptation so to do, society itself seems in a measure answerable for the crime that is committed, and is bound to have a *special* tenderness for the criminal. I do not speak of a sentimental tenderness, which weeps and laments, compassionates and excuses, but effects nothing: I speak of a tenderness like that which carried Howard through his loathsome tasks, which caused Elizabeth Fry to pass so many years of her life in visiting prisons,—a tenderness anxious to show itself in action, bent on making compensation to the criminal for that neglect whereby he has become such as he is. If it be in any degree by our own derelict that a criminal population has grown up in all our large towns, and that thousands among us are yearly born and bred to crime as their natural calling, we are bound, not by philanthropy only, but by the claims of simple justice, to do our utmost to reclaim criminals when we have the opportunity; since in so doing we are but partially redressing the wrongs inflicted by our

own hands. Thus it appears that we are under a double obligation to make our punishments correctional; a general obligation arising out of our relation to the criminals as men, and a special one arising out of our peculiar position towards them, as joint members with them of a community which is so organised as to make crime on their parts almost a necessity. (12)

The principle for which I have ventured to contend is to some extent admitted in our actual system. We have established what we call Reformatories; and, if our convicted criminal is under a certain age, he has a chance of being sent to pass the term of his imprisonment in an establishment where efforts will be made to reclaim him. So far then we allow the duty, or if not the duty, the expediency, of seeking to reform our criminals. But I cannot think that we go far enough. We do not, I believe, receive into Reformatories even all of our juvenile criminals. We certainly fix an arbitrary standard of age, and if a youth comes above it, whatever the circumstances of his case, however desirable it appears to the Court which tries him that he should be sent to a Reformatory, he cannot be received into one. And for our adult criminals we have no Reformatories at all; or if some few prisons for adults may be said to partake of this character, they are rare and scattered instances; and the result is that, as all know, nine-tenths of our prisoners come out of confinement worse men than when they entered it. (13) Scores of criminals are every year allowed impunity, because merciful and upright men will not subject

them to the corrupting influence of the ordinary prison. Can it be right that this should continue? Ought not *every* prison to be, in fact, if not in name, a Reformatory? Ought not the endeavour to be made to reclaim every criminal? Why is it to be supposed that up to a certain age there is a good hope of the offender's reformation, and beyond that age no hope at all of it? Granting that there are confirmed and hardened criminals, who may justly be regarded as irreclaimable, surely this is not true of all adults. Surely the great majority of those who fill our jails might have been reclaimed had they been subjected to proper treatment on their first conviction.

Those who plead the cause of our criminals are apt to be told, that theirs is a weak and sickly sentimentality, that they lack robustness of mind, that they are without any proper feeling of indignation at crime, that they have too much pity for those who deserve their sufferings, and too little for the innocent victims of these persons' evil passions. I cannot deny that these reproaches are sometimes deserved; but I think it must be plain to all that they may be, and sometimes are, unjust. The tender compassion of our Lord for sinners was not incompatible with a holy abhorrence of sin, and an indignation against wrong-doing, very strongly felt and shown upon occasions.[h] In wishing punishments to be made remedial, we need not wish them to be milder, lighter, or one whit less disagreeable to their recipients. The best remedies are often

[h] John ii. 15, Matt. xxiii. 13-33, xxi. 12.

the most unpleasant. Let punishments be as severe as may be necessary to satisfy our sense of justice and vindicate God's moral law; they will not be less punishments, they will not be less acutely felt, because their details are so ordered as to improve those who suffer them. (14) The process of moral restoration is not a pleasant one. Pride has to be broken down; hardness has to be removed; regret, remorse, and repentance have to be excited — these things are not very agreeable to the natural man. It is said that Reformatories are not popular even among our juvenile criminals. (15) I believe that adult criminals would regard the introduction of a strict reformatory system into our prisons generally as an aggravation, not as an alleviation, of their punishment.

What then should we gain by it? Clearly, we should gain, in the first place, all those who were really reclaimed by the effect of reformatory discipline. We should convert such persons from the enemies of society, not merely into neutrals, but into friends and allies. We should accustom them to act upon higher motives than selfishness; and in many cases we might fairly expect to recover them altogether from the dominion of sin and vice, and to bring them to godliness and virtue. We should not lose those, if any such there are, who must be terrified into abstinence from crime; for the fear of punishment would still have its full effect on such persons as a preventive. But we should gain those, and assuredly they are many in number, who may be drawn by the strong cords of love, but cannot be driven by the sharp scourges of fear. We should

overcome that feeling which, more than anything else, separates the criminal population from us, and keeps it what it is — the feeling that we are at war with it, that we are its natural enemies, that we hate it as it hates us, and that consequently we are fairly subjected to its attacks upon us. Even those whom we did not reclaim would feel that we had sought to reclaim them. They might scoff and jest at our efforts, but their hearts would in many cases be somewhat softened. Kind severity has a wonderful power of winning the approval of those who are subjected to it: much as men dislike it at the time, they feel drawn towards it in the retrospect. Thus strict schoolmasters are ultimately more popular than indulgent ones. A few criminals might remain unimpressed, because unimpressible; but the majority even of those too weak for real reformation would gain something from the salutary influences whereby they had been for a time surrounded, and though not won from crime, would be far less likely than at present to proceed to its worst forms and grossest excesses.

Let us never forget that we are of a truth "our brothers' keepers." If we have not done all that lay in our power to preserve them from sin and crime, their sin and crime will lie in part at our door. Doubtless it would be best if we could forestall crime, if we could so tend and nurture all the souls yearly added to our community, as that none, unless by inward viciousness, should be liable to go astray. All praise to those who invade the strongholds of sin, and by "ragged schools," "district visitings," or other such means, seek to nip crime in the bud, to stop the sources whence

the criminal population has its supply, and so to spare us the necessity of administering civil punishments at all. As prevention is better than cure, such efforts, so far as they can be successfully made, must take precedence over the curative plans to which I have invited your attention. But till they have greater success, and even perhaps when they have the greatest success that the condition of our modern society will permit, there will be room for curative efforts. It is Utopian to suppose that crime will ever cease. While man remains the frail being that he is, some will fall into this kind of sin. It would be worthy of our modern enlightenment, it would be worthy of our philanthropy, it would be worthy of our Christian profession, to extend to all our criminals the advantages of a reformatory system.

SERMON VIII.

PREACHED ON THE CONVERSION OF ST. PAUL.

ACTS ix. 19, 20.

"*Then was Saul certain days with the disciples which were at Damascus. And straightway he preached Christ in the synagogues, that he is the Son of God.*"

IT has been observed with truth, that "if the importance we are intended to attach to particular events in early Christianity is to be measured by the prominence assigned to them in the sacred records, we must confess that, next after the Passion of our blessed Lord, the event to which our serious attention is especially called, is the Conversion of St. Paul." (1) Three times is the occurrence related at length, with an abundance of minute and striking detail; once by St. Luke[a], the companion and faithful friend of the great Apostle, twice by the Apostle himself[b]; and the allusions to it in the writings of the latter are continual. (2) As the crucifixion of our Lord is the cardinal fact of the Gospel history, the central point around which all else seems naturally to arrange itself, so the conversion of

[a] Acts ix. 3—18. [b] Acts xxii. 6—16, and xxvi. 12—18.

Saul, the persecutor, is the cardinal fact of the apostolic or earliest Church history, the point in which the interest culminates, the end of all that precedes, the germ of all that follows, the centre whereto all gravitates, the event in the light of which all else clearly reveals itself. God's actual instrument for establishing Christianity in the world, so that it cannot possibly be ever rooted out, was that Apostle, who "laboured more abundantly"[c] than all the others, and whose labours were more abundantly blest; who, by establishing the Churches of Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, and Rome, planted in the great capitals of civilisation and of thought a seed of true wisdom, which "took root downward, and bore fruit upward,"[d] spreading till it filled the earth; and who likewise by those wonderful writings, which he was privileged to indite, secured the transmission of the faith in its integrity to all time, leaving the world a precious and exhaustless treasure, with which no other compositions of any child of man can compare. The intellectual basis of Christianity, the science of theology (as it is termed), was first elaborated by St. Paul; and only by him, or by such an one as him, could the work have been done. Only by one who had sounded the depths of all other thought, Jewish or heathen, to whom Cabalistic lore and Greek learning were equally familiar, who was at once a "Hebrew of the Hebrews,"[e] and a Hellenist, "brought up at the feet of Gamaliel,"[f] and well acquainted with Philo, or his school, (3) could Chris-

[c] 1 Cor. xv. 10.
[d] Isaiah xxxvii. 31.
[e] Philipp. iii. 5.
[f] Acts xxii. 3.

tianity have been enabled to grapple at once with the highest forms of human wisdom; to challenge them to the conflict, secure of triumph; and not only effectively to hold her own in the keen strife of polished intellects, but to assert and maintain a superiority over the most exalted efforts of philosophers and Rabbins. Only by St. Paul, or by such an one as him, could the Stoic and the Epicurean, the Pharisee and the Sadducee, the Hebrew Prince and the Roman Proconsul, the fanatic crowd of Jews at Jerusalem, and the polished Athenian audience, have been charmed into attentive listening, and made to feel that they had met with a master mind, who had proved the vanity of their systems, and had himself a system to offer, compared with which their boasted knowledge was the most absolute foolishness. Well able to dispute in synagogues and to "confound" the Jews,[g] but emphatically "the Apostle of the Gentiles;"[h] St. Paul adapted Christianity to the Western mind, working out, as has been said (4), its ideas into conceptions, giving it a defined doctrinal language, and completely developing its intellectual side, so that no other Apostle contributes any distinct feature to its theology. (5)

If the event which we this day commemorate be thus important to all men (and especially to us of the West) in its consequences, so as to deserve on that account our serious and devout attention, it is likewise in itself of such a character as naturally to attract thought, and claim prolonged consideration. Of all

[g] Acts ix. 22. [h] Rom. xi. 13.

the mental phenomena which present themselves to our apprehension, conversion is the most interesting and the strangest. Habits are so fixed, character once formed is so indelible, continuity is altogether so much the law of our being, that every such change as the word "conversion" indicates, seems to be well nigh a miracle. Even when it is slow and gradual, occupying months or even years in its accomplishment, it is surprising, marvellous; we can scarcely at first bring ourselves to believe in its reality; we suspect that its subject is really at heart the same, but has taken up a new line of speech and action with effort and for a purpose; we look to see the old man peeping out from under the mask of the new; it is long before we become convinced that the change is inward and real; that "old things are for ever passed away," and that "all things are indeed become new."[1] And the marvel is increased when the conversion is sudden. Fixed as habits seem, unaltered as character commonly remains, we can in a measure understand how, gradually, by resolutions formed and carried out, by a strong and sustained effort of the will, combined with repeated acts, (assisted perhaps by change of circumstances, removal of bad companions, advice and warning of friends, and the like,) a man may become other than he was; but the sudden conversions which meet us here and there through the whole history of the Church, and which the unprejudiced observer must accept as certain facts equally with any other rare but

[1] 2 Cor. v. 17.

well-ascertained phenomena, surpass our understanding, and are altogether unaccountable. When, "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye,"[j] the heart is changed, and the man made "a new creature,"[k] new in his aims, hopes, wishes, desires, affections, thoughts, fancies; when what seems naturally to be the work of years, is thus wrought suddenly and at once, as if to show that the spirit of man is not even here in absolute subjection to the ordinary conditions of temporal existence, then our reason is wholly at a loss to comprehend or explain the event, and we can only recognise it as a fact, and regard it with unmixed wonder. Still more must we be content to marvel when the sudden conversion takes place, not in the ordinary way, by the inward action of the Holy Ghost upon the soul, but extraordinarily, by a physical miracle. In such a case we have a complication of marvels, every one of which transcends our understanding, and for none of which can we pretend to account. These things do not fall within the province of ordinary Reason; but Faith may profitably dwell on them, representing to itself, as vividly and exactly as the record permits, the wonders that God has wrought, the "marvellous things that He has done in the sight of our fathers."[l]

Saul of Tarsus, journeying from Jerusalem to Damascus at his own instance, with letters to the synagogues from the High-priest, granted to his request, empowering him to bring bound to Jerusalem any

[j] 1 Cor. xv. 52. [k] 2 Cor. v. 17.
[l] Ps. lxxviii. 12.

Christians, whether men or women, whom he might find in that city[m], presents to us a stern and awful picture of the hard Jewish character, yet one not without its parallel in Christian times and countries. The conscientious inquisitor, fierce, bold, untiring, unsparing of himself, jealous (as he fully believes) chiefly, if not solely, for God's honour, unflinching, devoid of pity, fully and completely satisfied with himself, is no rare sight; but one which the pages of ecclesiastical history reveal to us, far too frequently, as prominent in the Church of Christ; not belonging (as some argue) to one section only, which is thereby condemned; but found in every section and subdivision of the sadly disunited body, and often wielding the authority of the section to which he belongs, which sanctions his proceedings, and is thereby implicated in his guilt. The self-condemnation with which St. Paul visits this portion of his life[n], has failed to deter Christians from imitating it. We in this country at the present day are apt to flatter ourselves with the belief that we at least are free from the evil in question; we pride ourselves on our tolerance, and speak of the days of persecution as over. But are we really tolerant of each other's views and opinions? Is there no persecution of religious persons by the worldly, no sneering at their motives, no imputation of hypocrisy, no keen and cutting ridicule? Again, are even religious persons truly tolerant towards each other? Has polemic lost its bitterness? Have personalities altogether ceased? Surely, in our zeal

[m] Acts ix. 2. [n] 1 Cor. xv. 9.

for the truth, we still occasionally "breathe out threatenings"[o] against those who differ from us; we torture them with cruel imputations; we brand them with our scorn; we seek not merely to refute their writings, but to gibbet and pillory the writers. Oh! for something of the patience and long-suffering of Him who "endured such contradiction of sinners against himself,"[p] who, "when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not, but committed himself to Him that judgeth righteously."[q]

When Saul, burning with all the zeal of a conscientious persecutor, left Jerusalem for Damascus on his errand of vengeance, nothing could well have seemed more unlikely than that he would swerve or blench in the performance of it. His was no hesitating or yielding nature, no infirm or unstable spirit. Some theologians have imagined that his mind had been long undergoing a change, that the words and look of the dying Stephen had haunted his thoughts continually, instilling doubts, and causing him to be beset with many scruples and conflicts on his way from Jerusalem to the Syrian capital. (6) But the narrative of St. Luke is so far from suggesting these views, that it appears pointedly intended to preclude them. The death of Stephen had seemed a good deed in the eyes of Saul, who had contemplated it with a calm satisfaction (Σαῦλος ἦν συνευδοκῶν τῇ ἀναιρέσει αὐτοῦ)[r], and had found his taste for blood whetted, as so often happens,

[o] Acts ix. 1.
[p] Heb. xii. 3.
[q] 1 Pet. ii. 23.
[r] Acts viii. 1.

by this his first indulgence of it. He had taken an active part (must we not say *the most* active part?) in the "*great* persecution"[s] which immediately supervened. Throughout Jerusalem "he had made havoc of the Church, entering into every house, and haling men and women, whom he committed to prison."[t] "*Many*" were the saints whom he thus "bound"[u] and "shut up,"[v] and having by his zeal obtained himself a seat in the Sanhedrim, he joined in their trials and "gave his vote (*κατένεγκε ψῆφον*) against them."[w] Thus he persecuted numbers "*unto the death*,"[x] till Jerusalem was well nigh emptied of its Christian inhabitants, who "were scattered abroad through the regions of Judæa and Samaria,"[y] or had in some cases fled to "Phœnicia, Cyprus, and Antioch."[z] Even then the persecutor was not sated. "Being" (as he says) "exceedingly mad against the Christians, he persecuted them even unto strange cities."[a] He asked and obtained letters from the high-priest to those in authority over the Jews at Damascus; and "yet breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord,"[b] departed for that city. In all this there is not only no intimation of a mental change, of growing doubts, and continually-increasing perplexities; but the very contrary is implied,—the picture put before us is one of unchanging and unswerving persistence in a

[s] Acts viii. 1.
[t] Acts viii. 3.
[u] Ib. xxii. 4.
[v] Ib. xxvi. 10.
[w] Ib. xxvi. 10.
[x] Ib. xxii. 4.
[y] Ib. viii. 1.
[z] Ib. xi. 19.
[a] Ib. xxvi. 11.
[b] Ib. ix. 1.

course deliberately adopted and distinctly regarded as right; nor is there the least reason to think that, up to the moment when his course was arrested by a miracle, a suspicion had ever crossed Saul's mind as to the rectitude of his conduct, or the slightest hesitation been felt with respect to the execution of his projects. He had left Jerusalem "breathing out threatenings and slaughter;" he had journeyed straight to Damascus, so far as appears, without pause or stay. Arrived near his journey's end he still slacked not, but pursued his way with fixed purpose under the full blaze of the hot noontide sun.

"Suddenly,"[c] without warning or preparation, inward or outward, "a great light shone from heaven,"[d] —a light expressly said to have been "above the brightness of the midday sun;"[e] not, therefore, lightning or a meteor, which cannot be seen in bright sunshine; but a light, the mere intensity of which showed it to be supernatural, and which at once struck all those on whom it fell to the ground. It is probably not the mere fancy or art of painters which has represented the young zealot and those in his company as on horseback upon this journey. A person of St. Paul's rank would certainly not have travelled on foot, and where despatch was an object, horses would be more likely to be used than any other animal. All fell (it would seem) from their horses to the earth[f], and one at least lay prostrate, while the rest "stood speechless,"[g] "being afraid."[h]

[c] Acts ix. 3; xxii. 6.
[d] Acts xxii. 6.
[e] Ib. xxvi. 13.
[f] Ib. verse 14.
[g] Ib. ix. 7.
[h] Ib. xxii. 9.

Then on the sight there followed an awful sound. It was heard by divers of the company, not as a sound merely, but as a voice.[i] Only to one, however, was the voice so distinctly articulate that the language, and even the words, were known. He who lay motionless and prostrate upon the earth[j] "heard the voice, speaking unto *him* in the Hebrew tongue, and saying, 'Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks.'"[k] Then, if not before, he looked up and saw. What that whole vision was we know not, but at least it included "the direct perception of the visible presence of Jesus Christ."[l] He who had already once shown Himself since His ascension to Stephen showed Himself now to one of Stephen's murderers. None may tell, none may even conceive, the glory of that vision. As Isaiah could not doubt when he "saw the King sitting upon His throne,"[m] so now the stricken Saul at once recognises in Him on whom his eyes rest, "the Lord." "Who art thou, *Lord?*" he says; "who art Thou, that canst at once show Thyself arrayed in all the terrible majesty of heaven, and yet be persecuted, and by me?" "Who art Thou?" he says; not that he does not suspect, not that he can greatly doubt, but for full assurance, that in so momentous a matter he may have (if the Lord so please) certainty. And certainty is vouchsafed him. "I am Jesus,"[n] he hears, "Jesus of Nazareth,"[o] "whom thou

[i] Acts ix. 7.
[j] Acts xxvi. 16.
[k] Ib. verse 14.
[l] Conybeare and Howson, vol. i. p. 99.
[m] Is. vi. 1 and 5.
[n] Acts xxvi. 15.
[o] Ib. xxii. 8.

persecutest." I am He, whose followers thou hast hunted, and art even now hunting, to the death. I am He whom thou hast "sought to compel them to blaspheme."[p] I, who now stand revealed to thee as the Lord of Earth and Heaven, am the despised Nazarene, in whose name men are forbidden "to speak at all or teach,"[q] the Jesus against whom all the energies of thy nature have been so long directed. "Astonished," humbled, for once conscious of weakness, and "trembling"[r] still with the dread which unregenerate man must ever feel in the presence of God, Saul once more speaks. "Lord, what shall I do?"[s] or, "What wilt thou have me to do?"[t] And then he is told to "rise and go into Damascus," where the question which he has asked shall be further answered.[u]

Such was the miracle whereby Saul the Persecutor became Paul the Apostle. It has been questioned whether any outward fact at all is intended to be conveyed by the narrative; whether, in reality, the whole was not merely an inward impression made on the mind of Saul during a trance, or ecstacy. At any rate, it has been urged, "the belief in an outward fact was not the essential point in St. Paul's faith, and therefore it need not be made the essential point in our own." We may contentedly leave the question undecided, as one which St. Paul himself would not have ventured to decide positively. (7) I cannot think that there is really any room for the doubts here in-

[p] Acts xxvi. 11.
[q] Acts iv. 18.
[r] Ib. ix. 6.
[s] Ib. xxii. 10.
[t] Ib. ix. 6.
[u] Ib. ix. 6.

dicated. Not only does the narrative in the Acts, whether proceeding from St. Luke or from St. Paul himself, distinctly imply the objective character of the occurrence; but it is as a real objective event that St. Paul repeatedly alludes to it in his epistles. "Am I not an Apostle? Am I not free? *Have I not seen* Jesus Christ our Lord?"[v] "He was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that He was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; ... after that of James, then of all the apostles; and last of all, *he was seen of me also.*"[w] It has been attempted to explain away all other appearances of our Lord as mere visions, on account of their combination in this passage with the appearance to St. Paul. (8) A sounder and more reverent logic will invert the reasoning, and gather from the conjunction, that the appearance to St. Paul and the conversation with him were as much outward facts, of which cognizance was taken through the senses, as the various appearances to fewer or more disciples between the resurrection and the ascension. A test of an outward fact is said to be its being "seen by more persons than one, who cannot be supposed to have been under any common impulse." (9) This test was answered on the occasion; and on this test both St. Paul and St. Luke dwell. "They that were with me saw the light and were afraid;"[x] "the men which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man."[y] It is in vain urged, to disparage

[v] 1 Cor. ix. 1.
[w] 1 Cor. xv. 7—9.
[x] Acts xxii. 9.
[y] Acts ix. 7.

this evidence, that the accounts of what Saul's companions witnessed vary. They do not vary importantly, much less irreconcileably. They do not vary more than the accounts of different persons who have seen the same event, or of the same person at two different times, are sure to vary. In all, it is plain that the whole company saw the light, and were struck with amazement and confusion by it. From one we learn that others besides Saul heard the voice; from another we gather that the words spoken were not intelligible to any but Saul himself. The impression made on the companions of Saul was thus both ocular and audible, and, so far as it went, agreed in both respects with the impression made on Saul, only it was altogether less distinct and definite. Such a difference in the impression would not throw any doubt even upon an ordinary fact, much less does it throw doubt upon one which belongs at once to the two spheres of the spiritual and the sensible. (10)

Instead, then, of saying that St. Paul would not have known how to answer, had he been asked the question, "Whether the manifestation made to him was an inward or an outward fact?" I think we ought rather to say, that St. Paul never conceived that the external fact could be doubted, since it had been witnessed by so many, and was admitted even by the Pharisees.[z] To himself the evidence of his own senses was enough. He knew that he had seen Christ with his bodily eyes, as he knew that he had just before seen Damascus and

[z] Acts xxiii. 9.

the road leading to it; and as he saw, at the very time, his companions "fallen to the earth," and himself lying there. He would not "ask for outward signs of the reality of what he had heard and seen" (10), because he would not doubt, and because the signs were already there, in the terror and affright of his companions, in the confusion of the whole cavalcade, in every word that they addressed either to him or to each other; and, finally, in his blindness, which was alone sufficient proof of a physical appearance. "When I could not see *for the glory of that light*, I was led by the hand."[a] The light that had produced a physical infirmity could not be an inward vision presented to the mind only. Sense had been the medium of the impression, for sense had suffered thereby; the dazed orbs could not at once recover themselves, and the sight which had rested on the glory of the Heavenly King was lost "for a season."[b]

The miraculous conversion of St. Paul must then remain among the objective evidences of Christianity. By some it has been placed among the very foremost of such evidences (11); but this is not the position which I should claim for it. Its controversial force does not appear to me very great; but to the Christian it is a most valuable evidence of the power and glory, as well as of the mercy and compassion, of his ascended Lord, while it demonstrates likewise very forcibly how near He is to each one of us, and how able to make His presence felt. It was not, however, a miracle

[a] Acts xxii. 11. [b] Ib. xiii. 11.

wrought *as an evidence*, but one which had for its special end the conversion of an individual, whose prejudices could perhaps not have been overcome in any other way.

While I would thus, on the grounds stated, claim a certain amount of consideration as due to the outward circumstances connected with the event which we commemorate to-day, I would fully allow that it is to the mental phenomenon—the conversion itself—that we are intended to look with the greatest interest and attention. And here, I think, we are entitled to ask two things, first, *What* was the change wrought on the mind of St. Paul by the miraculous appearance of our Lord? and secondly, *How* was that change produced in Him?

What was the change wrought? By some it has been regarded as a complete change of the whole moral being. St. Paul is represented as at one moment literally "the chief of sinners,"[c] proud, hard, cruel, self-seeking, worldly, a mere formalist in religion; at the next, as a perfect Christian, humble, meek, charitable, penetrated with the love of God, adorned with every grace and virtue which appertains to the Christian character. But this view is grounded rather upon preconceived notions of the nature of conversion in the abstract, than on the statements or representations of Scripture as to what actually took place in St. Paul's case. If we take Scripture for our guide we shall find (I think) that the moral change was much less than is

[c] 1 Tim. i. 15.

commonly supposed. Compare the unregenerate Saul, even as he paints himself, (and we may be sure that he gives us no flattering portrait) with even the ripe apostle, ready "to spend and to be spent" for Christ[d], and it is plain that many elements of the earlier exist also in the later character. The energy, the earnestness, the burning zeal, the strict conscientiousness, the readiness to affront dangers and undergo sufferings for what he deems the truth, which we admire in Paul the Preacher to the Gentiles, are all very clearly to be traced in Saul the Pharisee. He was not like those of his sect whom our Lord rebuked. There was no hypocrisy in him. Pharisaism attracted him by its "strictness,"[e] not by its formalism; by its "zeal toward God,"[f] not by its subtle casuistry and modes of teaching men to avoid their duties. He joined its ranks because it was "the straitest sect of the Jews' religion;"[g] he then acted "as he verily thought that he ought to act."[h] It was no soft or idle life on which he entered, no bed of roses whereon he lay down contentedly, no calm and placid stream on which he embarked in the expectation of a pleasure-voyage. We may suspect, perhaps, that ambition partly moved him; and in one place he certainly seems to imply that before his conversion he did not possess that singleness of heart which is content with the approval of God only, but that (at least to some extent) he regarded men, and shaped his course so as to "please" them.[i] Still, what-

[d] 2 Cor. xii. 15.
[e] Acts xxvi. 5.
[f] Acts xxii. 3.
[g] Ib. xxvi. 5.
[h] Ib. xxvi. 9.
[i] Gal. i. 10.

ever deduction is to be made from his goodness on this score, we cannot doubt that in the main he was actuated by a real zeal for religion, a jealousy for God's honour, and an earnest desire to do Him acceptable service. No doubt there were many defects in his character. Its type was Jewish, not Christian. It breathed the spirit of the law, which delighted in stern denunciations and strict punishments; not that of the Gospel, which attracts by blessings and leads onward by encouragements. It was hard and unbending, stern even to fierceness, perhaps proud, no doubt self-righteous; but it was on the whole such a character as exacts more commendation than blame, more admiration than disapproval, and it contained many of the elements which compose the highest moral excellence. These elements distinctly remain in the converted Paul, and they give a very striking harmony and continuity to his character, which was evidently not changed in every particular, but only modified and complemented, after his conversion.

The first and most immediate effect wrought upon the mind of St. Paul by the miracle of which he was the object, appears to have been the production of self-distrust and humility. "He, trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt Thou have me to do?"[1] Till this moment he would seem to have felt no doubt, no hesitation, no difficulty in determining his course; in other words, no distrust of his own judgment on moral matters. Firm and self-reliant, he had probably never

[1] Acts ix. 6.

known the need of the psalmist's prayer, "Lord, make Thy way plain before my face;"[k] he had always seemed to see a single straight and plain way before him, and in that way he had walked confidently. Now he was brought to feel that to know right from wrong is not always an easy matter; that God's aid is needed to enlighten man's purblind vision, to "teach" him the right way, and "lead him in a plain path."[l] Again, he was brought to feel what has been technically called "conviction of sin," a feeling which never afterwards departed from him. "I, that am *the least* of the apostles, that *am not meet to be called an apostle*, because I persecuted the Church of God."[m] "Unto me, who am *less than the least* of the saints, is this grace given."[n] "I, who was before *a blasphemer and a persecutor and injurious*, obtained mercy."[o] "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am *chief*."[p] His whole life had been one huge mistake. Thinking to serve and honour God he had blasphemed the Holy One; persecuted His saints, and Him in His saints; caused (or striven to cause) others to blaspheme; made havoc of the Church; bound, imprisoned, condemned, persecuted to the death those whose only fault it was to hold and be zealous for the truth; and, however circumstances might in the eyes of a merciful God extenuate his guilt, to him it was awful, terrible, well-nigh overwhelming. It brought the strong man down at once upon his knees, and drew forth the complete

[k] Psalm v. 8 (Prayer Book version).
[l] Ps. xxvii. 11.
[m] 1 Cor. xv. 9.
[n] Eph. iii. 8.
[o] 1 Tim. i. 13.
[p] 1 Tim. i. 15.

acknowledgment of entire helplessness—"Lord, what wilt Thou have me to do?"[q] Lord, I am ready, as ever, to do Thy will; but now I see that I have hitherto known nothing of Thy will; now I see that, thinking myself "rich" in knowledge and "in need of nothing," I have in truth been "wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked."[r] Now I perceive that, unless Thou guidest my feet, I may go astray into all manner of evil paths. On Thee henceforth I cast the burthen of my weakness and of my guilt. "What wilt Thou have me to do?"

Besides this, the great change which we remark in St. Paul's after character is the development of the spirit of love. Integrity, earnestness, conscientiousness, strictness of life, faith, zeal, even self-sacrifice, were his before; but of love we have at any rate no trace. Natural affection may undoubtedly have been known to him; but sympathy with mankind at large, compassion, tenderness, earnest desire for others' good, appear to have been lacking in the unregenerate Saul, while in the regenerate Paul they are striking and marked characteristics. "Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel is, that they may be saved."[s] "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart; for I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh."[t] "Therefore, my

[q] Acts ix. 6.
[r] Rev. iii. 17.
[s] Rom. x. 1.
[t] Rom. ix. 1—3.

brethren, dearly beloved and longed for, my joy and crown, so stand fast in the Lord, my dearly beloved."[u] "I would that ye knew what great conflict I have for you and for them at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh, that their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love. . . . . For though I be absent in the flesh, yet I am with you in the spirit, joying and beholding your order and the steadfastness of your faith in Christ."[v] "So, being affectionately desirous of you, we were willing to have imparted unto you, not the Gospel of God only, but also our own souls, because ye were dear unto us."[w] A deep, abounding, never-failing spring of love has been opened in the once dry soil of the apostle's heart, and from it wells forth continually a stream of sympathy and affection, unknown to Judaism, an affection of that warmth and earnestness which was perhaps not rare in the early ages, and which called forth the remarkable testimony on the part of the heathen — "See how these Christians love one another!"

Such were, I think, the two great changes which his conversion wrought in St. Paul. In the main, he is characterised by the same qualities as before, but his pride and self-trust are overthrown, humility being grafted into their place, and his nature has blossomed forth into love, "putting on bowels of mercies, kindness, meekness, long-suffering, forbearance, forgiveness," in a word, "charity, which is the bond of perfectness."[x]

[u] Philipp. iv. 1.
[v] Col. ii. 1 and 5.
[w] 1 Thess. ii. 8.
[x] Col. iii. 12—14.

It remains to consider how these changes were wrought in him. Were they accomplished, momentarily and inscrutably, by the secret working of the Spirit of Christ in his heart, as some have supposed? Or was this not the case, and did it please God to set in motion what may be called (in a certain sense) natural causes, in order to bring them about? The latter appears to me to be the teaching of Scripture. St. Paul's humility was the natural result of the discovery which he made — so soon as he knew that Jesus of Nazareth and the Lord were one — of the utter misdirection and perversity of his whole former life. A true conversion is always apt to make a sincere man humble, by bringing before him very palpably his previous ignorance. But when the man who has been the great leader and upholder of one system, and the great assailant of another, is converted to the creed which he has been for years attacking and reviling, a profound sentiment of humility and self-distrust is naturally engendered by the circumstances of his situation. For then the whole life up to a certain point is felt to have been lost, or worse than lost, the powers misapplied, the energies wasted, evil accomplished instead of good, evil often irremediable, and not past, but still continuing. The entire period is hateful to the man; he can only look back upon it with horror and self-abasement; and as the recollection is almost always present to him, a lowly and chastened tone becomes habitual. By the sight vouchsafed him of our Lord in heaven, and the declaration, "I am Jesus," St. Paul found the whole fabric of his former belief shattered to

atoms — the foundations were gone, the walls crumbled, and he lay weak and helpless amid the ruins. Humility was thus the natural consequence of the conviction flashed in upon his mind—a conviction which was actually effected by means of a miracle, but which, however it had been produced, would equally have wrought this change in his moral being.

And the other main element in St. Paul's later character, love, may be distinctly traced likewise to the circumstances of the miraculous appearance to him. In the words, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou *me?*" and "I am Jesus *whom* thou persecutest," was contained, in the most striking manner, that essential doctrine of Christianity, our incorporation into Christ, and His inhabitation in His members, from which Christian love springs naturally and, as it were, necessarily. It is this incorporation, this almost identity, distinctly, nay vividly, apprehended by St. Paul (as he shows throughout all his writings), that lies at the root of that deep and abounding love for the heathen which characterises him. And the conviction of this intimate union must have been brought home to his inmost soul by the words, "Why persecutest thou ME?" words which we may well conclude to have been used for that purpose. Thenceforward he saw in men, not merely subjects and servants of God, bound to worship and honour Him according to the method of His own appointment, but members of Christ, "very members incorporate in the mystical body of the Son of God,"[y] and therefore ten-

[y] Communion Service.

derly beloved by Him, and necessarily sharers in the love with which He was regarded; — thenceforward his heart yearned towards all men, as those for whom Christ died, but especially towards the brethren, who were altogether one with Him, "members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones."[z]

St. Paul's conversion, then, was not merely a change of intellectual belief; it involved, also, a change of heart. The twin graces of humility and love had birth within him in that awful hour, when he lay stricken and helpless upon the ground, hearing the voice of the Crucified. But it would be a departure from the plain teaching of Scripture were we to conclude that the whole change, which we observe between the earlier and the later character of the Apostle, was completed in this moment of time. Great events are turning-points in our lives from which changes date; but they do not effect the changes, which they initiate, at once. Not even has grace so superseded nature as to infuse qualities in that perfection which they acquire by habit, or suspend altogether the law of our natural moral growth. St. Paul was not fitted for his apostolic mission, nay! he was not even fitted for baptism, *at once*. He required first the discipline, the terrible discipline scarcely to be appreciated by any man with the gift of sight, of three days' utter blindness. "Saul rose from the earth, and when his eyes were opened he saw no man; but they led him by the hand, and brought him into Damascus."[a] What his thoughts were in those

[z] Eph. v. 30.

[a] Acts ix. 8.

days, what inward conflicts he underwent, what agony he suffered, we may perhaps in some small degree imagine, but we can never apprehend with any distinctness; for Scripture has left this dark and awful passage of his life enshrined in an obscurity which we vainly seek to penetrate. We are told nothing but that during the whole time he "neither ate nor drank,"[b] and that at the end he "prayed."[c] Still, I think we cannot doubt that into those three days were compressed an amount of struggle, trial, and suffering, such as must have given them the power of months, or even years, of ordinary life upon the character. Accordingly, at the end of them, he was considered fit for baptism; and Ananias was divinely commissioned to restore his sight and give him entrance into the Church. Still, he was far from being fully qualified as yet for the office of an Apostle, though he was singled out for miraculous conversion with that object. Not less than eight or ten years appear to have elapsed between the baptism of St. Paul and his separation for the work whereto he was originally called. (12) During all this time he was undoubtedly growing in grace, increasing in the knowledge and love of God, gradually perfecting that character which breathes through his epistles, becoming such that he could rightfully say to his Corinthian converts, "Be ye imitators of me, even as I am of Christ."

If it be asked now what practical lessons we are to derive from the event commemorated to-day, it must be

[b] Acts ix. 9. [c] Ib. ix. 11. [d] 1 Cor. xi. 1.

answered that, in the first place, being so extraordinary an event, and one so entirely out of the common course, it is less a matter for practical application than for reverent and devout thought. It is good to dwell on all that tells us of the ways of God towards man; and strange events, which can happen but to a few, are peculiarly apt to move our admiring wonder. The miraculous narratives with which Scripture abounds are not set in the written word simply as evidences of the truth; they are food for religious contemplation, very acceptable to the devout mind, which finds them at once quicken and exalt its apprehension of the Divine nature. Again, in the case before us, wonder and admiring awe are not the sole feelings which the narrative is calculated to produce; it calls likewise on our gratitude, it appeals strongly to our sense of God's deep and tender love. St. Paul's conversion is at once a signal instance of God's forbearance and long-suffering, which endured for such a length of time such contradiction of a sinner against Himself, and an evidence to us of His tender care for the Gentile world, for whose conversion He saw the persecuting Saul to be the fittest instrument. Again, in the words of our Lord, "Why persecutest thou ME?" we have, as I observed before, a proof—beyond almost any other which Scripture contains—of that oneness of Christ with His true followers, that absolute identification of them with Himself, which is at once the ground and the well-known characteristic of the truest love (13), the source and guarantee of a tenderness passing the power of man to conceive. Despite the persecuting

spirit which was in him, despite his pride and self-trust, Christ has a love for St. Paul, a love for his sincerity, for his earnestness, for his zeal, albeit a "zeal not according to knowledge."[e] Despite their many aberrations, despite their ignorance and unbelief, He has a love for the Gentiles, which causes Him to choose and convert miraculously the man whom He sees to be, in all the world, the fittest for their Apostle. Finally, for His own faithful converts, His suffering members, He has a love far greater than towards Jew or Heathen, infinite in its depth and tenderness, ineffable, inconceivable, inscrutable, a love which prophecy has faintly shadowed forth in the "Song of Songs," but which Apostle and Evangelist have been content to feel without describing. It is this three-fold love, and especially the last and highest form of love, which the narrative of St. Paul's conversion seems specially intended to bring before us; and therefore thankfulness and loving gratitude are the feelings it should chiefly awaken.

At the same time, there is a warning in it. "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." Not the inquisitor only, but all who are untender or unkind, all who oppress or browbeat, all who ridicule religion in others, all who indulge in bitter and cruel speech, all who are injurious or uncharitable, all who put stumbling-blocks in the way of God's "little ones,"[f] are in reality persecutors of Christ, to whom He speaks through the words which He addressed to Saul. "Why dost thou persecute me?"

[e] Rom. x. 2. [f] Matt. xviii. 6.

He says. What evil have I done to thee, that thou shouldest seek to do hurt to Me? Or what dost thou expect to gain? Σκληρόν σοι. "It is hard *for thee.*" It will hurt thyself only, or chiefly. Forbear, then, and repent. Persecute no more, be no more untender or unkind, suspicious or injurious, sarcastic or bitter, an oppressor or a hinderer of religion. Remember that I am in my servants and my servants in me, and that whatsoever thou doest to the least of these my disciples, whether in the way of kindness or in the way of hurt, thou doest it unto *Me.* When they "fill up that which is behind of My afflictions in their flesh,"[g] it is a blessed thing for them, but a wretched thing for those who bring the afflictions on them. "Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones. For I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father, which is in heaven."[h]

[g] Col. i. 24.

[h] Matt. xviii. 10.

SERMON IX.

PREACHED ON THE 31ST OF DECEMBER.

PSALM cxix. 96. (Prayer-Book Version.)

"*All things come to an end.*"

ALL things come to an end, yet all things always continue. Death is no close, but only a change of being. Things material fall apart and crumble to decay, but the matter whereof they consist dies not. Fresh forms constantly succeed to former forms; and the physical universe, though never "continuing" for a moment "in one stay,"[a] remains nevertheless in its general features unchanging and unchanged. Matter never perishes, species propagate themselves, worlds seemingly arise out of worlds,—even at that great, and in one sense final, destruction to which we are taught to look forward, a "new heaven and a new earth"[b] are promised to take the place of that former heaven and former earth, which shall then be swept away. Everywhere the law of continuity prevails, and is not only as much, but even more the rule of God's Providence than the counter law of cessation whereof we hear in the text. As in other things, so also in TIME, these opposite principles have their place; and while the primary and essential

[a] Office for the Burial of the Dead. [b] Rev. xxi. 1.

condition to which God has subjected that mysterious and impalpable creation, is a constant and never-ending succession, in attempting to trace which the mind loses itself, which in truth extends in an infinite series far beyond our utmost grasp or reach of thought,—so, on the other hand, there is impressed upon the same creation by special artifice and contrivance a character of cessation, whereby it falls, no less than things grosser and more material, within the scope of the Psalmist's words—"All things come to an end." It will, perhaps, not be inappropriate on this day to consider *how* and *why* God has so ordered this matter—*how* and *why* time, which naturally flows onward without pause in an unceasing stream, till perchance at some remote point it mingles its waters with the ocean of eternity, is made, so far as man is concerned, to wear a perpetual appearance of cessation—to die, to pass away, to expire—to "come" continually "to an end"—forming no exception to the general law which my text enunciates, but a striking illustration of it.

To pry over curiously into final causes in matters above our cognizance, and where we are without a warrant from the words of Holy Writ, is a boldness whereto it may be that we are by nature too much inclined, and which doubtless often needs to be checked and held under restraint. (1) But to search reverently into the mind of God so far as we may, and to seek to order our course by what we know of His designs where, either by the light of reason wherewith He hath endowed us, or by the revelation which He has bestowed upon us, He has, as it were, taken us into

His counsels and made us partakers of His intelligence —this is so far from being an unwarrantable intrusion into God's hidden things—into those deep abysses of His nature which His Spirit alone may search[c]—that it is rather an imperative duty upon all such as are gifted by their Creator with the precious boon of thought and intellect. For reason is not, as too many have taught, a mere *ignis fatuus*, landing those who in things divine entrust themselves to its flickering guidance in bogs and sloughs where they may flounder on for ever without once finding bottom—nor is there any authority in Scripture from beginning to end for that contrast which it has often been our lot to hear drawn, between Faith and Reason, between the light of nature, and the divinely implanted principle of spiritual intelligence, whereby we "comprehend with all saints what is the length and breadth and depth and height"[d] of the vast scheme whereof it has pleased God to constitute us part and parcel. "Faith" and "Sight" are contrasted by the Apostle[e], but not Faith and Reason. Faith and Sight—the outward and the inward vision —the experience of the senses, and the insight of the mind into things spiritual and immaterial—not Faith and Reason, between which there can be no contrast, since faith is but the assent of our reasonable nature to things which have become known to it in a particular manner. (2) To disparage Reason is to make light of that gift whereby alone we understand what revelation is, or what a particular revelation means—that gift, by

[c] 1 Cor. ii. 10.

[d] Ephes. iii. 18.

[e] 2 Cor. v. 7.

which we are made susceptible of spiritual influences, by which we reflect God's image, and resemble (faintly it may be and feebly, yet still really and truly) our Blessed Lord, who is the Word, or *Reason* of the Father.

True it is that many, professing to follow Reason, have gone grievously astray, having "sought out" for themselves "many inventions."[f] But the condemnation of these men is in the *unreasonableness* of their conclusions. The "wisdom" whereby the old world "knew not God,"[g] was not, even considered in itself, a true wisdom; but was absurd, foolish, inconsequent, and self-contradictory, according to that saying of the Apostle, "professing themselves to be wise they became fools."[h] And in like manner in all times the grossest unreason is to be found in the writings of those who regard themselves as especially the Apostles of Reason, and who refuse on rationalistic grounds to receive the doctrines of revelation. These men do not really err, as has been commonly thought, by the over-use, but by the abuse of reason. Their error is not that they reason too much or too far, but that they reason poorly and unsoundly. (3) Reason itself cannot mislead—it is the light of the soul, given us by "the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."[i] It may be dimmed and dulled—it may gasp and flicker—it may fail and be extinguished—but so long as it exists, and so far as it extends, it *shines*, it shows *true*

[f] Eccles. vii. 29.
[g] 1 Cor. i. 21.
[h] Rom. i. 22.
[i] John i. 9.

—it indicates that which is, not that which is not—it is our natural guide—the principle which we were intended to follow—which if we follow, God will cause to burn more and more brightly, "until our whole body shall be full of light."[j]

I have thought it necessary to premise thus much, because a prejudice—a very undue prejudice as I think—exists against arguments from final causes, grounded partly on a depreciation of Reason, the faculty whereby we search them out, partly on an overestimate of the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. It is true that we cannot search out God[k], that there must ever be in Him much that transcends our faculties—vast "treasures of wisdom and knowledge *hid away*"[l]—but it is not true that God has denied us all knowledge of His nature, or forbidden us to speculate, so we do it humbly and reverently, on the workings of His allwise and perfect mind, and to form conclusions concerning His will from the arrangements ordered by His Providence. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are *clearly seen*, being understood *from the things that are made*."[m] This is the justification of such as search into final causes, seeking from the things that are made—from the mode and fashion of their making—to understand the invisible

[j] Matt. vi. 22.

[k] Job xi. 7.

[l] Col. ii. 3. "ἐν ᾧ εἰσι πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῆς γνώσεως ἀπόκρυφοι."

[m] Rom. i. 20.

things of Him, who did not frame them without thought[n], or fashion them without a purpose.

We may then, I think, reverently, and at this season, fitly, ask—for what ends and objects should we judge it to have been that God from the first so ordered and arranged His universe, that time, which is a necessary condition of the existence of created beings, should not flow on and on, as it so readily might, in an uniform and unbroken stream, but should have a circular motion whereby it becomes divided into portions, which measure and mark its flight,—and that so plainly and palpably, that there was never a nation upon the face of the earth which failed to recognise what are called the natural divisions of time, the day, the month, and the year; or which did not by these means, to a greater or less extent, take account of and estimate duration. The consideration of this subject will not be found, I venture to say, a matter of barren speculation, but one of great practical import; involving as it does the question of what use we are to make of the constant recurrence of those marked and recognised periods which form stages in the journey of life, and which cannot but have been intended to serve some valuable purpose.

I said that time might readily have flowed on in an uniform and unbroken stream, with nothing to mark its flight or separate it into periods. To render this clear, let us consider briefly what time is, and distinguish between its real nature and essence, and those

[n] See Ephes. i. 11. "Who worketh all things after the *counsel* of his own will."

points attaching to it which are accidental and accessory. Now time is by some regarded as bound up with motion (4); and even those who have pointed out that the two are not united by any law of necessity, have yet admitted it as a fact that motion and time were by nature brought forth together, declaring that the spinning of the thread of time and of the line of the celestial movements, as they began at the same moment, and proceed *pari passu*, are actually, though not notionally, inseparable. (5) But this does not seem to be in reality a true account. Time began, not with the creation of the heavenly bodies, but with that of the angels; for the moment anything began to be which before was not, that instant did time exist. Time *is* to all beings whose existence dates from a certain point, who "through continuance have the time of their former continuance lengthened, so that they could not heretofore be said to have continued so long as now, neither now so long as hereafter." (6) Time *was* therefore ere the celestial bodies were created, and would have flowed on had they never been made, being independent altogether of them, and still more of their motion. For motion is an accident of celestial spheres, which might *as* easily, or even more easily, have been formed to remain always at rest; since to create a material body in motion requires two acts of omnipotence, to create a material body at rest requires but one. Man, therefore, might have been placed on a material globe, and that globe might have had no motion at all, either in itself or relatively to other bodies. Yet time or duration would have belonged to man none the less, as

to the angels before the worlds were made—the moment of his first existence would have continually become more distant—he would have grown older, as he does now, only he would have possessed no means of measuring the duration of his life; and as he could not have marked, so he would scarcely have perceived, the lapse of time. Or again, if it be thought that there may be causes, of which we wot not, rendering the motion of a material universe in the strictest sense of the word necessary, yet motion might have been arranged in manifold ways without its serving, as it now does, to measure out and divide time for us. Our globe might have moved, surrounded by an atmosphere of light, in a straight line through infinite space, revolving at the same time upon its own axis, and we should have had no perception whatever of its motion. Or it might have moved in a vast circle or ellipse through space with the same effect. It is only through our perceived connection with the other heavenly bodies, given us "for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years,"[o] that we either are conscious of motion, or have the power to measure it. It is not the mere revolution of the earth upon its axis, but the falling of the sun's rays upon it during the process, that makes the day of which we are conscious. Had light continued diffused, as at the first[p], instead of being concentrated for our use into the sun and stars, as we should have had no alternation of light and darkness, and could not have perceived the revolution of our globe

[o] Gen. i. 14. [p] Gen. i. 3, 14.

upon its axis, the division of time which we call the day would have been unknown to us. Again, we owe our month to the accident—so to speak—of our earth being accompanied by a satellite; and our year to the arrangements by which we are enabled to perceive our revolution round the sun—the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator which produces our seasons, and the power of tracing the sun's course among the fixed stars, which a little alteration of our atmosphere or of our sense of sight would have prevented us from ever possessing. We might have moved round the sun and upon our axis without perceiving the existence of motion, or we might have been cognizant of motion without experience of those similar intervals and perpetually recurring periods, which mark time out into portions and give it the special character which it now bears in our conceptions. Had we been without a satellite and revolved round the sun as the moon revolves round ourselves, making but one revolution upon our axis during the time that we completed our orbit, and had our orbit been larger, like those of the more distant planets, other things remaining as they are, we should have been conscious of a gradual progression, of a change of our place in the heaven; and philosophers might even have spoken of a great year to be completed in many generations of men, when the earth would pass again through the same point in the heavens which it occupied at the moment of their speaking; but to the ordinary man the course of life would have seemed like the course of a vast river, not flowing round upon itself, as Oceanus was fabled to do, but

speeding ever onwards in one continuous and unbroken stream, without rest or pause, without mark or note of its passage, bearing him upon its surface, but how fast or how far he could not know, till at length he sank without warning or notice beneath its waters.

God in His wisdom has ordained otherwise. God has caused our earth to revolve on its axis with a rapidity more than twenty-seven times greater, or, if we take the bulk of the two bodies into the account, more than ninety times greater, than that of the moon, and has thereby given us as a first measure, or true terrestrial unit of time, a space which, compared to the term of our natural lives, is of such brevity, that its rapid and frequent recurrence becomes one of the most striking facts of the world in which we live, noting for us in a way that cannot fail to draw observation, the beatings of the pulse of Time, the gyrations of that vast wheel upon which its restless chariot rolls along. God, again, not content with marking time's flight for us by this change, the very frequency of which renders it in some sort less apt to move our minds, has bestowed upon our earth a satellite, whose phases he has enabled us to discern, and has by these means given us a second measure of time, the true or lunar month of from twenty-nine to thirty days, which is not only a second or additional mode of causing us to perceive the flight of time, but is, by the less frequency of its occurrence, adapted to provoke our attention more than the diurnal change with which constant habit renders us too familiar. "We take no note of time save by its loss;" and the loss of a day seems to most of us, who are more

prodigal of our time than was the old heathen Emperor, an insignificant and trifling matter; but a month is felt to be an important term, the lapse of which cannot be passed by so lightly. When the day comes to an end we *are* warned, but when the month comes to an end we *feel* warned—then we note the flight which at the day's close we know, but too often note not—then we perceive and are conscious of time gone—then our minds naturally rest for a longer or a shorter space upon the past, and our ordinary thoughtlessness receives a check, which is seldom without some good effect on us. But if this, the second of those natural measurements which break time up into portions, is thus of some practical moment to us in our journey through life, much more is the third and main division of time, which grows from the earth's motion round the central source of life and heat, of great consequence to our moral and spiritual progress. The expiring year, far more than the dying day, or the waning month, forces upon our notice the thought of time's passage—compels us to consider its flight, and to bethink us how far we have sped upon our journey—does not allow us to put the thought away from our minds, but challenges and commands our attention. This it does, not only by the comparative seldomness of its occurrence—though that circumstance alone is of no little weight—but more by the remarkable accessories wherewith God's Providence has accompanied and surrounded it. By the variation of the seasons the natural close of the year is made to bear the image of death. The sere leaves wither on the trees, and drop one by one from their bare and skele-

ton-like branches—the herbage pales and sickens along the meads—the water-plants decay and sink in the streams—the birds cease to sing—the insect world with its busy hum of life disappears—the rivers flow heavily, or are stiff and ice-bound—the very heavens themselves put on mourning—all nature seems to die together with the dying year, or at least in robes of sadness to attend upon its funeral; and man, formed as he is to be most sensibly affected by the aspect of outward nature, cannot but be wrought upon by these manifold influences, which help to attune his feelings to such a pitch and key, as befit the contemplations which at this time he is designed to entertain.

It scarcely seems to admit of serious doubt that the various divisions of time were designed to counteract the natural tendency which there is in man to forget the past, and to let his life glide by without periods of earnest and prolonged reflection. We need not, indeed, when we accept this statement as true, confine the Providence of God herein to this single end; for God's workings do not come within the law which requires human agents to design *one* thing for *one* end (7), that so that end may be attained in the best possible way, and not sacrificed to a second end, whether subsidiary or co-ordinate. God in the plenitude of his mastery over his materials can make one thing answer several ends, and yet answer each as perfectly as if it were designed for that end only. The admirable fitness of the air to convey sounds to our ears in no wise hinders its perfect adaptation to support our life and strength when inhaled by our lungs. The sun is as much con-

trived to give us light as heat, and could give us neither more amply nor more excellently, were it solely designed for one or the other purpose. The tree that affords us shade gives also timber; the animal, whose flesh is pleasant meat, supplies us at the same time with clothing. One thing for one end is man's law, but one thing for many ends is God's practice. It may, then, well be that the motion of the celestial orbs has other uses also in the divine economy of the universe; but the special service whereof that motion was meant to be to man during the period of his earthly pilgrimage, must, I think, be allowed to be what I have said—the encouragement of reflection upon the past, the inducing us from time to time to pause awhile and review steadily the spaces in our lives which are thus marked out for us, as it were, by clear natural boundaries.

That such periods of reflection are of great practical use to us, is too generally admitted to need proof or illustration here. The need of a provision for provoking us to them at intervals, seems to arise from certain facts in the general constitution of our nature, upon which it may not be superfluous to make one or two remarks. Man is in the main, and is wisely designed to be, a creature of aspiration and of hope. God, meaning to lead him ever onward in a wonderful progression—"from strength to strength."[q]—from grace to more perfect grace—has so framed his mind that he looks forward naturally and habitually, living in and for that future to which he tends—"forgetting those

[q] Ps. lxxxiv. 7.

things that are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before."[r] The law of progress or development, which many think that they trace throughout nature, is at least the law of each individual human mind. Man's face is ever set to behold the upward steps of the ladder whereon he seeks to mount, whether to earthly rank and eminence or to heavenly glory. And it is well so. But for these upward strivings, these hopeful aspirations after things to come, blank and dismal indeed would our prospect be. In the past our own transgressions and short-comings occupy so large a space that they cloud and overshadow the entire scene of life with a gloom ever increasing as time goes on and the sum of our sins becomes greater. On the future sin has not set its stain — towards that we can look and see nothing but God's mercy and goodness streaming ceaselessly from heaven to earth in a flood of light "wherein is no darkness at all"[s] — and gazing towards this radiance, we can strive and struggle on — "saved," as the Apostle says, "by hope."[t] God has mercifully designed that such should be the *general* bent of our thoughts; but man, prone to abuse every mercy which he receives at his Maker's hands, and shrinking with coward and faint heart from all that causes him pain and suffering, is too apt to overstep the limits which nature and nature's God have prescribed herein, and to substitute for a general bent, an uniform and unvarying direction. He would gladly "forget those things that are behind" *altogether*, turn-

[r] Phil. iii. 13. [s] 1 John i. 5. [t] Rom. viii. 24.

ing from the retrospect as from an unpleasant spectacle. He would shut his eyes upon his past life, and blindly press forward upon his course, without the wisdom that may be gained from a careful review of past follies. But God, who has appointed everything its "season and a time to every purpose under heaven,"[u] while He bids men ordinarily look forward and have their thoughts in the future, commands them also upon occasions to look back — to "call to remembrance the former days"[v] — to "consider,"[w] and again to "search and try their ways"[x] — to reflect, that is, on their past lives, and honestly and narrowly examine themselves, and see what their course has been during the period under review, how the record of it is likely to endure that awful retrospect which it cannot escape at the day when the secrets of all hearts will be revealed, and Christ shall come in His glorious majesty to judge the quick and dead, and they that have done good shall go into everlasting life, and they that have done evil into "everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels."[y]

This review, to which the closing year invites us, each man will do well to make secretly in his chamber, on his knees before God. Each soul has its own special history. The past year will have brought to each special trials, special doubts, special fears, special difficulties, special blessings and mercies, which none can recount but he who has experienced them. Each

[u] Eccles. iii. 1.
[v] Heb. x. 32.
[w] Hagg. i. 5.
[x] Lam. iii. 40.
[y] Matt. xxv. 41.

will have to mourn his own special falls, of which himself alone, it may be, is conscious. "The heart knoweth his own bitterness."[z] Vague and general reflections would but stand in the way of that strict and searching examination by each man of his own case, which alone avails to awaken in us true gratitude or true repentance, and from which alone we can expect to derive such self-knowledge as shall be of service to us in our struggles through future years with the dread power of evil.

But there is one review which it is open for us to make at this time and in this place. We have a corporate, as well as an individual life; and in our corporate capacity the chastenings or mercies which we receive at God's hands are common to us all. "Whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it, or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it."[a] This is true, in a certain sense, of all mankind, and, in a closer sense, of all Christians; but it is a thousand times more true of us, who are not only fellow-men and fellow-Christians—but members together of one Church and of one Academic body, closely interested each one of us in the welfare of that body, whose fame is our glory, whose advancement is our gain, whose reproach is our discredit, whose humiliation is our shame, whose loss is our grievous hurt. Meeting here as members of that body, we may well glance back at the Academic history of the year now drawing to a close, seeking if so be we may draw some

[z] Prov. xiv. 10. [a] 1 Cor. xii. 26.

useful lessons for our future guidance from a consideration of the by-gone events and circumstances which will make the past year for ever memorable in our annals.

It is not, indeed, to be expected that we can all take the same view of these events. They are as yet too close to us to stand clearly revealed in their just and true proportions. Again, their consequences are undeveloped, and must be to a great extent a matter of conjecture. I would be understood, therefore, as speaking with great diffidence on these subjects, and not as supposing that the aspect which the events of the past year wear to me is necessarily the true one, or that others who have spoken from this place may not have judged them more correctly. Still, if the events in question are to be spoken of at all, as to-day surely they ought to be, it must be under some *one* aspect; and no one, I suppose, would wish the aspect to be any other than that in which they do in fact present themselves to the speaker's mind, and in which he conscientiously believes that they will one day be seen generally.

That the last year has been a crisis in our corporate life, all who hear me will, I am sure, admit most readily. After two centuries of comparative calm, during which the constitution of our University and the general conduct of its affairs continued almost wholly unchanged, a sudden and great alteration has been made in the whole character and idea of our government. We have exchanged a system by which the direction of the University was entrusted to a body of persons chosen

to their office by certain close corporations within it, or nominated *ab extra*, and holding office, when once appointed, during the term of their natural lives, for one of direct and, with certain limitations, of full and free representation. The democratic movement which had long been creeping steadily over our country, and absorbing one by one its various social institutions, has at last reached ourselves, and the privilege of self-government—the desire of freemen, and the crowning privilege implied in freedom—has been conceded to us. We have acquired a power of placing always at the head of affairs those whose knowledge, whose talents, whose principles, whose character, whose age, whose special gifts and powers, best fit them for conducting the business of the University at each stage of its progress. This is surely a singular advantage, if we only use it rightly. Our former system placed the University under the governance of persons who were the choice, when chosen at all, of the men of a bygone generation. Such a constitution possessed in a remarkable degree the element of stability, and was suited to quiet times; but it made scant provision for progress, and in an age of stir and general advancement it could scarcely be expected to continue. When society is rapidly changing, when new needs and new claims are perpetually showing themselves and demanding attention, when the prosperity or even the continued existence of an old institution depends on its power of adapting itself with sufficient promptitude to the sudden and novel wants which are being constantly developed both within it and without it with change of circumstances—then a

vigour and energy is needed in the governing body which in more tranquil times might have been even undesirable—then a society needs to have recourse to the talent and inventiveness of younger counsellors (8), —then the very law of self-preservation demands that the *whole* power inherent within the body should be placed at its entire disposal for employment in whatever way may best subserve the general interests of the community. This is the principle of the great change which our University has recently undergone in respect of its constitution and government — a change which, whether we look to its grounds and reasons, or to its actual working hitherto, must, I think, be pronounced to be of immense advantage to us —a change which tends to promote alike internal harmony, and external strength and power— a change which will, I believe, benefit Colleges by allowing their governors to devote their attention more entirely to the welfare of those under their immediate charge—raise the character of the University in the learned world, and, I trust, promote real learning among us, by assigning higher rank and position to those who stand at the head of the several branches of learning which we cultivate—strengthen us against external attack by placing in the position to defend us those who are best able to fight our battles—secure us against internal struggles by giving us rulers of our own choice, whom we place and maintain in office—and, finally, enable us to grapple with circumstances as they arise, and adapt ourselves without delay to the manifold changes which so rapidly succeed one another in the

modern world, and which must be met promptly as well as wisely, unless we are to drop out of our place in the country, and become an effete and useless institution.

Such are the benefits which I for one anticipate from the alteration of our constitution. I cast no blame on those who framed, or on those who administered, the system which is now superseded. It lived its time, and I believe it served its purpose. It preserved the University unhurt through the times of Puritanism —in the age of indifference which succeeded, it was innocuous—when a period arrived for which it was manifestly unsuited, it gave way. Doubtless one might have wished that a voluntary surrender had prevented Parliamentary interference, and preserved intact for us that independence of the State which we all value highly. But such surrenders are among the rarest events in history; and few bodies possessed of important powers have taken so many steps towards a surrender as were taken here by those in authority during the early part of the year now ending. That the concessions came too late and fell short of what the occasion was thought to require, is only what an acquaintance with the progress of social reforms generally would have led us to anticipate. Public opinion without the body is sure to outrun its own echo within—and "too late" is the answer almost invariably given to propositions for curtailing their own power when at length they issue from any long-established authority.

The change of which I have spoken is, I think, the most important of those which this year has brought to

us, and certainly it is by far the most complete. Other changes whereby the University is to be enabled to expand itself freely, to improve the quality of its teaching, and to make its endowments more available for the encouragement of study and the advancement of sound learning, are as yet in prospect rather than in progress; and though they deserve to be glanced at as points to which we may look back with thankfulness and forward with hope, yet at present they are not sufficiently advanced to require more than this cursory notice. One topic only connected with these subjects demands some further comment, occupying as it does a large share in the thoughts of most of us. I mean the change by which we are required to admit to our teaching and to our first Degree in Arts all British subjects, whatever may be their religious belief.

This change has been spoken of as involving a complete severance of the University from the Church—as depriving us of the power of teaching religious truth authoritatively—as reducing us to the condition of those Colleges and Universities in Ireland and in the Colonies where all religious beliefs are upon a par, and the natural result follows, that within the institutions themselves, religion is not taught at all to the students. But such statements are gross misrepresentations of our actual circumstances. The University is not severed from the Church, for the whole teaching and the whole governing power is reserved exclusively to the Church of England by the Act in question, and the only change introduced is, that persons who dissent from the Church may henceforward claim to put themselves under our

governance and our teaching. That this is a small or a harmless alteration, I do not mean to say—it is an alteration, which I for one have ever deprecated—but I do mean to assert that it is a far less change than many have thought and argued. It calls for some alteration of our system as respects those dissentients from our Church's teaching who may take advantage of the change in the law to come here for study. But it calls for no alteration at all as respects others. I would fain express a hope that the University will not be induced, for the sake of mere consistency and uniformity, to change for Church Students either the matter or the *manner* of the Divinity Examination now attached to the first Degree in Arts. Better a thousand times that we should allow a wide amount of irregularity and diversity of proceeding in our treatment of different classes of students, than that we should depart one whit from what we conceive to be the *best* mode of training and examining those who will doubtless always form the great mass of our student body, and for whom we are as Churchmen especially bound to care, the young Churchmen sent here for education. If we retain our present system unaltered as respects such persons, whatever trouble, inconvenience, or awkwardness the change which has been forced upon us may cause, it will not vitiate our teaching or impair our usefulness. A University where all who have the right to govern or to teach are Churchmen, allowed and even required to be such by law and statute, will teach *authoritatively* the doctrines of the Church to all such as do not declare themselves dissidents. For

those who so declare themselves express provision will need to be made. The University may either decline to examine them at all on the subject of religion, requiring from them perhaps in that case a greater amount of secular learning (9), or she may permit them to choose from among a list of theological works selected by herself, or she may demand from them a general acquaintance with the facts of Sacred and Church History, and with the chief forms of religious opinion. Objections doubtless may be urged against each of these plans, and it must be admitted that in the matter before us the University has only a choice of difficulties. Anything, however, will be better than to sacrifice the interests of our Church students, to deteriorate their training and instruction, and lower the standard upheld by us to the world of a full and complete education—not because we cannot otherwise do justice to the new students whom we are compelled to receive—but because otherwise we cannot exactly square and smoothe our system into perfect and exact regularity, but must put up with sundry awkwardnesses and anomalies.

If we carefully guard against being seduced into the sacrifice of our present full and dogmatic teaching of our Church students, it is possible that the harm which we anticipate from the change forced upon us may be counterbalanced by certain good results which have been too much overlooked. We may gain in religious earnestness more than we lose from the want of religious unity—we may come to be better understood by other bodies of Christians, who now perhaps oppose us as much through ignorance of our character as through

actual hostility to our principles—we may affect for good the minds of those who are likely to have the greatest influence over their several religious communities, and so we may gradually draw together the scattered members of Christ's body, the parted fragments of His once seamless robe,—and that which we feared to be to our hurt may become the occasion of inconceivable good both to the Church at large and to our own branch of it. That such a consummation, however, may be reached, we must be prepared to respect thoroughly the rights of conscience—to observe the "royal law,"[b] and do towards others as we would have them do towards us in like case—to require of our Dissenting students no more than we should be content to have required of us, were we dwellers in a Roman Catholic or a Puritan land, and forced to go for a really good education to a Roman Catholic or a Puritan University.

On the whole, I think we shall do well to look back upon the past year, and the great changes which it has brought to the body whereof we are members, in a spirit of deep gratitude and thankfulness to God—whose Providence has preserved us through a period of stormy trial, and brought us out of our troubles strengthened in many ways, and, if injured, injured only in one—and there far less than we might have anticipated. We had many enemies who would gladly have seen our entire destruction—we had other more subtle and more dangerous foes whose wish was to pre-

[b] James ii. 8.

serve our form and outward substance but to destroy our inward spirit and life—I mean that distinctive character of a witness for Christ's truth which we have maintained through evil report and good report for above nine centuries—we had internal divisions weakening us—we had the short-comings of many years weighing us down—we had the popular cry against us—we had few staunch friends who really understood and valued us aright—yet from the midst of the perils caused by such a combination of circumstances God's mercy not only saved us, but brought us out invigorated,—our freedom enlarged, our powers increased, our command of our resources more complete,—to enter on a sphere of usefulness far greater than we have enjoyed hitherto —to become, if we will, the instructors of the nation at large. We deemed the task beyond our powers, and we shrank from it—but God has laid the burden upon our shoulders and will doubtless give us the strength to bear it, if we ask His aid and seek to do our best. Let us, with the new year, enter on our task hopefully—trustfully—cheerfully; let us beseech God for wisdom to direct our steps aright—let us not spare our own time or trouble—let us determine above all things to be perfectly fair and just—and then let us leave the issue of our efforts in God's hand, confident that when the great institution in which and for which we work, shall "come," like all things else, even the most perfect[c], "to an end," it will be in His good time, and when He has no further need of it to serve His

[c] Psalm cxix. 96 (Bible Version).

purposes—and that even then, He will not be "unrighteous to forget our work and labour" that proceedeth "of love"[d]—but will reward all honest endeavours to promote His glory, and enlarge the boundaries of His kingdom.

[d] Heb. vi. 10.

NOTES.

SERMON I.

Note (1), p. 4.

This view of Plato will be found most distinctly stated in his Timæus. See, in particular, the following passages: — *Βουληθεὶς ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον.* — Op. vol. vii. p. 16, ed. Stallbaum. *Ὅτε δ' ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν, πῦρ πρῶτον καὶ γὴν καὶ ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ, ἴχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὐτῶν ἄττα, παντάπασι μὴν διακείμενα ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἔχειν ἅπαν ὅταν ἀπῇ τινὸς θεὸς, οὕτω δὴ τότε πεφυκότα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεσχηματίσατο εἴδεσι καὶ ἀριθμοῖς. Τὸ δὲ ᾗ δυνατὸν ὡς κάλλιστα ἄριστά τε ἐξ οὐχ οὕτως ἐχόντων τὸν θεὸν αὐτὰ ξυνιστάναι, παρὰ πάντα ἡμῖν ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπαρχέτω.* —Ib. p. 39. In the tract ascribed to Timæus of Locri the doctrine is taught still more plainly: — *Τὰν δ' ὕλαν, ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ ματέρα, τιθάναν τε καὶ γεννατικὰν εἶμεν τᾶς τρίτας οὐσίας . . . . ταύταν δὲ τὰν ὕλαν ἀΐδιον μὲν ἔφη, οὐ μὰν ἀκίνατον.* — Ib. p. 87. It was the doctrine of most, but not of all the Platonists. (See Hierocles ap. Phot. *Bibliothec.* cod. CCLI. p. 1381; Cic. ap. Lactant. ii. 9; Chalcid. *Comment. in Plat. Tim.* § 298, p. 388; &c.)

Note (2), p. 4.

See Burton's *Bampton Lectures* (Lecture ii. pp. 35–38) for the opinions of the Gnostics on the point; and for those of the Orientals, consult Plutarch. *De Isid. et Osir.* p. 369 E.; and Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philosoph.* vol. ii. pp. 648 *et seq.*

Note (3), p. 5.

The warranty of Scripture consists, especially, of the two following texts: Heb. xi. 3: — "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of those which do appear" (*εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλεπόμενα γεγονέναι*); and Rom. iv. 17 — "God, who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things that be not as if they were" (*καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα*). See, on this last passage, Pearson's *Exposition of the Creed*, vol. i. pp. 93, 94. It has been argued by some that the term used in Genesis for "created," בָּרָא, has the sense of "created *out of nothing*;" but this is denied by all the best Hebraists.

The belief of the Jewish Church in early times has been matter of controversy[a]: their ultimate belief is sufficiently evinced by the well-known passage in Maccabees[b]: — "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth and all that is therein, and consider that God made them of things that were not" (*ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ Θεός*).

The subjoined passages will show the consistent witness of the early Christian Church: —

[a] Beausobre, *Histoire de Manichée*, v. 3. (vol. ii. p. 182).
[b] 2 Mac. vii. 28.

Nicene Creed.

"I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth, and of *all* things, both visible and invisible."

Hermes.

"First of all, believe that there is one God, the Creator and Disposer of all things, who made all things to be from that which was not (ὁ ποιήσας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα)."

Tertullian.

"The rule of faith is that by which we believe that there is but one God, and no other besides the Creator of the world, who made all things *out of nothing* by his word."

Theophilus of Antioch.

"If God and matter were both uncreated, God would not be the Maker of all things." *Ad Autolyc.* ii. 4.

Maximus.

"If such be the case with men, how should not God be able to make, not only qualities, but things themselves, out of nothing?"—Ap. Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* vii. 22.

Origen.

"It is just as absurd to say, that matter, being such as it is, so vast and yet so tractable in the hands of the great Artificer, subsisted of itself from all eternity, as to assert that the world, wisely contrived as it is, came into being without a wise Contriver."—*Op.* vol. ii. p. 2, ed. Delarue.

Dionysius.

"If we say that God made matter by his own proper

wisdom, and gave it the qualities that he wished, this is a holy and a true doctrine."—Ap. Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* vii. 19.

Compare further on this subject Beausobre, *Histoire de Manichée*, vol. ii. pp. 165, 230; Burton, *Bampton Lectures*, Note 21, pp. 318-320; and Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, vol. i. pp. 133—136, E. T.

NOTE (4), p. 7.

Aristotle's remark is just — Ἀεὶ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν. — *Eth. Nic.* vii. 14, § 5. Similarly St. Paul says: — "In this tabernacle" (our earthly house or body) "we groan, being burthened[c];" and again, "The whole creation" (or every creature, πᾶσα κτίσις) "groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now."[d]

NOTE (5), p. 8.

Phædo, § 12 (vol. i. p. 89; ed. Stallbaum). Note the expression, ἐκλυομένην [τὴν ψυχὴν] ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. The later Stoics were fond of the same phrase. (See Epictet. *Dissert.* i. 9.)

NOTE (6), p. 8.

"Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo
Seminibus, quantum non *noxia* corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.
Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque; neque auras
Dispiciunt, clausæ tenebris et *carcere* cæco."

Æn. vi. 730—4.

Expressions like these are found in many writers. In the *Somnium Scipionis* we are told, "Immo vero ii vivunt, qui ex corporum *vinculis*, tanquam e *carcere*, evo-

[c] 2 Cor. v. 4. [d] Rom. viii 22.

laverunt;"[e] and in the Tusculans[e] we have the phrases "*vincula carceris* rumpere" for "seipsum interficere," and "emitti e *custodiâ* et levari *vinculis*," for "exire e vitâ."[f] Similarly Epictetus talks of the "chains" (δεσμοὶ) from which death frees us, and speaks of men as "fettered with the body" (μετὰ τοῦ σωματίου τούτου δεδεμένοι).[g] Indian authors, as Patanjali, compare the several bodies through which persons have passed to "iron fetters." (Morris, *Essay towards the Conversion of Hindus*, p. 296, note 10.) So the Manichæans called men's bodies "carceres Dei." (S. August. *c. Faust.* xx. 22.)

NOTE (7), p. 9.

Some account of these may be found in Mr. Morris's *Essay*, pp. 30, 31, and notes 42 and 43 to Dialogue I. pp. 110–113.

NOTE (8), p. 9.

See Herod. ii. 37; Porphyr. *de Abstinent.* iv. 7; Plut. *de Isid.* 3.

NOTE (9), p. 9.

It was the great object of the Gnostic theories to separate between the supreme God and matter. Hence the entire theory of emanations. It was thought that by introducing a long succession of Æons — emanations from the true God, or from one another — between the Source of Life and the World, God was not only kept clear of a debasing contact with matter, but was exonerated from the charge of being the author of evil. (See Burton's *Ecclesiastical History of the First Three Centuries*, vol. i.

[e] See § 3 (Cic. Op. omn. vol. iv. pt. 2da, p. 1008, ed. Ernesti).
[f] Lib. i. § 30, and § 49. [g] Dissert. i. 9, § 12, and § 14.

pp. 77, 78; and his *Bampton Lectures*, Note 17, p. 310.) Starting with this intention, the Gnostic writers proceeded in the most wonderfully audacious manner to lay down the exact mode in which the Divinity had unfolded himself, and to fix the number, order, and arrangement of the emanations. It has been well said that the systems of those who were reckoned the wisest among them "would rather be looked upon now as the ravings of a madman than the serious lucubrations of a philosopher." (Burton, *Eccl. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 65.) Valentinus, in whom Gnosticism culminated, ventured to lay it down that the Æons proceeded in pairs from the First Cause; that each pair consisted of a male and a female; that they bore certain names which he definitively assigned to them; that the whole number of them was thirty, fifteen male and fifteen female; and finally, that our Lord was produced in a mysterious manner by the united agency of all these Æons. (Ibid. p. 100.) All the Gnostics held that matter was eternal and inherently evil; that it had existed from everlasting beyond the limits of the Pleroma, or place in which God's presence was felt; that after countless ages it had been found and arranged into a world by some Æon, more or less remote from the supreme God, without his knowledge, or at least without his authority; that the creating Æon was the God whom the Jews worshipped; and that Christ — a superior Æon — had come to turn men from this worship to the worship of the true God, the First Cause of all things. They differed chiefly as to the number and arrangement of the Æons, and the character of the Demiurgus, or Creator of the World, whom some made merely rash and inconsiderate, while others identified him with the Evil Principle. (See Burton's *Bampton Lectures*, Lecture II. pp. 35–41; and compare Dr. Mill's *Pantheistic Principles*, pp. 17–19.)

The connection of Gnosticism with the religion of the

Magi is an obscure subject, on which it is difficult to form any positive opinion. Dr. Burton thought he saw indications of such a connection; but he confesses that "the supreme God and the Demiurgus" of the Magian system "were not altogether the same with the Ormazd and Ahriman of the Persians," and makes light of the evidence which has been adduced to show that some Gnostic leaders studied in the East.—*Eccles. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 63; *Bampton Lectures*, Lecture II. p. 50, and Note 13, pp. 280–296.

Note (10), p. 10.

Ep. ad Ephes. xviii. p. 298, ed. Jacobson. Ὁ Χριστὸς . . . ἐβαπτίσθη, ἵνα τῷ πάθει τὸ ὕδωρ καθαρίσῃ. Tertullian has a similar passage: — "Baptizato Christo, id est, *sanctificante aquas* in suo bâptismate, omnis plenitudo spiritualium retro charismatum in Christo cesserunt."—*Contra Jud.* § 8; Op. p. 191, ed. Rigalt.

Note (11), p. 11.

So Irenæus declares, τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, μεταλαμβάνοντα τῆς εὐχαριστίας, μηκέτι εἶναι φθαρτά. — *Adv. Hæreses*, iv. 34. And Cyprian: — "Panis in carnem mutatus procurat vitam et incrementum corporibus."—*De Cœn. Dom.* p. 345.[h] In the same spirit Hooker asks: — "Doth any man doubt but that even from the flesh of Christ our very bodies do receive that life which shall make them glorious at the latter day?"—*Eccl. Pol.* v. 56, § 9.

Note (12), p. 13.

See Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed*, Art. xi. pp. 643–648; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. i. pp. 229–234; and for a philosophical defence of the doctrine, consult Morris's

[h] *Opera*, Rome, 1563.

Essay towards the Conversion of Hindus, Dialogue II. pp. 266–283.

NOTE (13), p. 15.

So Hooker: — "The power of the ministry, by blessing visible elements, maketh them invisible grace."—*Eccl. Pol.* v. 77, § 1.

SERMON II.

NOTE (1), p. 24.

Tertullian says: — "Ut carnis restitutio negetur, de unâ *omnium* philosophorum scholâ sumitur." — *De Præscript. Hæret.* 7. There is nothing in our extant remains of Greek or Roman philosophy to discredit this statement. (See Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed,* p. 627; Burton's *Bampton Lectures,* Note 59, p. 428.) The vulgar heathen of the classical nations believed, perhaps, that men descended to the shades with bodies of a certain kind (compare the descriptions of Homer and Virgil, *Od.* xi. and *Æn.* vi.), an opinion held also by some of the more learned, as Philoponus (Cudworth's *Intellect. System,* v. p. 787); and certain sects, both in Greece and in the East, maintained (as the Hindus still maintain) the passage of the soul after death into another body; but the revivification of the actual body in which we have lived during this present life, is a doctrine peculiar to Christianity, and one which unassisted reason seems quite unable to reach.

NOTE (2), p. 24.

The Magians are almost solitary in that contempt of the corpse which would submit to see it cast out to birds

and beasts of prey. (See Herod. i. 140; Strab. xv..3, § 20.). All other nations paid respect to their dead. (Herod. i. 93, 198; ii. 84-90; iv. 71-73; v. 4, &c. For the ideas and practices of the classical nations, see Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, ad voc. FUNUS. For the customs of many other heathen nations, see Grimm's *Verbrennen der Leichen*, and Mr. Wylie's *Burning and Burial of the Dead*, a work of much learning and research.)

NOTE (3), p. 24.

Hody, in his work on the Resurrection[a], maintains, not only that there are heathen opinions "which carry with them no small resemblance of the doctrine of the Resurrection," but that there are some "which *plainly express it*." (P. 3.) He builds especially on the accounts given by travellers and missionaries of the belief entertained by various uncivilised nations; but he acknowledges that such accounts are very liable to be mistaken. "The truth is," he says, "the first authors of reports of this nature are oftentimes such as are either too ignorant of the language of those whose opinions they give an account of, to understand them aright, or not sufficiently knowing and judicious to distinguish rightly one opinion from another." (P. 49.) The utmost that seems to have been really believed by any of the Greeks or Romans, was the possibility of the translation of a body which had never suffered death (compare the cases of Romulus, Alcmena, and others), and of the revivification of a body from which the soul had departed, but which remained still undissolved, *e. g.*

[a] *The Resurrection of the Same Body asserted*, by Humphrey Hody, D. D., London, 1694.

that of Aristeas of Proconnesus. (Herod. iv. 14; compare Hody, pp. 13—16.) It is very doubtful whether any of the less civilised heathen went beyond this.

Note (4), p. 24.

See Plat. *Phæd.* § 25 et seq. (vol. i. pp. 103–106), especially the subjoined passages: — Ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον, γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ . . . εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον; (pp. 105–6.) And: Σκόπει δή, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν, τῷ δ' ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. (p. 105.) Plotin. *Ennead.* iv. lib. ii. sub init.: Λέγομεν δὴ τὰ μὲν πρωτως εἶναι μεριστὰ, καὶ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει σκεδαστά· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι ὧν οὐδὲν μέρος ταυτόν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἄλλῳ μέρει, οὔτε τῷ ὅλῳ· τό τε μέρος αὐτῶν ἔλαττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ὅλου· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μεγέθη καὶ οἱ ὄγκοι, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴδιον τόπον ἔχει, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ταὐτὸν ἐν πλείοσι τόποις εἶναι· ἡ δέ ἐστιν ἀντιτεταγμένη ταύτῃ οὐσία, οὐδαμῇ μερισμὸν δεχομένη, ἀμερής τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, κ.τ.λ. Plutarch. *Vit. Rom.*: Καὶ ὅλως πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογοῦσι παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς, ἐνθειάζοντες τὰ θνητὰ τῆς φύσεως ἅμα τοῖς θεοῖς. Ἀπογνῶναι μὲν οὖν παντάπασι τὴν θεότητα τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀνόσιον καὶ ἀγεννές· οὐρανῷ δὲ μιγνύειν γῆν, ἀβέλτερον. Ἑατέον οὖν, ἐχομένης τῆς ἀσφαλείας κατὰ Πίνδαρον, ὡς "σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἔπεται θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ, σωὸν δὲ ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἴδωλον." τὸ γάρ ἐστι μόνον ἐκ θεῶν· ἥκει γὰρ

ἐκεῖθεν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἄνεισιν· οὐ μετὰ σώματος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα σώματος ἀπαλλαγῇ, καὶ διακριθῇ, καὶ γένηται καθαρὸν παντάπασι καὶ ἄσαρκον καὶ ἀγνόν, κ.τ.λ. See also the arguments in Cicero's First Tusculan, §§ 19-29.

NOTE (5), p. 24.

See the passages from Plato's Timæus quoted in Note (1) on Sermon I.; and compare the following:— Plat. *Politic.*: *Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἀεὶ καὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσήκει μόνοις, σώματος δὲ φύσις οὐ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως.* (p. 204, ed. Stallbaum.) *Ὁ κόσμος . . . τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν, κατ' ἀρχὰς . . . ἀκριβέστερον ἀπετέλει, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύτερον· τούτων δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σωματοειδές τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ξύντροφον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἦν μέτοχον ἀταξίας, πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι· παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα καλὰ κέκληται· παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν οὐρανῷ γίγνεται, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτός τε ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ἐναπεργάζεται.* (Ibid. pp. 208, 209.) These passages seem clearly to prove, notwithstanding the denial of Cudworth (*Intellect. Syst.* i. 4, p. 220), that Plato made matter at least *one* of the original causes of evil. That the same was the opinion of Pythagoras is asserted by Mosheim (ad Cudworth. *Syst. Intellect.* vol. i. p. 244, note 29), and argued by Wolf in his *Manichæismus ante Manichæos* (ii. 29, p. 116). Aristotle is not very clear upon the point, but his tone with respect to matter is always more or less depreciatory. (See *Eth. Nic.* x. 8, § 2; *De Anim.* i. 3, § 14.) The Stoics appear to have held even stronger opinions on the subject than Plato, and to have deduced evil altogether from matter. (See Burton's *Bampton Lectures*, note 18, pp. 315, 316.) The Oriental Dualists and the early Gnostics maintained similar views. Valentinus said: "I conceive that there exists, together with God, that

which is called matter, out of which He created all things, separating them by a wise and proper contrivance, and arranging them properly; *out of which also Evil seems to come.*" (Ap. Origen. Op. vol. i. p. 841, D.: Ἔδοξέ μοι συνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ (*sc.* τῷ θεῷ), ᾧ τοὔνομα ὕλη· ἐξ ἧς τὰ ὄντα ἐδημιούργησε, τέχνῃ σοφῇ διακρίνας, καὶ... διακοσμήσας καλῶς· ἐξ ἧς καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἶναι δοκεῖ.)

NOTE (6), p. 25.

See Notes (5) and (6) on Lecture I. (pp. 204, 205); and add to the passages there quoted, Cic. Tusc. § 31; Senec. Ep. 65; Antonin. ix. 3.

NOTE (7), p. 25.

So Arist. *de Anima*, iii. 5, § 4.

NOTE (8), p. 25.

It is not improbable that the doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration, may have been invented in order to furnish the mass with a doctrine of future existence, which they could in some sort comprehend and realise. This doctrine is usually found combined with some higher esoteric view, as in India and Egypt, and possibly in the system of Pythagoras.

NOTE (9), p. 26.

That Socrates and Plato had a very confident expectation, almost amounting to a conviction, of the immortality of the soul, is allowed on all hands, and does not need to be proved here. That Aristotle had a similar belief is not quite so clear from his works; and it is far less generally admitted. There are expressions in Aristotle which lead in

a contrary direction, and which have been thought to show that he either disbelieved a future state altogether, or at least denied the future state to be one of consciousness. Long and close familiarity with Aristotle's most important treatises, combined with some study of his other works, has convinced me that these views are mistaken — that Aristotle looked for a conscious future life of the individual in another world no less confidently than Plato himself, and expected that existence to be eternal. As, however, this is far from being an universal view, I proceed to state briefly the grounds upon which I have come to the above conclusion.

In the first place: as Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and as he seems to have written on all moral points with perpetual reference to Plato's opinions, combating them freely whenever he differed from them, I think it is most reasonable to suppose that if Plato held an important opinion on a moral subject, and Aristotle never openly controverts it, the reason is that he agreed with his master.

Secondly: it seems to me that the passages adduced from Aristotle as implying that he held sceptical opinions on the subject of a future life, admit of easy explanation without any such supposition. These passages are chiefly from the Nicomachean Ethics. They consist of a statement that "Death is the greatest object of dread, because it is a bourn, and the dead man is thought to be no longer capable either of good or evil;"[b] a remark that "It is in our power to wish for impossibilities, as, for instance, immortality;"[c] and a question, "Is it not absurd to call a man happy after he is dead, especially for us who place happiness in energy?"[d]

With respect to the first passage, it is a mere statement of fact. Death is, in point of fact, Aristotle says, the thing

[b] *Eth. Nic.* iii. 6, § 6. [c] Ib. iii. 2, § 7. [d] Ib. i. 10, § 2.

which men dread most; and no wonder, "for it is a bourn" (*πέρας γάρ*). He does not say, as some have translated [e], that it is "the end of all things." It is a limit, bourn, or boundary-line, — therefore, with *something* certainly on the other side — as our own Shakspeare says: —

> "The undiscover'd country from whose *bourn*
> No traveller returns." *Hamlet.*

It *is* this; and further, men *think* it an end altogether. The Sophists had persuaded men that they might safely laugh at the stories of Cocytus and Hades; and it was thought, generally, or at least by a large number, that after death there was neither suffering nor enjoyment. Aristotle does not say that he participates in this opinion. He only notes it as accounting in some degree for the extreme dread of death which was common in his day.

The second passage is weaker than the first, and has indeed no real reference to the subject under discussion. The "immortality" (*ἀθανασία*) which Aristotle places among things impossible, is earthly immortality, escape from death, the immortality of Oriental compliment — "May the king live for ever!" That this was Aristotle's meaning is rendered apparent from the parallel passage in the Eudemian Ethics, where we are told "Men sometimes wish for impossibilities knowing them to be such; — for instance, they desire to be immortal, and to have universal dominion." [f] The coupling of these two wishes together sufficiently shows that they are things of the same kind — that both, that is, belong to this sublunary sphere; the wish to be immortal being that common desire to escape death, which in after times made the *elixir vitæ* as much sought after as the philosopher's stone.

[e] See Dr. Chase's translation, p. 95.

[f] *Eth. Eudem.* ii. 10: Βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι

The remaining passage is far more to the point; and certainly presents some difficulty. If it were a statement, instead of a question, the conclusions which have been drawn from it would undoubtedly seem to follow. But, as it stands, it is only a knotty point (*ἀπορία*), which Aristotle throws out for our consideration, and on which he does not base anything, since he immediately proceeds to show that the condition of the dead was not really involved in Solon's view, which he is criticising. He afterwards himself suggests the true answer to the *ἀπορία*, by making a distinction between practical energies, which involve bustle and stir (*ἐνέργειαι κινήσεως*), and the energies of thought, which are still and quiet (*ἐνέργειαι ἀκινησίας*).[g] The former are most commonly understood by the term *ἐνέργειαι*; and these he would regard as altogether at an end when we die. But the latter would then (according to him) be most active; and they are, at least, as much energies as the former, being (as they are in his view) the sole energies of the Supreme Being. (See *Eth. Nic.* x. 8, § 7.)

Thirdly, and lastly: Aristotle seems to me, throughout all his ethical writings, to imply at every turn that this life is not the whole of our existence. He is essentially an optimist, holding in the broadest way that "Nature does all for the best,"[h] that, beginning with what is deficient and imperfect, she works on to a final perfection and completeness, that leaves nothing to be desired.[i] With human life, however, *as it is*,—even with its fullest and completest development here,— he is wholly dissatisfied. Man here is *σύνθετον*, a compound being[j]; he possesses two natures, as those

[g] *Eth. Nic.* vii. 14, § 8.

[h] Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν.—*Eth. Nic.* i. 9, § 5.

[i] Οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου.—*Polit.* i. 1.

[j] *Eth. Nic.* x. 8, § 3.

things do which are undergoing corruption[k]; what pleases the one nature, thwarts and vexes the other; and thus man lives in a perpetual state of struggle and difficulty. His highest energy, that which ought to constitute his happiness, is abstract thought (*θεωρία*[l]); but this energy, instead of being free and unimpeded, and so continuous, as it ought to be, if man is to realise happiness here, is in reality so checked and thwarted, so infringed upon and interrupted[m], that the result is at best something very poor and unsatisfactory. Aristotle's happy man in this life is "happy, *for a man*" (*μακάριος ὡς ἄνθρωπος*).[n] He passes his time *chiefly* in contemplation[o]; but his trains of thought are often sadly marred by weariness and interruption. His mind itself tires by continued exercise; his enjoyment consequently lessens at each moment; even if nothing occurs to interrupt him, he must relieve the undue tension, he must turn away from the subject which occupied him, and rest his intellect, while he calls some other portions of his nature into play.[p] And he is liable to constant interruptions, while his mind continues untired; he has a body; he has appetites and cravings; he has passions and affections; he has calls upon him of various kinds; friends to aid, children to educate, slaves to manage, countrymen to advise. He is not a recluse; he does not live out of the world; he does not renounce the ties of family or country; he does not divest himself of property,

[k] Οὐκ ἀεὶ δ οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν εἶναι ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖταί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά.—*Eth. Nic.* vii. 14, § 8.

[l] Ib. x. 7, § 7; 8, §§ 7, 8.

[m] Ib. vii. 14, § 8; x. 8, § 6; &c.

[n] Ib. i. 10, § 16.

[o] Ib. x. 7, § 2.

[p] Πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδύνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν· οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα· ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως, διὰ ταῦτα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκλιται ἡ διάνοια, καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες· μετέπειτα δὲ οὐ γίνεται τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται.—Ib. x. 4, § 9.

like a Cynic.[q] He lives with his fellows; he uses his wealth to assist them; he gives them his counsel in their difficulties; he discharges all the offices of a friend with zeal.[r] All this causes frequent interruption to his abstract thinking, which it grievously hinders and cramps.[s] It has been supposed[t] that Aristotle was content to regard human happiness as "something ideal," and the nearest approach to its realisation as "the whole of life summed up into a vivid *moment* of consciousness," or again as "the aggregate of such moments with the intervals omitted;" but it is quite contrary to the whole tone of Aristotle's teaching, that an *unattainable* condition should be held up to men as that whereto nature pointed them, and to which all their own efforts should tend. A future life is the necessary complement to Aristotle's scheme of this life as openly put forth in the Ethics; it reconciles all that is otherwise defective, unsatisfactory, contradictious; it provides a sphere where the tendencies of nature may take effect—a place where energies may be continuous — where pleasure may be unimpeded — where our nature may be simple and uncompounded—where the divine element in us, released from the companionship of inferior principles, may have free and full liberty to exercise itself in its own way. Without it, the scheme is maim, mutilate, and futile through defect; with it, all is consistent and harmonious, a full, complete, rounded, satisfactory whole.

Nor is the argument from the general bearing of Aristotle's moral system the only direct one that can be drawn from his writings. There are many particular passages where a future life, if not positively asserted, is very evidently implied; for instance, the following: —

[q] *Eth. Nic.* i. 7, §§ 6—8.

[r] Ib. ix. 8, § 9; and 9, § 3.

[s] Καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι, πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν.—Ib. x. 8, § 6.

[t] Sir A. Grant's *Essays*, prefixed to his edition of *Aristotle's Ethics*, vol. i. Essay iv. pp. 200, 201.

1. "God," says Aristotle, "whatever his nature may be, possesses the chief good — perfect happiness — *even now*."[u] How otherwise can we account for these last words, unless by supposing a tacit contrast in the passage between God and man? "God possesses perfect happiness *even* now — man does not; his is at present — during this life — a very imperfect happiness; but this will not always be so — a time will come after death when he too will possess his own chief good, the most perfect happiness of which he is by nature capable."

2. "Abstract thought," again he says, "is the most pleasant of all things; for, in point of fact, it is accompanied by a pleasure of extraordinary duration and purity. And it is also reasonable to think that they who possess truth must delight in their occupation even more than they who merely seek for it."[v] Is it not implied here, that in this life, when we indulge in speculation, we are at best searchers after truth, and so cannot enjoy the *full* pleasure of *θεωρία*, while in another life we shall possess an actual knowledge of the truth, and shall therefore enjoy a happiness far higher and more intense?

3. "The intellect of man," he tells us in another work, "and the speculative faculty which he possesses, seem to differ from all the other parts of his soul: *they* cannot be separated from the body; but the speculative intellect is capable of such separation, *as being eternal*, while the body is corruptible."[w] And, later, in the same treatise: "This intellect then is separable from the body: it is pure and

[u] Ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὃν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστί.—*Eth. Nic.* ix. 4, § 4.

[v] Ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστί· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ σοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν τῇ καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ· εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν ἀγωγὴν εἶναι.—Ib. x. 7, § 3.

[w] *De Anim.* ii. 2: Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέπω φανερὸν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.

unmixed; it cannot be acted upon, but is itself essentially activity."[x] It seems here to be clearly taught, that the pure intellect of man is eternal; that it will be separated from the body at death; and that it will then energise freely.

4. "It is absurd to suppose," he remarks, "that the good and ill fortune of their friends in this life, does not at some time or other penetrate to the departed. And it would be clearly very unfeeling, if it did not affect them in some degree. It will affect them, however, much less than if they were alive, and never to such an extent as to make them happy, if they are not happy otherwise; nor, if they are happy, to annul their happiness."[y] Here the departed are evidently spoken of as still continuing to exist; they are represented as retaining their identity and the consciousness of it, as having feeling and thought; and they are separated into two classes, and declared to be, some of them, in the enjoyment of happiness, others not so. This is the only place in the whole of Aristotle's writings, where the condition of the dead is the direct subject of consideration; and he here distinctly expresses himself as a person would who believed in a future life.

To this direct evidence may be added the testimony of Origen—no mean proficient in Greek philosophy—who considers that Aristotle was aware of the rational soul being separable from body, and immortal. (See his treatise *Opiniones de Animâ*, Op. pp. 631 and 660.[z])

Note (10) p. 28.

The Stoics, however, differed among themselves on this point. The more common, as well as the earlier, opinion

[x] Οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς, καὶ ἀμιγὴς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνέργεια. —*De Anim.* iii. 6.

[y] *Eth. Nic.* i. 10, § 5, and 11, §§ 1—5.

[z] Edition of 1618.

was that stated in the text. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* i. § 32: "Stoicos, qui aiunt manere animas, sed non semper." Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xv. 18-20: Ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης ἐξαιθεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων, κ.τ.λ. In later times, the favourite Stoical doctrine seems to have been that of absorption into the Divine Essence immediately after death. (See Senec. *Epist.* 54; Epictet. *Dissertat.* iv. 7; M. Antonin. xii. 12, § 5.)

Note (11), p. 28.

Ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἵα ἐστί, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ.—Arrian's *Epictetus*, iii. 13.

Note (12), p. 28.

See the description of Eusebius (loc. cit.), and compare Diog. Laert. viii. 137 ad fin.: Τὸν θεὸν . . . ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, δημιοῦργος ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως, κατὰ χρόνων τινὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἁπᾶσαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. See also Origen *contr. Cels.* v. 20, 21 (vol. i. pp. 592-594); where the views in question are assigned, not to the Stoics only, but also to the Pythagoreans and the Platonists.

Note (13), p. 30.

St. Paul found only philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics at Athens. (Acts xvii. 18.) Cicero, himself an Academic, assigns the chief part in his philosophical dialogues to Stoic and Epicurean disputants. The hold of the Epicurean sect on the Roman world is indicated by the number of Epicurean treatises discovered amongst the ruins of

Herculaneum. The hold of the Stoics is even more evident, from the position and celebrity of Seneca, Lucan, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

NOTE (14), p. 30.

The Indian belief is well known, and continues to the present day. For the belief of the Egyptians, see Herod. ii. 123, and the note of Sir G. Wilkinson in the author's *Herodotus*, vol. ii. p. 198, note 1. (Compare Diod. Sic. i. 98, § 2.) Cæsar found the notion among the Celts of Gaul (*De Bell. Gall.* vi. 14.) It is said to be common among the Chinese-Buddhists. That Pythagoras taught it, there cannot be a doubt; and Aristotle appears to have thought that he taught it seriously. (See Arist. *De An.* i. 3.) Plato has by many been regarded as speaking of a transmigration by way of allegory; but this is very uncertain. Perhaps it is more probable that he really held the doctrine. (See his *Phædo*, § 31, vol. i. p. 107, ed. Stallbaum; *Tim.* vol. vii. p. 27, and p. 82; *Republ.* x. sub fin.; *Phædr.* vol. viii. p. 27.) So Plutarch (Op. vol. ii. p. 993, C.) and Plotinus (*Ennead.* iii. 4, § 2). Some moderns have endeavoured to persuade the world that, so far at least as the Greeks were concerned, the whole teaching was symbolical. (See Ficin. ad Plot. *Ennead.* iii. 4, § 2, p. 508.)

For the opinion of the Gnostics, see Burton's *Bampton Lectures*, Note 58 (pp. 424-428).

NOTE (15), p. 30.

Compare Mr. Morris's *Essay*, Dial. ii. note 61, p. 241.

NOTE (16), p. 32.

M. Antonin. iv. 13: *Αἱ εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαὶ, ἐπὶ πόσον συμμείνασαι, μεταβάλλουσι καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται εἰς*

τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι· καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χώραν ταῖς προσυνοικιζομέναις παρέχουσι. (Comp. xii. 5.) Epictet. *Dissert.* iii. 13: Λέγει σοι, Ἔρχου. Ποῦ; Εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν· ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πυρὸς, εἰς πῦρ ἄπεισιν· ὅσον ἦν γηδίου, εἰς γῆδιον· ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον· ὅσον ὑδατίου, εἰς ὑδάτιον. Οὐδεὶς Ἅΐδης, οὐδ' Ἀχέρων, κ.τ.λ. (Comp. iv. 7, § 15.) Senec. *Epist.* liv.: "At ego mortem diu expertus sum. Quando? inquis. Antequam nascerer. Mors est non esse id quod ante fuit. Sed quale sit, jam scio; hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit."

NOTE (17), p. 32.

Ennead. iv. 7, § 15, and 9, § 1.

NOTE (18), p. 33.

The Stoics spoke of the conscience as a δύναμις δοκιμαστικὴ καὶ ἀποδοκιμαστική. (Epictet. *Dissert.* i. 1.) Plato often notices the terrors of a guilty conscience; as, especially, in the following passage:—Ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσῄει· οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅΐδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν, μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσι. —*Republ.* i. § 4. He also distinctly notes the satisfaction arising from a good conscience, as in the continuation of the above-quoted passage: — ὁ μὲν οὖν εὑρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῇ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον ξυνειδότι ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ πάρεστι. Similarly, Isocrates, with a more distinct reference to the ground of the hope: — τοὺς μετ' εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ζῶντας ἔν τε

τοῖς παροῦσι χρόνοις ἀσφαλῶς διάγοντας καὶ περὶ τοῦ ξύμπαντος αἰῶνος ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντας.—*De Pace*, p. 165, ed. Corai. So, too, Aristotle speaks of the ἀγαθαὶ ἐλπίδες which make the life of the good pleasant to them, and the contrary expectations which torment the bad. (*Eth. Nic.* ix. 4, §§ 5, 9.) Thus St. Paul is fully justified in speaking of the heathen as having "the law of God written in their hearts, their *consciences* also bearing witness, and their thoughts meanwhile accusing or else excusing (κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων) one another."—*Rom.* ii. 15.

NOTE (19), p. 33.

See the *Epistles* ascribed to Plato, *Ep.* ii. p. 106, ed. Stallbaum: Ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, μέλειν ἡμῖν τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τυγχάνουσι κατά τινα φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀνδραποδωδέστατοι οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες αὐτοῦ, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικέστατοι πᾶν ποιοῦντες ὅπως ἂν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον εὐ ἀκούσωσιν. Ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ τεκμήριον ποιοῦμαι ὅτι ἔστι τις αἴσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τῶν ἐνθάδε· αἱ γὰρ βέλτισται ψυχαὶ μαντεύονται ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

NOTE (20), p. 34.

See Archdeacon Williams's *Primitive Tradition*, and compare Mr. Gladstone's *Homer and the Homeric Age*, vol. ii. pp. 3—8, and 167—171.

NOTE (21), p. 34.

Plat. *Phæd.* §§ 15—56, vol. i. pp. 93—138.

NOTE (22), p. 34.

Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* i. §§ 12—33.

Note (23), p. 34.

Butler's *Analogy*, part i. ch. 1.

Note (24), p. 35.

So Bishop Pearson says — "There is as absolute a necessity of God's preserving us from returning into nothing by annihilation, as there was for his bestowing an existence upon us by creation."—*Exposition of the Creed*, Art. i. p. 82. And St. Augustine: — "Creatoris potentia et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis virtus, causa subsistendi est omni creaturæ: quæ virtus ab eis quæ creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim, sicut structuram ædium cum fabricaverit quis, abscedit, atque illo cessante atque abscedente stat opus ejus, ita mundus vel ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Deus regimen sui subtraxerit. Proinde et quod Dominus ait, *Pater meus usque nunc operatur*, continuationem quandam operis ejus qua universam creaturam continet atque administrat, ostendit. Aliter enim posset intelligi si diceret, *et nunc operatur*, ubi non esset necesse ut operis continuationem acciperemus: aliter autem cogit intelligi cum ait, *usque nunc*, ex illo scilicet quo cuncta cum conderet operatus est. . . . Et illud quod ait Apostolus cum Deum Atheniensibus prædicaret, *In illo vivimus, movemur, et sumus*, liquide cogitatum quantum humana mens valet, adjuvat hanc sententiam quâ credimus et dicimus Deum in iis quæ creavit indesinenter operari."—*De Genes. ad lit.* iv. 12. (Compare *De Mor. Eccles. Cath.* 6; and *Enchirid. ad Laurent.* 27.) In the same spirit, preservation has been called "a continual creation."

Note (25), p. 35.

In the *Timæus* Plato makes the Supreme God thus address the inferior deities of his own creation: — Ἐπειπερ

γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἔστε, οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν· οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς, ὅτ' ἐγίγνεσθε, συνεδεῖσθε (vol. vii. p. 26. ed. Stallbaum). It is evident that the argument would apply *à fortiori* to human souls. (See Justin Martyr, *Dialog. cum Tryph.* § 5, pp. 107—109.)

NOTE (26), p. 35.

See Butler's *Analogy*, part i. ch. iii.: "In the natural course of things, virtue *as such* is actually rewarded, and vice *as such* punished; which seems to afford an instance or example, not only of government, but of moral government, begun and established. . . . And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who fully believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion." (p. 64. Oxford ed. 1833.)

NOTE (27), p. 37.

See the first Tusculan Disputation, § 34: "Video te alte spectare, et velle in cœlum migrare. *Spero* fore, ut contingat id nobis; sed fac, ut isti volunt, *animos non remanere* post mortem." And again, the conclusion of the whole: "Nos vero, si quid tale acciderit, ut a Deo denuntiatum videatur, ut exeamus a vita, læti et agentes gratias pareamus, emittique nos a custodia et levari vinculis arbitremur, ut aut in æternum et plane in nostram domum remigremus, *aut omni sensu molestiaque careamus.*" (§ 49.) Compare the Consolation: "Necesse est autem, sit alterum de duobus, ut *aut sensus penitus omnes mors auferat*, aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur." (p. 1072.)

NOTE (28), p. 37.

See Plat. *Apolog. Socr.* § 32 (vol. i. p. 54, ed. Stallbaum):

Ἐννοήσωμεν δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. In the *Phædo* Plato makes him speak more confidently, but even there his strongest assertion has a qualifying clause — εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διϊσχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. (§ 8, p. 84.)

NOTE (29), p. 38.

The Platonic Epistles well give the spirit of Plato when they make him say to the friends and kindred of Dio: Πείθεσθαι δὲ οὕτως αἰεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις. (Epist. vii. p. 134, E.) Cf. Plat. *Tim.* pp. 7—10; *Gorg.* pp. 100, 101, &c.

NOTE (30), p. 38.

Aristotle's deference to traditional beliefs is less marked than Plato's, but still it appears occasionally. (See *Eth. Nic.* i. 8, §§ 2 and 7; *Metaph.* ii. 1, and xiv. 8; *De Mund.* ii. 1. This last passage is particularly strong: Διόπερ καλῶς ἔχει συμπείθειν ἑαυτὸν τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ μάλιστα πατρίους ἡμῶν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι λόγους.)

NOTE (31), p. 38.

Republ. x. § 12, et seqq., pp. 283—290, ed. Stallb.; *Phæd.* § 58, et seqq., pp. 140—147; *Gorg.* § 79, pp. 100, 101.

NOTE (32), p. 38.

Cf. *Rom.* i. 21: Ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία.

NOTE (33), p. 38.

Aristotle commonly speaks of the Pythagoreans in the *past* tense, as a by-gone School: *οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι ἔφασαν, εἴκαζον, ἀπεφήναντο, κ.τ.λ.* (See *Eth. Nic.* ii. 6, § 14; v. 5, § 1; *Metaph.* i. 5; ii. 1, &c.)

NOTE (34), p. 39.

See Burton's *Bampton Lectures*, note 58 (pp. 424—428). It has been generally thought that the Gnostics, like other Orientals, looked to a final absorption of the individual in the Divine Essence. But this is perhaps doubtful. Burton denies it. (See note 59, p. 429.)

NOTE (35), p. 39.

See Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, i. §§ 16 and 21: "Quæ anus est tam delira, quæ timeat . . . Acherusia templa alta Orci?"

NOTE (36), p. 42.

Hody maintains, on the contrary, that about the time of our Saviour the doctrine of the Resurrection of the body was "the received and common doctrine of the Jewish nation." (See his *Resurrection of the Same Body asserted*, pp. 64—76.) But his arguments do not bear out his conclusion. At the utmost, they show that about this time *some* Jews believed in the resurrection of the body. It was certainly not held by any of the three great sects — the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes.

NOTE (37), p. 42.

The *literal* translation of the passage in Job seems to be as follows: — "I know that my Redeemer lives, and that at length he shall stand upon the dust (*i. e.* earth). Though

after my skin they destroy this, yet in my flesh shall I see God. Since I shall see for myself, and my eyes shall behold, and not another. My reins are consumed in my breast." The LXX. translators render: Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἀείνᾶός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκλύειν με μέλλων, ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναστῆσαι τὸ δέρμα μου τὸ ἀνάντλουν ταῦτα· παρὰ γὰρ Κυρίου ταῦτά μοι συνετελέσθη, ἃ ἐγὼ ἐμαυτῷ συνεπίσταμαι, ἃ ὁ ὀφθαλμός μου ἑώρακε, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλος· πάντα δέ μοι συντετέλεσται ἐν κόλπῳ. Grotius argues with great force that the passage cannot be understood of the resurrection without wresting the Hebrew very much from its plain meaning; and he expounds the place of Job's final restitution to his former health and temporal prosperity. (*Annot. ad Vet. Test.* Op. vol. i. p. 208.) St. Chrysostom had, before him, admitted a similar application of the passage. (*Caten. in Job.* pp. 340, 341.) Pearson, who contends against Grotius that the reference to the resurrection is "very express" (*Exposition of the Creed*, vol. i. p. 636), admits that the Jewish expounders, while insisting on many weak arguments in proof of the resurrection, acknowledge no such interpretation of the place in Job. (*Ibid.*; and see note *x*, vol. ii. p. 499.) The balance of modern authority is in favour of the view of Grotius.

Note (38), p. 42.

In Matt. xxii. 23, our Lord confutes the Sadducees, by showing the continued existence after death of the *souls* of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In Acts xxiii. 8, we are told, "The Sadducees say there is no resurrection—neither angel, nor spirit. But the Pharisees confess *both*:" *i. e.* the existence both of angels and spirits. The latter was the doctrine of the resurrection which the Sadducees denied.

Note (39), p. 42.

So Origen (*Comment. in Johann.* vi. § 7), and others. The

belief of the Pharisees in the doctrine of metempsychosis is distinctly witnessed by Josephus. (*De Bell. Jud.* ii. 7.) Its wide prevalency appears, from its being the doctrine of the Sanhedrim (John ix. 34); of some of our Lord's disciples (*ib.* verse 2); of Philo (*De Somn.* pp. 641, 642, ed. Mangey); of Josephus (*De Bell. Jud.* iii. 25); and of Trypho (Just. Mart. *Dial. cum Tryph.* p. 172).

Note (40), p. 42.

The notion that the Sadducees admitted no part of the Old Testament as authoritative except the books of Moses, has had many advocates from Origen to Prideaux; but its fallacy has been abundantly exposed by various writers. (See J. Scaliger, *Elench. Trihæres.* 16; Spanheim, *Dub. Evang.* part iii., Dub. xxix. 4; Bull, *Harmon. Apost.* Diss. Post. x. 14; Jortin, *Remarks*, App. to vol. ii. p. 339; Waterland, *Sermons*, vol. ix. p. 306, Serm. xxiv.; Brucker, *Hist. Philos.* vol. ii. p. 720.)

Note (41), p. 43.

The Pharisees would "compass sea and land to make one proselyte[a]" to the *doctrines of their sect;* and other Jews would perhaps sometimes compel Gentiles, who had pried into their rites, to adopt their profession. (See Hor. *Sat.* i. 4, ad fin.) But the general spirit of the Jew was narrow and exclusive, as sufficiently appears in the Acts and the Epistles of St. Paul.

Note (42), p. 45.

See the "Consolation" of Cicero. Compare the remark of Aristotle: Τὰς μὲν τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων, τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι [τοῖς τεθνεῶσι], λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται, καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον.— *Eth. Nic.* i. 11, § 1.

[a] Matt. xxiii. 15.

NOTE (43), p. 46.

Philo, *De Insomn.* l. s. c.; *De Gigant.* pp. 263, 264.

NOTE (44), p. 46.

Plat. *Tim.* pp. 17—26.

NOTE (45), p. 47.

This expression is taken from Cudworth. (*Intellect. System*, ch. v. p. 797, folio edition.)

NOTE (46), p. 48.

"Angelificatam carnem." (Tertull. *De Resurrect. Carn.* § 26, p. 341, C.)

NOTE (47), p. 49.

See Plato's *Phædo*, § 9: *Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.* (p. 85, ed. Stallbaum.)

SERMON III.

NOTE (1), p. 51.

Bacon's *Essays*, Essay i.: "'What is truth?' said *jesting* Pilate, and would not stay for an answer."

NOTE (2), p. 52.

Homil. lxxxiv. p. 498, D.: *Ὁ Χριστὸς . . . . ἐπισπᾶται*

τὸν Πιλάτον διὰ τούτων, καὶ πείθει γενέσθαι τῶν λεγομένων ἀκροατήν· οὕτω γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶλε τοῖς βραχέσι ῥήμασιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστιν ἀλήθεια ;

NOTE (3), p. 52.

Comment. in Johann. xii. p. 1038: Οὐ μόνον τοῦ φόβου Πιλάτον ἐξίστησι, ἀλλά τι καὶ μέγα περὶ ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖν ἀναπείθει.

NOTE (4), p. 52.

Comment. in Johann. xviii. vol. i. p. 744: Οὕτω γοῦν εἶλε τοῖς βραχέσι τούτοις ῥήμασι τὸν Πιλάτον, ὥστε περὶ ἀληθείας ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Πιλάτον, τί ἐστι; σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἠφάνιστο, καὶ ἠγνοεῖτο ὑπὸ πάντων, ἔτι ἐν ἀπιστίᾳ ὄντων.

NOTE (5), p. 52.

Exposit. in Johann. Tract. cli. p. 541: "Credo, cum dixisset Pilatus, Quid est veritas? in mentem illi venisse continuo consuetudinem Judæorum quâ solebat eis dimitti unus in Pascha; et ideo non expectavit," &c.

NOTE (6), p. 54.

"Num igitur *dubitamus*," says Cicero, "*sicut pleraque*, sic et hoc?" (*Tusc. Quæst.* i. § 17.) His doubts concerning a future state have been already noticed. (See Note 27 on Sermon II.) He tells us that a common thesis for discussion in his time was the question, "Sitne in humano genere sapientia?"—"Was there, or was there not, any knowledge among men?" (*De Orat.* iii. 29.)

NOTE (7), p. 57.

This hope was accomplished in 1859, when the author

took this branch of the Evidences as the subject of his *Bampton Lectures,* preached in that year.[b]

NOTE (8), p. 58.

Butler's *Analogy,* part i. ch. 3. p. 68. Mr. Mansel would probably not deny what is stated in the text; but he scarcely makes sufficient allowance for the difference between our critical and inventive faculties, when he says, with respect to the *doctrines* of Christianity: "The doctrines revealed must either be such as are within the power of man's natural reason to verify, or such as are beyond it. In the former case, the reason which is competent to verify *may* also be competent to discover: the doctrine is tested by its conformity to the conclusions of human philosophy: and the wisdom which sits in judgment on the truth of a doctrine must itself be presumed to have an equal(?) power of discerning the truth."—*Bampton Lectures,* Lecture viii. p. 238.

NOTE (9), p. 59.

When the Thirty Tyrants were at the height of their power, Socrates and four others were summoned before them, and ordered to take part in the arrest of Leo the Salaminian, one of the generals who had fought at Arginusæ. There was no plausible ground of accusation against Leo; and it was evident that his only crime in the eyes of the Thirty was his wealth. Socrates, knowing this, refused to become their instrument, and instead of proceeding to Salamis went quietly home, while the arrest was effected by the other four. (Plat. *Apolog. Socr.* § 20.) For another instance of his boldness at this period, see Xen. *Mem. Socr.* i. 2, §§ 32—38.

[b] *Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records,* stated anew, with special reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times. London: Murray, 1859.

NOTE (10), p. 59.

At the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, when popular feeling was excited to the utmost, not only against them, but against every one who took their part, Socrates, and the other Prytanes, refused to put to the vote the illegal proposition of Callixenus, which required the fate of all to be decided by a single vote. A violent display of feeling was the immediate consequence. Callixenus turned his invectives against them; and the populace demanded with vehemence that they should be brought to trial for their refusal. Upon this all the others yielded. One man alone stood firm—Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. (See Xen. *Hell.* i. 7, § 15; *Mem. Socr.* i. 1, § 18; Plat. *Apolog. Socr.* § 20.)

NOTE (11), p. 60.

Xen. *Mem. Socr.* i. 3, §§ 5–15; iv. 5, §§ 9, 10. Schneider's remark on the former passage is just: "Socrates juventuti incontinenti concedit consuetudinem cum prostibulis vilibus et turpibus." And he pertinently remarks that Antisthenes, the most faithful of all Socrates' disciples, is represented by Xenophon in another work as describing his own practice almost in the same terms. (See Xen. *Sympos.* iv. § 38.) Hence we see why it was necessary to make a special law against fornication, as soon as the Gentiles were converted to Christianity. (Acts xv. 20.)

NOTE (12), p. 61.

Xen. *Mem. Socr.* iv. 8, §§ 6—10.

NOTE (13), p. 62.

See Plat. *Republ.* vi. § 10: *Καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γευόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ*

τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει, οὐδ' ἔστι ξύμμαχος μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων βοήθειαν σώζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θῆρια ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσὼν,.. οὔτε συναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν π'λιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελὴς αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβὼν ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας, ἀγαπᾷ εἴ πη αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεως τε καὶ εὐμενὴς ἀπαλλάξεται. Compare the despondíng passage in the Platonic Epistles, where we are told — Πλάτων μὲν ὀψὲ παρεγένετο ἐς τὴν πατρίδα — too late, that is, to do any good.

NOTE (14), p. 62.

See the passage above quoted, especially the expression, ἀγαπᾷ εἰ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται.

NOTE (15), p. 62.

Προαπολόμενος. l. s. c. Compare *Rep.* vii. § 2, ad fin.: Καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν. The fate of Socrates had made a deep impression upon Plato. (See the remarks of Justin Martyr, *ad Græc. Cohort.* § 20, p. 21, A, B.)

NOTE (16), p. 63.

Arist. *Eth. Nic.* ix. 8, § 9: Ἀληθὲς δὲ τὸ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου, καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. Compare iii. 9, § 4: Ὁ μὲν

θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται· ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτὰ, ὅτι καλὸν, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.

NOTE (17), p. 64.

Eth. Nic. i. 10, § 12: *Ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδάν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίας, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.*

NOTE (18), p. 64.

Ibid. iv. 5, § 1: *Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς. ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν.* And again: *Ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν [ὁ πρᾶος]· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός, κ.τ.λ.*

NOTE (19), p. 64.

Ibid. § 6: *Τὸ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀνδραποδῶδες.*

NOTE (20), p. 64.

Ibid. v. 5, § 6: *Τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις· ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει, ἢ τὸ εὖ, κ.τ.λ.*

NOTE (21), p. 66.

This passage is translated somewhat more freely by Sir W. Jones in the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. i. p. 244. Compare with it the "Hymn to the Supreme God," in Prof. Max Müller's *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 569.

NOTE (22), p. 66.

On the twofold aspect of Gnosticism, see Burton's *Bampton Lectures,* Lecture v. p. 141, and Notes 61 and 62, pp. 438—447.

NOTE (23), p. 67.

This effect of the Hindoo system is noted by Mr. Maurice in very forcible terms. "Imagine yourself in the school where this sublime doctrine was taught; look at the self-satisfied, self-glorified person who is proclaiming it; see how he has gone on, step by step, till, from a profound idea of some awful, absolute Being, he has passed into the habitual conviction that this Being is himself; he has become his own God. Mark what contempt he manifests for persons about him, what utter inhumanity has grown out of this notion, that he is the very perfection of humanity, that he is above it."—*Religions of the World,* Lecture ii. p. 46.

NOTE (24), p. 67.

See M. Huc's *Voyage dans la Tartarie,* vol. i. ch. ix. pp. 326, 327. (Pp. 194, 195, English Translation, 3rd edition.)

NOTE (25), p. 71.

Ἡ φιλία, says Aristotle, φύσει ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν· ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις, ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. — *Eth. Nic.* viii. 1, § 3. Compare ch. xi. § 7; and see also *Pol.* i. 2.

NOTE (26), p. 73.

This expression is taken from Dr. Grant's *Bampton Lectures,* Lecture v. p. 145, where a graphic sketch of Xavier's missionary exertions is given.

NOTE (27), p. 74.

We have an example of this before our eyes in the Mormon missions, so active in our own country and in Germany.

NOTE (28), p. 75.

See Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xv. § 4.

NOTE (29), p. 75.

Plin. *Epist.* x. 97: "Se sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere [Christianos], sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent; ne depositum appellati denegarent," &c. And again: "Necessarium credidi ex duabus ancillis, quæ ministræ dicebantur, quid esset veri et per tormenta quærere. Sed *nihil aliud inveni, quam superstitionem pravam et immodicam.*"

NOTE (30), p. 76.

Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 44. Compare Suetonius, who calls the Christians "genus hominum superstitionis novæ et *maleficæ*." Dr. Burton's conjecture, that "it was from the gross immorality of nominal Christians (Gnostics), that the holy name of Christ was blasphemed among the Gentiles" (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 144), is well entitled to attention.

SERMON IV.

NOTE (1), p. 77.

On the ἀπάθεια or ἠρεμία of the Stoics, which constituted the highest perfection of the σοφὸς or sage, see Ritter's *Ancient Philosophy*, bk. xi. ch. 5, vol. iii. p. 583, E. T.

NOTE (2), p. 77.

According to Aristotle, man's final happiness, that to which his whole nature points, is an "energy of *rest*" — *ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας*; one single, pure, unchanging, and perpetual energy of thought, the silent contemplation of God and God-like things — *θεωρία*. (See *Eth. Nic.* vii. 14, § 8; ix. 4, § 4; x. 7, § 3; and 8, § 7.)

NOTE (3), p. 78.

The burden of the Book of Ecclesiastes is the vanity and unsatisfactoriness of all labour; and the feeling which most thoroughly pervades it is a craving after rest. See, especially, the following passages. Ch. ii. verses 22 and 23: "For what profit hath a man of all his labour, and of the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun? For all his days are sorrows, and his travail grief; yea, his heart taketh not *rest* in the night." Ch. iv. verse 6: "Better is a handful with *quietness*, than both the hands full with travail and vexation of spirit."

NOTE (4), p. 78.

Moses: "The Lord said, my presence shall go with thee, and I will give thee *rest*." (Exod. xxiii. 14.) Job: "There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be at rest." (iii. 17.) David: "And I said, Oh! that I had wings like a dove, for then would I fly away and be at *rest*." (Psalm lv. 6.) Isaiah: "In returning and *rest* shall ye be saved." (xxx. 15.) Jeremiah: "Walk in the good way, and ye shall find *rest* for your souls." (vi. 16.) Daniel: "Thou shalt *rest*, and stand in thy lot." (xii. 13.)

NOTE (5), p. 78.

Lord Byron, in one of his letters from Italy[c], speaks with

[c] Moore's *Life of Byron*, vol. ii. p. 218. (Ed. 1830.)

equal admiration and sympathy of two epitaphs which had come under his notice, wherein rest was represented as the sole object of the dead person's wishes. They ran thus —

"MARTINI LUIGI.
IMPLORA PACE."

"LUCREZIA PICINI
IMPLORA ETERNA QUIETE."

Byron's comment is: "Can anything be more full of pathos? These few words say all that can be said or sought; the dead had had enough of life; all they wanted was rest; and this they *implore!* There is all the helplessness, and humble hope, and death-like prayer, that can arise from the grave—'implora pace.' I hope whoever may survive me, and shall see me put in the foreigners' burying-ground at the Lido, within the fortress by the Adriatic, will see those two words, and no more, put over me."

NOTE (6), p. 78.

Hence the wide prevalence of the theory of absorption, spoken of in another discourse. (Supra, pp. 31—33.) In no other way was it possible to obtain such perfect rest. The dreamy Oriental mind naturally embraced this comfortable theory, sometimes even pressing it so far as to believe that the absorption had taken place. Even where such views do not prevail in the East, as among the Confucian Chinese, there is still found a longing after repose. One of the primary maxims of Confucius is the following: —

"We must first know the goal towards which we are tending, or our definite destination. This being known, we may afterwards maintain the *calmness* and *tranquillity* of our

minds. The mind being calm and tranquil, we may afterwards enjoy that *unalterable repose which nothing can trouble.* Having then attained to the enjoyment of the unalterable repose which nothing can trouble, we may afterwards meditate and form our judgment on the essence of things; and having formed our judgment of the essence of things, we may then attain to the desired perfection."

This passage is quoted by M. Huc from the *Ta-hio*, or "Grand Study," a work placed in the hands of all students. (See Huc's *Chinese Empire*, vol. i. pp. 116, 117, E. T.)

NOTE (7), p. 78.

Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. v. ch. lxxiv. § 4.

NOTE (8), p. 84.

See the *Report* of the "Oxford University Commission," pp. 22, 26, 27.

NOTE (9), p. 85.

Aristotle is of course the Heathen Moralist to whom allusion is especially made. His bold assertion that man must have a work to do (ἔργον), and that his actual work is to energise (ἐνεργεῖν, ἐνέργεια), will be familiar to Oxford students. (See *Eth. Nic.* i. 7, §§ 10–13; 8, § 3; &c.)

A recent writer[d] has explained the ἐνέργεια of Aristotle in a way which almost deprives it of an active character. "Consciousness," according to him, is "the chief import" of Aristotle's ἐνέργεια. It is the deepest and most vivid consciousness in us that constitutes our happiness in Aristotle's view, he thinks. To me this notion appears a very mistaken

[d] Sir A. Grant. See the Essays prefixed to his edition of the *Ethics* of Aristotle, vol. i. Essay iv. p. 194.

one. Self-consciousness, self-reflection, according to Aristotle, is neither easy nor pleasant. (*Θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτούς, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας.—Eth. Nic.* ix. 9, § 5.) His good man is very unconscious. (*Πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν τὸ εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει.—Ib.* ii. 4, § 3.) By *ἐνέργεια* he really means the active exercise of any power or capacity of our nature; and in this active exercise he teaches us to seek our happiness. We frequently find the term *πρᾶξις* used by Aristotle as a synonym for *ἐνέργεια*—(*ἀνθρώπου τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις.*—i. 7, § 14. *Ὀρθως δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος.*—i. 8, § 3) —not, of course, that he thinks practical energies the only ones, for he fully recognises energies of thought (*αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι*, vii. 12, § 2, and 14, § 8; x. 4, §§ 5-9, and 7, §§ 2-7; &c.) too; but because they are among the energies in which he considers the happiness of life chiefly to consist. It is his clear and constant teaching that we are to find our happiness in the complete discharge of all our active duties, as men, as fathers, as husbands, as citizens. This is the predominant notion contained in his term *ἐνέργεια*, so far as it is connected with happiness; and "consciousness" is no otherwise comprised in it, than as that is one employment or "energy" of thought (*αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα*), and so included among the energies or activities of human beings.

NOTE (10), p. 85.

See Hesiod. *Op. et Di.* 300—314; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* vii. 7, § 5; Cic. *de Off.* i. § 34; Epictet. *Dissert.* iv. 4.

NOTE (11), p. 85.

Arist. *Eth. Nic.* x. 6, § 4: *Οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ, οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ*

σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου, ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσι, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι. . . . . Οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

NOTE (12), p. 85.

Hes. *Op. et Di.* 300 et seqq.:

Λιμὸς γάρ τοι πάμπαν ἀεργῷ σύμφορος ἀνδρί·
Τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες, ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς
Ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν, κ.τ.λ.

NOTE (13), p. 89.

This Sermon was preached in the spring of 1853, soon after the death of the Duke of Wellington, Chancellor of the University.

NOTE (14), p. 90.

"When we praise a man for being ambitious," says Aristotle, "we mean, that he is *more ambitious than the generality of persons;* when we blame him, that he is more ambitious than it is right to be."—*Eth. Nic.* iv. 4, § 4.

NOTE (15), p. 92.

Πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. — Arist. *Eth. Nic.* x. 4, § 9. Ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν, ἀναπαύσεως δέονται, κ.τ.λ.—Ib. x. 6, § 6.

NOTE (16), p. 93.

Οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. —Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I. s. c.

NOTE (17), p. 96.

The Statute by which the Final Schools were increased to four,—Schools of Natural Science, and Law and Modern History, being added to the old Schools of *Literæ Humaniores* and Mathematics,—was passed in 1850. The new Statute first came into operation in the spring of 1853, shortly after this Sermon was preached.

SERMON V.

NOTE (1), p. 99.

I would not be understood as intending to rule, that the Epistle to the Hebrews is *certainly* the work of the great Apostle. I have always felt, with Erasmus, that the difference of language and style between this treatise and the acknowledged works of St. Paul was very great. But, whoever may be the author, there can be no doubt of the Canonicity and authority of the Epistle, which is quoted by the early Fathers, in proof of doctrine, as freely as any other portion of the Greek Testament. (See Clem. Rom. *Ep.* i. § 10, p. 42; § 12, p. 46; § 17, p. 72; § 21, p. 94; &c.)

NOTE (2), p. 99.

Gal. iv. 24: "Which things are an allegory" (*ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα*). In this instance, and in some others (as Heb. vii. 1-17), the New Testament writers find a

spiritual or symbolical meaning, not merely in the ceremonial law, but even in the facts of Jewish history. The argument in the text stops short of this.

NOTE (3), p. 102.

In the history, we find David fasting three times only—viz. on the death of Saul and Jonathan (2 Sam. i. 12), on the illness of his first child by Bathsheba (ib. xii. 16), and (probably) on the murder of several of his sons by Absalom (ib. xiii. 31), though here it is only said that "he tare his garments, and lay on the earth." From David's own psalms we should gather, that his fastings were not indeed limited to these very rare occasions; but still that they were irregular and occasional. "As for me," he says, "when they (his enemies) were sick, my clothing was sackcloth: I humbled my soul with fasting." (Ps. xxxv. 13.) And again, "When I wept and chastened my soul with fasting, that was to my reproach. I made sackcloth also my garment, and I became a proverb unto them." (Ps. lxix. 9, 10.) In these places something like frequency seems to be implied.

Of the law given by God to Moses, fasting was no part. On the great day of atonement, the Jews were ordered to "afflict their souls" (Lev. xvi. 29); but the manner of the affliction was not pointed out. The first actual fast that we hear of in Scripture is that of the Israelites in their war with the Benjamites (Judg. xx. 26). The second that of the Jews generally, at the great national repentance under Samuel at Mizpeh (1 Sam. vii. 6). The third is the fast for Saul (ib. xxxi. 13; 2 Sam. i. 12). Thus David is not absolutely the first instance; but he is the first person who seems to have used fasting as an habitual discipline.

NOTE (4), p. 102.

Hence the Pharisee says in the Parable,—"I fast *twice in the week*" (Luke xviii. 12). According to Jewish authorities, the practice was commemorative of the long fast of Moses upon Mount Sinai. Tradition said that Moses went up into the mount on the fifth day of the week (our Thursday) and descended on the second (our Monday). The second and fifth days of the week are consequently made fast days by the Pharisees. (See Lewie's *Hebrew Republic*, vol. i. p. 225, and Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. i. p. 613, ad voc. FASTS.

NOTE (5), p. 102.

Bell. Jud. ii. 8. An excellent account of the Essenes and Essenism will be found in Dr. Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* (vol. i. pp. 581–583), contributed by Mr. Westcott. "The growth of Essenism," he says, "was a natural result of the religious feeling which was called out by the circumstances of the Greek dominion; and it is easy to trace the process by which it was matured. From the Maccabæan age there was a continuous effort among the stricter Jews to attain an absolute standard of holiness. Each class of devotees was looked upon as practically impure by their successors, who carried the laws of purity still further; and the Essenes stand at the extreme limit of the mystic asceticism which was thus gradually reduced to shape. The associations of the Scribes and Pharisees gave place to others, bound by a more rigid rule; and the rule of the Essenes was made gradually stricter. Judas, the earliest Essene who is mentioned (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* i. 3, § 5), appears living in ordinary society. Maccabæus, according to tradition a colleague of Hillel, was a friend of Herod, and brought upon

his sect the favour of the king. (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xv. 10, § 5.) But by a natural impulse the Essenes withdrew from the dangers and distractions of business. From the cities they retired to the wilderness to realise the conceptions of religion which they formed; but still they remained on the whole true to their ancient faith. To the Pharisees they stood nearly in the same relation in which the Pharisees themselves stood with regard to the mass of the people. The differences lay mainly in rigour of practice, not in articles of belief."

NOTE (6), p. 103.

Aristotle had before his eyes the coarse asceticism of the Cynics, which was peculiarly offensive to a man of refined and delicate taste. His condemnation of the system will be found especially in the following passages: *Eth. Nic.* ii. 2, § 7, and vii. 9, § 5. He calls the Cynics ἀγροικοι, "clowns," or "boors," from their coarse tastes and habits. The more refined asceticism of the Stoics can scarcely have come under his notice, since Zeno had only just begun to teach at Athens when Aristotle died.

NOTE (7), p. 104.

It was a leading characteristic of the Oriental mind to be strongly impressed with a feeling of guilt and shame. Among the Greeks, until they were brought into contact with Oriental systems, the feeling was almost entirely wanting. Hence the boldness, simplicity, and openness of the Greek, who is not conscious that he has anything to hide. He does not perceive that he is naked, as Adam did (Gen. iii. 7); much less that he is "wretched, and miserable, and

poor, and blind."[e] He readily exhibits his unclothed frame in the palæstra, and at the Great Games. He openly and innocently talks in the plainest language of our most "uncomely parts"[f] and actions. He uses few periphrases and fewer euphemisms. He is *αὐθέκαστος*, calling things by their right names, not veiling his own personality, nor that of the persons with whom he converses. In early times he is quite devoid of any notion of fasting or other ascetic practices. He treats the body as a dear companion, lavishing upon it his cares and attentions, bathing it, anointing it, exercising it; developing its strength; even when he is just going to die, carefully combing the long hair which forms one of its chief beauties (Herod. vii. 208, 209), and in which he especially glories. (Thucyd. i. 6. Compare the *καρηκομόωντες* Ἀχαιοί of Homer.) He first learns ascetic notions from Pythagoras, who derives them from Egypt or the East, whence also he brings the doctrines of guilt, retribution, and judgment to come. Even after he has partially adopted these views, he finds it difficult to act upon them. Pythagoreanism soon goes out of fashion — Cynicism has few adherents (*ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις φανερά*. Arist.) — Stoicism itself is less attractive to the Greeks who originate it than to the Romans, who have more of the Oriental temper in them.

On the other hand, in the East asceticism has always been wide-spread, and is of very ancient institution. Living nearer to the locality of the Fall, the Orientals seem to have retained a more vivid recollection of it. There, man has always been humble, crouching, timid, conscious of guilt. His attitude before God has been that of a trembling suppliant. He has felt his impurity, and has striven to purify himself by such means as have seemed to him likely to make

[e] Rev. iii. 17. [f] 1 Cor. xii. 23.

him more acceptable to God. Hence the frequent ablutions, the abstinence from various kinds of food, the prolonged watchings, the fastings, and the other austerities common in Egypt and India from remote times, in Persia under the Magian system, among the later Jews, as the Essenes and Therapeutæ[8], and among the various sects of Gnostics. Hence, too, Christian Monachism proceeded to its greatest lengths in the East, in Egypt, and Syria. The spirit still remains; and, while the Abyssinian Church is probably the most ascetic of all Christian communities, austerities almost equal to those of St. Antony or St. Simeon Stylites are practised at the present day by many an Indian devotee, and many a Persian *fakir*.

NOTE (8), p. 104.

According to Plato, the great aim of the philosopher is to purify the soul by separating it from all bodily wants and cravings. (*Phædo*, §§ 11–13.) The principle of desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) implanted in man is altogether evil. The soul of man is like a chariot and pair, where Reason sits and drives the two horses, Feeling and Desire. Desire has every defect that a horse can have (*σκολιός, πολύς, εἰκῇ συμπεφορημένος, κρατεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος, μελάγχρως, γλαυκόμματος, ὕφαιμος, ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος, περὶ ὦτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπείκων*); and it requires the whole united strength of both Reason and Feeling to keep him under. The business of Reason is not to yield to him one jot; for otherwise, all is lost. (*Phædrus*, pp. 24–36; ed. Stallb.) Compare with this the somewhat modified account of the relations of the three to one another, which is given in the *Republic*, bk. iv. § 16. Plato's

[8] Philo, *De Vit. Contempl.* § 4.

real view seems to be that Feeling (*θυμός, τὸ θυμοειδές*) is a valuable element in man, which requires training and discipline, but on the whole works for good; while Desire is the reverse — an evil element which only leads astray. He would therefore crush, smother, or (if possible) eradicate Desire, in order to improve our nature, and make it such as it should be.

NOTE (9), p. 104.

The Stoics aimed at eradicating, not Desire only, but Feeling also. Man was to be Reason, and Reason only.[h] All emotions were to be stifled as disturbing the soul's serenity. (Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* iii. §§ 4–11.) Affection was to be kept under, lest it should interfere with liberty or cause us trouble. (Epictet. *Dissert.* iv. 1, § 153.) The perfect condition at which all were to aim was *εὐστάθεια, ἀπάθεια, ἀλυπία, ἀφοβία, ἀταραξία, ἁπλῶς ἐλευθερία.* (*Ib.* iv. 4, § 7.)

NOTE (10), p. 104.

I suppose there can be no doubt that man's passions and appetites are more violent since the fall than they were previously. All moralists seem to be agreed that what actually leads men away is the strength of their passions. (Plat. *Phædr.* l. s. c.; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iii. 12, § 7; vii. 14, § 6; &c.; Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* iv. § 15; Epictet. *Dissert.* iv. 1, § 15; Butler, *Sermons,* ii. p. 18, &c.; *Anal.* part I. ch. iv. p. 90.) The violence of anger in infants is very remarkable. And the strength of lust in some of the young seems to be equally inordinate. Butler takes the view here mentioned. He speaks of our fall from original rectitude as consist-

[h] Cic. *de Fin.* iv. 11: "Chrysippus summum bonum id constituit, non ut excellere animo, sed uti *nihil esse præter animum* videretur [homo]."

ing, at least partly, in the fact, that "our passions are become excessive by repeated violations of our inward constitution." (*Anal.* part I. ch. v. p. 116; compare *Sermons*, viii. sub fin. p. 77.)

NOTE (11), p. 104.

The frugality (εὐτέλεια) of Socrates amounts to a modified asceticism. (See Xen. *Mem.* i. 3, §§ 5, 6; Plut. *De Sanit. Tuend.* p. 124, D.; Plat. *Phædr.* vol. viii. p. 5, ed. Stallb.)

NOTE (12), p. 105.

St. Paul indeed says, "Ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ" (1 Cor. ix. 27); and this statement has been viewed as justifying, or even as requiring, the infliction of such rigours as those practised by the Flagellants and other Christian ascetics. But the analogy of faith requires us to understand this passage, not in a literal, but in a metaphorical sense — not of blows and flagellations, but of that "temperance," or rather "continence" (ἐγκράτεια), which is held up to our imitation two verses before. (1 Cor. ix. 25.) Ὑπωπιάζειν, it should be remembered, had even a weaker sense than this in Hellenistic Greek. See Luke xviii. 5, where it is simply "trouble" or "annoy."

NOTE (13), p. 108.

If men and women, who have attained to years of discretion, choose to bind themselves by vows to abstain from doing a thing, which is in itself indifferent, there is perhaps not much to be said. They have laid a burthen upon themselves, which they may find very grievous to bear; but they have done nothing whereof other people have any right to complain. The case, however, is different, when, not content

with fettering themselves, and recommending to all their adult brethren the adoption of their chain, they proceed to cajole, or compel — for it is often practically compulsion — persons under age, boys and girls of eleven or twelve years old, to undertake similar obligations. "Bands of Hope," as they are called, have been formed in various parts of the country, often under the auspices and direction of the clergy, on which it is hard to look with any other feelings than compassion and disquietude. Tender and ignorant children have been made to pledge themselves, never, unless medicinally, to taste what are called "intoxicating liquors." Fortunately many of them do not know what they have done, and will never feel that they have contracted any obligation at all. But what evil may not result to tender consciences? To what unnecessary temptations may they not be exposed? How many will be sure to yield, and break their pledge, not without serious damage to their firmness, and self-control ever after! Can it be right that those whose business it is to "feed the lambs of Christ,"[i] and "lead them forth into green pastures beside the waters of comfort,"[j] should bring them into such straits and difficulties as these? Again, considering the difference in the diet of the upper and the labouring classes, and the comparative easiness of abstaining from fermented drinks when men are well fed, is it not something like "binding burdens on others grievous to be borne, which we do not touch with our own fingers,"[k] to require them to abstain from a stimulus which we do not need? No doubt intoxication is a great evil, and a crying one in this age and country; but we shall not properly meet the foe if the weapons of our warfare are carnal[l], and such as we have no right to use.

[i] John xxi. 15.
[j] Ps. xxiii. 2.
[k] Matt. xxiii. 4.
[l] 2 Cor. x. 4.

SERMON VI.

NOTE (1), p. 115.

See Bishop Butler's *Analogy*, part II. ch. vi. p. 274.

NOTE (2), p. 116.

So Hooker: "Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, *nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things*. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no." — *Eccl. Pol.* i. 7, § 3. And Butler: "Particular propensions, from their very nature, *must* be felt, the objects of them being present." —*Analogy*, part I. ch. v. p. 113.

NOTE (3), p. 116.

Republ. vii. § 1.

NOTE (4), p. 117.

This is the opinion of those who have been called "the Scottish Metaphysicians," and it seems to be that of Mr. John Stuart Mill. "All states of mind," says this last-named writer, "are immediately caused either by other states of mind, or by states of body." — *System of Logic*, book VI. ch. iv. § 2. Of the latter kind are Sensations; of the former, Thoughts, Emotions, and Volitions. "These ideas, or secondary mental states, are excited by our impressions,

or by other ideas according to certain laws, which are called Laws of Association."—*Ibid.* § 2.

NOTE (5), p. 117.

Such is the opinion of M. Comte, and of many eminent physiologists. I give their view in the clear and intelligible summary of Mr. Mill. "These persons contend," he says, "that a thought is as much the result of a nervous agency, as a sensation: that some particular state of our nervous system, in particular of that central portion of it called the brain, invariably precedes, and is presupposed by, every state of our consciousness. According to this theory, one state of mind is never really produced by another: all are produced by states of body. Where one thought seems to call up another by association, it is not really a thought which recalls a thought; the association did not exist between the two thoughts, but between the two states of the brain or nerves which preceded the thoughts; one of those states recalls the other, each being attended, in its passage, by the particular mental state which is consequent upon it. On this theory, the uniformities of succession among states of mind would be mere derivative uniformities, resulting from the laws of succession of the bodily states which cause them." —*System of Logic*, book VI. ch. iv. § 2. Psychology is thus swallowed up in physiology, and the sequence of our thoughts is affected by all that has any bearing on our physical condition.

NOTE (6), p. 117.

I do not know that this view has ever been maintained with the same exclusiveness as the others — I mean so as to apply to *all* our thoughts, and leave nothing to be accounted

for in any other way. But many ancient and some modern theologians regard at least a considerable number of our thoughts as whispers from the Spirit-World. See such passages as the following:—"Operatio dæmonum est hominum eversio: sic malitia spiritalis a primordio auspicata est in hominis exitium. Itaque corporibus quidem et valetudines infligunt, et aliquos casus acerbos; animæ vero repentinos et extraordinarios per vim excessus. Suppetit illis ad utramque substantiam hominis adeundam subtilitas et tenuitas sua. Adspiratio dæmonum et angelorum mentis corruptelas agit furoribus et amentiis fœdis, aut sævis libidinibus cum erroribus vanis."—Tertull. *Apol. adv. Gent.* xxii. "I would wish to make people consider, whether Satan's present mode of dealing with those he tempts, does not make it credible that he is, even after the Incarnation of our Lord, allowed a wonderful power of access to our souls, *so as to be able to inspire them with bad thoughts* even now. Neither do I think that any supernaturally accurate observance of external features, &c., will account for all his modes of tempting; since, when he finds a proposition in our minds, which we use as an argument against him, he *raises up another* to meet it, or endeavours to make us believe that the case is an exception."—Morris's *Essay towards the Conversion of the Hindus*, note 22 to dialogue ii. pp. 212, 213.

Note (7), p. 119.

"Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift thee as wheat." (Luke xxii. 31.) "Supper being ended, the devil having now *put into the heart* of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray him; Jesus, knowing," &c. (John xiii. 2.) These passages (it is thought) afford sufficient basis for the conjecture offered in the text.

NOTE (8), p. 119.

Butler shows that the moral principle in us, like every other, is capable of improvement, and is improved by proper discipline and exercise. (*Analogy*, part I. ch. v. p. 111.) Each trial of our moral principle, if withstood, strengthens it, and raises us to "a higher and more secure state of virtue." (Ibid. p. 114.)

NOTE (9), p. 120.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος. — Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iii. 5, § 17. This is the case, because κατὰ μικρὸν διϊκνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. — Ibid. i. 13, § 13.

NOTE (10), p. 130.

Ἦ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; Πότε δή; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ὅταν, εἶπον, ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἤ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον, ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ' αὐτοὺς αἵ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου.—*Republ.* vi. § 6.

SERMON VII.

NOTE (1), p. 135.

"As the affairs of this present world are ordered," says Bishop Pearson, "they show no sign of an universal justice. The wicked and disobedient are often so happy, as if they were rewarded for their impieties."—*Exposition of the Creed*, Art. VII. pp. 495, 496.) Compare Charles Lamb's ingenious remarks on the popular fallacy — that "Ill-gotten gain never prospers," in his *Essays of Elia*. (*Works*, vol. iii. pp. 401, 402: edition of 1855.)

NOTE (2), p. 136.

The account of the origin of laws, which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Diodotus, seems to be true enough in point of fact. (Thucyd. iii. 45.) Men wished to deter others from crime, and sought to do it by frightening them. They chose such punishments as they thought would be most feared; and when they found them insufficient, they sought a δεινότερον δέος. Compare the account of the Sophist in Plato: Ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὑτοὺς μὲν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν, ἐκφοβοῦντές τε τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν.—*Gorgias*, § 38.

NOTE (3), p. 137.

Even Plato could see this, and could speak of a system, which bartered pleasure for pleasure and fear for fear, as pro-

ducing a mere shadow of virtue with nothing sound or real about it. See the *Phædo:* *Ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἦ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις . . . χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ.*— § 13, pp. 91, 92; ed. Stallb.

NOTE (4), p. 138.

See the speech of Diodotus in Thucydides, loc. s. c.: *Διεξεληλύθασι διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι προστιθέντες, εἴ πως ἧσσον ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων· καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων μαλακωτέρας κεῖσθαι αὐτάς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσιν· καὶ τοῦτο ὁμῶς παραβαίνεται.*

NOTE (5), p. 138.

The latest of our historians so states. (See Alison's *History of Europe,* vol. viii. p. 802.) A similar testimony is given not unfrequently by our Judges in their charges to grand juries.

NOTE (6), p. 139.

A well-informed writer on crime asserts, that in one year in Scotland, 393 prisoners were found to have been in prison *twenty* times; one was believed to have been committed 1000 times; and it was calculated that in one district 20,000 separate offences had been committed by only *fifteen* individuals. (See *Crime,* by Mr. Frederick Hill, p. 27; quoted in the *Edinburgh Review,* No. 204, p. 597.) Another tells

us, that of 3817 prisoners in Reading prison between 1844 and 1849, 1704 had been already imprisoned once, twice, five times, ten times, or twenty times. (*Report on Prison Discipline*, Blue Book, 1850, No. 632.)

NOTE (7), p. 139.

See Plato's *Gorgias*, §§ 33—36. Aristotle is less express. He tells us distinctly that κόλασις is a "remedial process" (ἰατρεία τις)[m]; but he does not make it quite clear whether κόλασις is the whole of rightful human punishment, or whether he includes in it τιμωρία also. Τιμωρία, which is for the satisfaction of the man who punishes, not for the benefit of the man who is punished (*Rhet.* i. 10), seems to be regarded by Aristotle as legitimate to some extent. (*Eth. Nic.* iv. 5, §§ 4 and 12; *Rhet.* ii. 2, ad init.)

NOTE (8), p. 139.

Even Butler speaks of "the end of civil punishment" as being simply "to prevent future mischief." (*Preface to Sermons*, p. xi.) And Hooker talks of punishments as at any rate mainly intended to "deter men from evil." (*Eccles. Pol.* i. 10, § 6.) Paley lays it down expressly that "The proper end of human punishment is the prevention of crime." (*Moral Philosophy*, bk. vi. ch. 9.) Some protests against these views have been made of late years by writers of this University[n]; but their arguments have scarcely obtained as much attention as their merits deserved.

NOTE (9), p. 139.

This end is omitted in the Gorgias; in the Protagoras it is denied. The denial is given, however, not by Socrates him-

[m] *Eth. Nic.* ii. 3, § 4.

[n] See the Essay of Mr. C. E. Prichard, in the *Oxford Prize Essays*, and compare a paper in the *Oxford and Cambridge Magazine*, for July, 1846.

self, but by Protagoras, who is made to say: *Οὐδεὶς κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται — οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν πραξιν ἀγένητον θείη — ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα.* — Vol. ii. p. 142, ed. Stallb.

NOTE (10), p. 140.

See Butler's Sermon on "Forgiveness of Injuries": "If lower instances of injury may lessen our benevolence, why may not higher, or the highest, destroy it? The answer is obvious. It is not man's being a social creature, much less his being a moral agent, from whence *alone* our obligations to goodwill towards him arise. There is an obligation to it prior to either of these, arising from his being a sensible creature: that is, capable of happiness or misery. Now *this obligation cannot be superseded by his moral character.*"— *Sermon* ix. p. 83.

NOTE (11), p. 140.

It was not within the direct scope of this Sermon to consider the propriety of capital punishments. They have been justified on the ground, that "the life of the criminal is inconsistent with the quiet and happiness of the world," and that "a general and more enlarged obligation necessarily destroys a particular and more confined one of the same kind, inconsistent with it." (Butler's *Sermons*, l. s. c. p. 84.) No doubt the reasoning here is sound, if the fact is as stated. But can we say that the life of the criminal is always, or generally, inconsistent with the quiet and happiness of the world? Would not the quiet and happiness of the world be as fully secured if the criminal were imprisoned for life, as

if he be executed? It has always appeared to me, that, if capital punishment is to be justified, it must be in quite a different way from this. I should place its justification on the following grounds:—

In the first place, our sense of moral fitness, our instinctive feeling of what certain crimes *deserve*, requires it. The theory of the Pythagoreans, that Retaliation (*τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*) alone is strict justice, in the case of murder at any rate, finds an echo in our moral nature. Who ever heard the awful announcement—"Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed,"[o] without an inward acknowledgment of the justice of such an award? We feel that punishment ought to be *adequate;* and there is no adequate punishment for murder except death. I believe murderers, who are brought to repentance after their committal or after their sentence, have this inward feeling as strongly as others; and, strange as it may sound, have a sort of satisfaction in laying down their life for the life or lives that they have taken.

Secondly, and chiefly, capital punishment is not only sanctioned, but expressly commanded, in God's word; and the sanction is not confined to the Old Testament but is repeated in the New. I cannot agree with those who see in the proclamation to Noah and his sons after the flood (Gen. ix. 6), not a command, not a law, but a prophetic announcement. Supposing that the passage "Whoso sheddeth," &c., would bear the interpretation, if it stood alone, that interpretation is at any rate precluded by the coherence of the passage with what goes before. The fifth verse tells us that God "will require" the life taken at the hand of the man who takes it. The sixth points out the mode in which the requirement is to take effect. Again, as a prophetic an-

[o] Gen. ix. 6.

nouncement the passage would not be true; for it is certain that many murderers have died quietly in their beds without human intervention; so that we must either regard the passage as a law or as an untrue prediction. It is hardly necessary to add, that both the Jewish and the Christian Church have always regarded it in the light of a law.

Some, who allow the mandatory character of this passage, maintain that it was a temporary law, like the command to abstain from blood, which is found in close connection with it. (Gen. ix. 4.) But that a combination of this kind proves nothing, is apparent from Acts xv. 20; where the command to abstain from fornication, which all admit to be an eternal law, is coupled still more closely with an injunction to abstain from blood and from things strangled. To argue safely from such a combination the mandates must be *in pari materie;* which is not the case in this instance. The command to abstain from blood is *per se* a positive law; the injunction to execute murderers is moral, and has a moral ground assigned for it.[p]

If we turn to the New Testament, we find, in the first place, nothing to indicate that the law given to Noah and his sons — and in them to all the world — has been repealed by Christianity. The texts adduced as having this bearing are manifestly strained from their true signification. They are such as the following: — "Judge not, that ye be not judged" (Matt. vii. 1), — "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord" (Rom. xii. 19), — passages, which clearly intend private vengeance and judgment, and which, if extended to the public administration of justice, would forbid every other punishment and sentence as much as the punishment and sentence of death.

The only passage of the New Testament which seems to

[p] "For in the image of God made he man."

me to bear directly on the present question, is the first part of the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Here the office of the civil magistrate is plainly and palpably the subject-matter of the apostle's thought. "Let every soul," he says, "be subject to the *higher powers;* for there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, *be afraid;* for he beareth not the *sword* in vain: for he is *the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.* Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake." (Rom. xiii. 1-5.) Civil rulers cannot bear *the sword* (*τὴν μάχαιραν*) for any other purpose than to inflict capital punishment. And in this act, St. Paul declares, they are "the ministers of God"—"revengers" (*ἔκδικοι*) to execute His wrath on the evil-doer—to whom therefore men are to submit, as to God's instruments, "not only for wrath, but also for *conscience* sake." I can only conclude from this, that the civil ruler has his power of life and death from God, and may lawfully use the sword, with which he is entrusted, to execute God's wrath on criminals.

It may be asked whether this view does not conflict with the "remedial" theory of punishment, and especially with the statement in the text, that "we are bound at all times and under all circumstances to do the best we can for each one of our fellow-men, consistently with our obligations to the remainder;" since it has been already admitted that those obligations might be sufficiently discharged if the criminals who are now executed were imprisoned for life instead. Now,

in the first place, it is no valid objection to a theory that its application is partial; and the remedial theory might have a sound application to secondary punishments, though it failed to apply to primary. I believe, however, that capital punishment furnishes no real exception to the remedial theory, but is rather an example of it. If anything can bring a murderer to repentance, it is the certain prospect of death within a definite term. A man who has sunk so low cannot be returned to the world — cannot again resume his place in it. It is felt on all sides that, in settling what we are to do with such a person, our choice is simply between capital punishment and lifelong imprisonment. We cannot restore the man to society — we cannot even hold out to him any prospect of such restoration. There is no more any place for him in this world — his only chance is in another. Now what would be the probable effect, on a criminal of this class, of a sentence to solitary confinement for the remainder of his days? I can conceive of nothing more hopelessly deadening or more destructive of any little remnant of moral goodness that might be still left in him, than such a long blank prospect. Safe from all immediate danger, secure from the ordinary trials and afflictions which turn men to God, with plenty of time (as he would think) for repentance, he would grow old in dull impenitent hardness and insensibility; his intellect would contract; his moral nature would shrink up; he would shortly be little better than a caged bear or tiger. On the other hand, as already observed, the capital sentence and its accessories, — the solemn announcement, the certain doom, the short yet sufficient time for making his peace with God, the deep earnestness of the attendant minister who feels the value of each passing moment, the affecting partings with friends, — all these things together are calculated to work on the criminal's mind, if there be a spark of softness or goodness in it, and,

if anything can, to bring him to repentance. His body is delivered to death, "that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. v. 5). And the result is that a surprising proportion of those executed die penitent. Even when they do not, their execution probably does them no harm. If such circumstances as those by which they are surrounded, from the time of their sentence to that of their execution, do not break the stubbornness of their spirits, and bring them on their knees to Christ, it can scarcely be that any other circumstances would have done so.

Finally, if it be thought that we should have no right to calculate probabilities in this way, and put men to death on the strength of them, if we had no direct warranty for so doing, at any rate, when we *have* such direct warranty (see above, p. 261), we are entitled to believe, that in carrying out the divine command we do not in fact infringe on the absolute and peremptory duty of benevolence to our fellow-creatures,— that in no case, when we put a guilty man to death, do we do him any harm,— but that, either by our sentence we cause him to repent, or by removing him from the world we prevent him from growing worse; or, at the least, that we remove him when he is in as good a moral condition as he would have reached at any future time, if we had suffered him to live.

NOTE (12), p. 143.

See *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1854, No. 204, p. 599: — "The great proportion of criminal offenders have become such, not in consequence of an inherently bad, or an originally perverted nature, but because, in truth, the circumstances and companions which have surrounded them from infancy have influenced them towards evil with a weight and pressure which even superior natures would too probably have proved powerless to resist. Thousands of them have

succumbed to an urgency and continuity of temptation which, even as we read it, we feel conscious would have conquered ourselves far sooner; while few indeed of them were provided with that early education, or those moral safeguards, which enable their more favoured fellow-citizens to preserve with ease an upright attitude and a straight path. Thousands more have been trained, nurtured, coaxed, bullied into the way of crime by all the forces of parental example and authority combined. Thousands have fallen, less because they had no power of resistance, than because they had no motive to resist; because living among the outcasts and outlaws of society, their conscience had never been awakened; they had been taught to look upon their depredations as hazardous pastimes merely,—as dangerous certainly, but not as wrong."

NOTE (13), p. 143.

I suppose it is still true to say, as was said in the year 1855,—"In the *great majority of our prisons* there is no adequate provision for separate confinement. The untried herd with the convicted; the young with the old; the hardened with the comparatively innocent. The convict finds himself in another and a more advanced and efficient school of crime: his education proceeds; he goes in a raw apprentice; he comes out *passé maître.*"—*Edinburgh Review* for April, 1855, No. 206, p. 386.

NOTE (14), p. 145.

This is well argued in the above-quoted periodical:—"Those acquainted," the writer says, "with the habits, tastes, dispositions, and desires of the criminal classes, are well aware that the *ensemble* of prison regulations (in a prison conducted on reformatory principles) are far from

being matters of enjoyment or attraction to the prisoners themselves. They are benefits, unquestionably; but, as unquestionably, no temptations. It is true they are kept clean; but this very compulsory cleanliness is of itself a nuisance and a penalty to the habitually filthy and the inveterately idle — which criminals generally are. It is true they have a sufficiency of wholesome food; but they are debarred from what they value above everything — luxuries and stimulants. Accustomed for years to place their chief enjoyment in dainties and extravagances, in exciting banquets, in smoking, chewing tobacco, and in drinking, in excess of every feverish and unwholesome sort — they feel severely the confinement to a simple diet and the rigid denial of tobacco and intoxicating liquors. It is true they have their lessons and their schoolmaster; but it is not to men accustomed to the wild reckless life of the social outlaw that schooling can ever be other than intolerably irksome. It is true they have their loom, or their shoe-last, or their tailor's-board in their cell; but they have often their crank too. If labour is enforced it is to the indolent and self-indulgent a severe infliction; if asked for, as it often is, as a solace and a refuge from solitude and oppressive thoughts, it is a measure of the suffering from which it is felt as a relief. The mere system of restraint, the enforced regularity of a prison life, is an hourly penalty to men to whom license of every kind has become a passion and almost a disease; and to be compelled to observe certain hours, to conform to certain rules, to do certain things at fixed times, is, to them, of itself a galling punishment, the hatefulness of which is scarcely conceivable to those brought up in habits of regular industry and unceasing, though perhaps unconscious, self-control. And, lastly, to those with so few becoming tastes and so few mental resources as prisoners generally possess, we can scarcely conceive any severer privation than

that of being entirely debarred from the company of friends and associates, and reduced to a solitude broken only by the occasional visits of a silent turnkey, an exacting schoolmaster, or a possibly grave, ungenial, and hortatory chaplain."—*Edinburgh Review* for October, 1854, No. 204, pp. 574, 575.

NOTE (15), p. 145.

Treatment of Criminal Children. Report of the Society for the Amendment of the Law (London, 1854), p. 16.

SERMON VIII.

NOTE (1), p. 148.

See the *Life and Epistles of St. Paul,* by the Rev. W. J. Conybeare and the Rev. J. S. Howson, vol. i. p. 97.

NOTE (2), p. 148.

As in Rom. i. 1; 1 Cor. i. 1; ix. 1; xv. 8; 2 Cor. i. 1; Gal. i. 15, 16; Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1; &c.

NOTE (3), p. 149.

The familiarity of St. Paul with the writings, or at any rate with the ideas, of Philo, is very clearly shown by Professor Jowett, in the Essay "On St. Paul and Philo," contained in the first volume of his *Epistles of St. Paul,* pp. 336-417.

NOTE (4), p. 150.

"St. Paul, in his way of treating religion, gives a prominence to the exercise of the intellect, and exhibits the characteristic acuteness of his understanding in working out the ideas received by the spiritual sense into distinct conceptions. It was through this talent for reasoning that St. Paul became the author of a precisely defined doctrinal language, and the founder of Theology, as a science, in the Church of Christ." — Olshausen's *Biblical Commentary on the New Testament*, Romans, Introduction, § 2; p. 9, Engl. Tr.

NOTE (5), p. 150.

It has been sometimes argued that St. James supplements St. Paul, by adding to St. Paul's doctrine of faith his doctrine of works. But in reality St. Paul is as clear on the necessity of Christian works as St. James himself. See Locke's *Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul*, and compare Lord Lyttelton's *Considerations upon the Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul*, p. 24, note, and Olshausen on Romans vi. § 10, p. 207 *et seqq.* Eng. Tr.

NOTE (6), p. 154.

Most recent German theologians have argued that St. Paul's conversion was caused almost entirely by psychological changes in the mind of the Apostle himself, dating from the martyrdom of St. Stephen. Even Olshausen, who thinks they have carried the argument too far, so as to "do violence to the text," allows it considerable weight. "It is not to be denied," he says, "that the mind of a Paul, who persecuted the Christians with an honest purpose, but ignorantly, must have been deeply impressed with the joyful faith of a Stephen. In consequence too of his knowledge of the

Scriptures, passages could not fail to occur to him which appeared to confirm the Messiahship of Jesus. In his heart, therefore, there might be a violent struggle, and he might have to fight against the truth forcing itself upon his mind, a state which, although not outwardly apparent, yet internally would prepare the way for the designs of God in reference to him. We may therefore quite properly connect the supposition of internal preparation in the apostle, with the miraculous appearance which Christ made to him."—*Biblical Commentary*, vol. iv. p. 459, Eng. Tr. See, on the other side, Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. i. pp. 81, 82.

Note (7), p. 158.

See Professor Jowett's *Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. i. pp. 231, 232. (1st edition.)

Note (8), p. 159.

"When Paul," says Strauss, "in 1 Cor. xv. places the Christophany which occurred to himself in the same series with the appearances of Jesus in the days after His resurrection, *this authorises* us, so far as nothing else stands in the way of such an inference, to conclude that, for aught the Apostle knew, these earlier appearances were of the same nature with the one experienced by himself. Now, with respect to the latter, as narrated to us in the Acts, it is no longer possible, after the analysis of Eichhorn and Ammon, to maintain it as an external, objective appearance of the real Christ. . . . . If, according to this, we have in the Apostle Paul an example, that strong impressions from the infant Christian community might carry an ardent mind that had long striven against it, to a pitch of exaltation which issued in a Christophany, and a total change of sentiment: surely

the impression of the sublime personality of Jesus would suffice to inspire into his immediate disciples, struggling with the doubts concerning his Messiahship which his death had excited in them, the experience of *similar visions.*"— *Leben Jesu*, § 140; vol. iii. pp. 367, 368, Eng. Tr.

NOTE (9), p. 159.

Professor Jowett's *Epistles of St. Paul*, l. s. c. note.

NOTE (10), p. 160.

The subjoined passage, with which I first met after my Sermon had been preached, expresses very clearly what I feel with regard to the alleged "discrepancies": —

"Now surely the discrepancies commented upon by the author (Olshausen) are merely apparent, and too much has been made of them. The two statements, 'they heard the voice, but saw no man,' and 'they heard nothing, but saw the light,' are by no means opposed to one another; for surely they might see the light and yet see no person, and they might hear the voice so far as the sounds of it were concerned, and yet not hear the words that were addressed to Paul. The two statements combined indicate that they saw the light but not the person of Jesus, that they heard the sound of His voice, but did not catch His words. And as to the other alleged disagreement between the statements, that they fell to the ground and stood speechless, they may be reconciled on the principle that they belong to different instants of time. They might stand speechless for a little, and then fall during the progress of the scene, overcome by their augmenting alarm; or they might fall at first, struck down by the suddenness of the occurrence, and afterwards rise, but only to stand in speechless terror. Or perhaps εἱστήκεισαν in Luke may not refer to the standing posture as

distinguished from prostration, but simply to the fact of their being riveted to the spot as distinguished from advancing on their journey. Even in the case of an uninspired author, a charge of contradiction is not advanced if any plausible method of reconciling two statements can be pointed out; and surely the sacred penmen are entitled, at the very least, to the same rule of judgment." — Translator's note to Olshausen's Comment on Acts, ix. 5–7; *Biblical Commentary*, vol. iv. p. 466, E. T.)

NOTE (10*a*), p. 161.

Professor Jowett, *Epistles of St. Paul*, l. s. c.

NOTE (11), p. 161.

See Lord Lyttelton's *Considerations upon the Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul.* p. 2.

NOTE (12), p. 171.

The chronology of St. Paul's life has been variously arranged; and many points in it rest upon little more than conjecture. But it does not seem to admit of a doubt that a considerable space of time — eight or nine years at the least — intervened between his conversion and his "separation" to the work of a missionary apostle (Acts xiii. 2). Burton makes the interval as much as fourteen years (*Eccles. Hist. of First Three Centuries*, vol. i. pp. 145–147, and compare p. 90); but his scheme places the conversion in the very year of our Lord's ascension — "a date wholly improbable." The weight of modern authority inclines to a period of about eight or nine years, the conversion being placed about A.D. 36 or 37, six years after the ascension, and the "separation" in A.D. 45 — the year succeeding the death of Herod Agrippa. (See Olshausen on Romans, Introduction, § 2; pp. 19, 20,

E. T.; Dean Alford, *Greek Testament*, vol. ii. ch. 1, § 6, pp. 23, 24; Birks' *Horæ Apostolicæ*, ad fin.; and compare Olshausen's Comparative Tables, in his Comment on the Acts; *Biblical Commentary*, vol. iv. pp. 333–337.)

NOTE (13), p. 172.

Ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος. — Arist. *Eth. Nic.* ix. 9. § 10.

SERMON IX.

NOTE (1), p. 176.

Bacon objected to the intrusion of the argument from final causes into *Physics;* and it may be granted, generally, that as we have not faculties capable of comprehending the vast designs of God in his material creation, it is dangerous to use the argument to any great extent in this field of study: although even here it has done good, as well as ill, service to science; as, for instance, when Harvey, from considering the final cause of the valves of the heart, was led to form his great discovery of the circulation of the blood. Recently, it has been sought to raise a prejudice against the argument from final causes altogether; but that argument has been used with good effect in morals by some of our best and safest writers. (See Butler's *Sermons*, Sermon vi. pp. 51–53; Sermon viii. p. 71, &c.; Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 11, §§ 1–4, &c.)

NOTE (2), p. 177.

See the definition of Bishop Pearson:—"Belief in general I define to be an assent to that which is credible, as credible. By the word *assent* is expressed that act or *habit of the understanding*, by which *it* receiveth, acknowledgeth, and embraceth anything as a truth; it being the nature of the soul so to embrace whatsoever appeareth true unto it, and so far as it so appeareth."—*Exposition of the Creed*, Art. i. p. 3.

NOTE (3), p. 178.

Such as desire to see what is here asserted abundantly proved, may be referred to Mr. Mansel's *Bampton Lectures*, where the irrationality of Rationalism is set forth with equal wit and logical power.

NOTE (4), p. 181.

So Aristotle: Χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως.—*De Cœlo*, i. 9, p. 279. And Cicero: "Tempus est pars quædam æternitatis, cum alicujus annui, menstrui, diurni, nocturnive spatii certâ significatione."—*De Invent.* i. 26. And again: "Tempus sine mundi conversione effici non potest."—*De Univ.* p. 200, b.

NOTE (5), p. 181.

Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* v. 69, § 2 (vol. ii. p. 487. Keble's edition).

NOTE (6), p. 181.

Ibid. v. 69, § 1.

NOTE (7), p. 186.

See the *Politics* of Aristotle, book i. ch. 1; where the law of human working is, however, extended without sufficient reason to the operations of Nature, or, in other words, of God in Nature: Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον, οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν, πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀποτέλοιτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις, ἀλλ' ἑνὶ δουλεῦον.

NOTE (8), p. 193.

See Bacon's *Essays*, Essay xliii.: "Young men are fitter to invent than to judge; fitter for execution than for counsel; and fitter for new projects than for settled business: for the experience of age, in things that fall within the compass of it, directeth them; but in new things abuseth them. The errors of young men are the ruin of business; but the errors of aged men amount but to this, that more might have been done, or sooner. Young men, in the conduct and manage of actions, embrace more than they can hold; stir more than they can quiet; fly to the end, without consideration of the means and degrees; pursue some few principles which they have chanced upon absurdly; care not to innovate, which draws unknown inconveniences; use extreme remedies at first; and, that which doubleth all errors, will not acknowledge or retract them, like an unready horse, that will neither stop nor turn. Men of age object too much, consult too long, adventure too little, repent too soon, and seldom drive business home to the full period, but content themselves with a mediocrity of success. Certainly it is good to compound employments of both; for that will be good for the present, because the virtues of either age may correct the defects of both; and good for succession, that young men may be learners, while men in age are actors; and, lastly,

good for external accidents, because authority followeth old men, and favour and popularity youth: but, for the moral part, perhaps, youth will have the pre-eminence, as age hath for the politic."

NOTE (9), p. 197.

This was the plan which the University preferred, and carried into effect by Statute early in 1855. Some dissatisfaction was expressed at the time by a portion of the Dissenters; but the feeling seems to have died away, and the arrangement is thought to work satisfactorily.

THE END.

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